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This dissertation aims to understand the articulation of nationality in postwar 
Japan by looking at literary texts that theorize the nature of the emperor and 
“emperor system” (tennōsei) as a phenomenon specific to the postwar itself. I 
analyze texts that comment on the nature of “disrespect” toward the emperor, and 
in some cases perform that very disrespect, which I argue is ultimately the 
deconstruction of the emperor system itself. The texts under consideration were 
written at two points in time: the immediate postwar (around 1946) and the time 
marked by protests of the renewed U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. I consider 
these points in time as “discursive spaces” that the texts capture by bringing together 
a constellation of images and forces, and that allow for productive cross-reading of 
the texts. 
 Chapter One introduces some of the theoretical premises for the project, and 
emphasizes my focus on the discursive representation of the emperor as opposed to 
the tendency of scholarship to focus on the individual emperor as historical and 
political agent. Chapter Two traces the invention of the postwar emperor system to 
narratives deployed to project the image of a human and sympathetic emperor who 
at once broke with the past and represented absolute continuity with it. Chapter 
Three turns to Nakano Shigeharu’s postwar writings on the emperor that show the 
  ii 
contradictions inherent in the “emperor system” itself as well as the role of media 
and society in reproducing it discursively. The narrator of his text, Goshaku no Saku, 
believes that the only means to liberate the emperor from the emperor system is to 
take the notion of the “human” emperor to its logical conclusion: “elevate” the 
emperor to the status of citizen. Chapter Four argues that Sakaguchi Ango’s postwar 
writing on the emperor leads to very similar conclusions, but frames it as “descent” 
to humanity. Chapter Five considers the context of 1960 in which the postwar 
narrative of the peaceful emperor became challenged by remilitarization and the 
renewed Security Treaty; the image of the emperor was mobilized not to unify 
opposing views, but rend them apart. I argue that Fukazawa Shichirō’s Fūryū Mutan 
depicts this very disunity. However, reaction to the text as event shifted the debate 
from literary representation of the emperor to the ways that the terrorism 
circumvents free speech. In Chapter Six, I argue that Mishima capitalizes on this shift 
and creates a moral equivalence between terrorism and political revolt by defining a 
notion of militaristic glory as the protection of Japanese culture. In the process, he 
designs a theory of emperor system that reproduces a foreign fantasy. Chapter Seven 
argues for the relevance of asking today the same questions raised by the authors.
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1.1  What it’s not 
This project is not about the emperor of Japan. It is rather about how the 
image of the emperor is mobilized and represented for the production of nationality 
in Japan. We have plenty—in fact, too many—books about the emperor in English. 
The problem with these books is that in focusing all their attention on the individual 
emperor—his movements, second-hand accounts of his conversations, his political 
acumen, his internal feelings—they are completely incapable of theorizing the 
“emperor system” (tennōsei) and how it is the production of nationality itself. 
Immersed in the intricate and intimate details of an emperor’s life, the authors of 
these books “embed” themselves into the imperial palace of their fantasy; they lack 
the critical distance needed to recognize that the actual will of the emperor is 
completely irrelevant to the ideology, not to mention that it is remarkably 
unspectacular and boring. And yet, the emperor’s words, actions, and intentions 
become fetishized. Sparing no detail from publication, the authors produce tomes 
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bound to weigh down the backpack of the undergrad eager to study history through 
“facts.”1  
Hirohito’s earliest English-language biography, Hirohito: Emperor of Japan, 
written by Leonard Mosley in 19662, was symptomatic of what was to come. Through 
a journalistic account of the emperor from boyhood to the present, he portrays an 
emperor that was exempted from major decisions during World War II, only to 
heroically exert his executive authority to end the war, thus changing the course of 
history. In doing so, Mosley retroactively fully validates the decision of the postwar 
Occupation powers (and Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, SCAP) not to try the emperor for war crimes at the Tokyo Tribunal. The 
emperor is portrayed as a passive figure during the war, but then an active agent of 
world history by ending it. Prior to Hirohito’s death, only one biography, David 
Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, scrutinized Hirohito’s wartime role, but it 
was roundly dismissed for its critical depiction.3  
Even texts that try to trace the emperor’s complicity in political decision-
making in order to show that he should have been held accountable for war crimes 
                                                 
1 Herbert Bix’s biography of Hirohito is 800 pages; Donald Keene’s biography of 
Emperor Meiji is 922 pages.  
2 Mosley, Leonard. Hirohito: Emperor of Japan. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966.  
3 Harry Harootunian notes how Bergamini’s book committed a type of “scholarly lèse 
majesté” by proclaiming that the emperor actually had a role in the war. This was 
exacerbated by Bergamini connecting the “imperial conspiracy” to American scholars 
at Harvard, who were “subsequently involved in the whitewash” of Hirohito’s 
involvement. Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux-Hirohito and the Making of 
Modern Japan by Herbert P. Bix". Critical Asian Studies. 33, no. 4, 2001, pg. 613.  
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end up bolstering the cult of the individual: they turn the emperor into a historical 
agent. Harry Harootunian, in his review of Herbert Bix’s Hirohito, recognizes this as a 
central failure of the text. He says, “Centering Hirohito as the means to grasping 
Japan’s modern formation, as Bix does, affirms the role played by the emperor and 
reduces the lived history of the nation and the temporality of its modernity to 
‘imperial time.’”4 This gets to a basic premise of my dissertation:  the emperor is not 
an agent in the formation of nationality. We need a model of scholarship that 
decenters the emperor and does not get trapped in this “imperial time.” 
Here are frequently pursued lines of inquiry that take as premise that the 
emperor’s agency matters, but that I will not be asking: Was Hirohito an emperor-
organ theorist during the war? Did he sincerely embrace his role as symbol of a 
democratic order? Was his denial of divinity a non-denial? Was he operating 
politically during or after the war? Did he hope to be restored to a sovereign head of 
state at any point in the postwar? Did Akihito really think that students in high 
schools shouldn’t be forced to stand for the singing of Kimigayo? Are the current 
members of the imperial family liberal at heart? The list could go on and on, but each 
question is irrelevant if what we are trying to get is this: how was (and is) the 
emperor system produced in the postwar?  
The individual emperor is relevant only to the extent that he contributes to 
the production of the discourse of the postwar emperor system, which it to say, 
                                                 
4 Ibid, pg. 616.  
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hardly at all. It is not a question of agency. Assigning historical agency to the emperor 
works to conceal the real power structures that operate in Japan, such as those 
economic, political, and educational institutions, and the military role of the U.S. in 
Japan. Therefore, when I look at the “emperor system,” I want to look at two things: 
one, how the emperor and emperor system are represented in ways that contribute 
to the production of nationality in Japan; and two, how writers have exposed the 
many ways that the emperor system functions to conceal actual power in Japan. In 
other words, how the emperor system is constructed and how it is deconstructed.  
1.2  Figurative decapitation 
What I would really like to do is to interpretively “cut off the head of the 
king,” to take the emperor’s agency out of the equation. In The History of Sexuality, 
Michel Foucault traces the modern development of the European monarchy in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as something that represented itself as law, an 
agency of regulation, prohibition, demarcation, etc. The monarchy, in other words, 
was constructed as system of law.5 However, as Foucault explains, the operation of 
power cannot be explained by reference to law alone. Power is far more complex and 
operates far beyond the unilateral domination and repression by the state. (In the 
text Foucault traces the way that power also operates external to the state and its 
apparatus onto bodies by controlling sexuality). However, because the monarchy 
represents itself as law, it is nearly impossible to think of power outside of that 
                                                 
5 Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, pg. 87.  
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framework. Law is the “code according to which power presents itself and prescribes 
that we conceive of it.”6 Therefore, it is also what conceals the actual operation of 
power: “The history of the monarchy went hand in hand with the covering up of the 
facts and procedures of power by juridico-political discourse.” This is to say that, 
because the power of the monarchy is primarily represented through legal discourse, 
the ways that power operates outside of this model are difficult—if not impossible—
to represent. We have been trapped within a mode of representation that compels 
us to conceive of power in terms of law and the agency of the sovereign even though 
new modes for representing power have emerged. Foucault says,  
At bottom, despite the difference in epochs and objectives, the 
representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In 
political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. 
Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right 
and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and 
sovereignty.7  
Foucault’s understanding of monarchy in Europe, which arose in concurrence with 
law, and which was represented in and through law, is precisely how monarchy and 
law formed in Japan during the Meiji Era (1968-1912). For the first time in Japan, the 
emperor was represented as sovereign, as the practical subject or agent of change, a 
                                                 
6 Ibid, pg. 88.  
7 Ibid, pg. 88-89. (My italics).  
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source of power codified into law. During the postwar, however, the monarchy was 
disconnected from any notion of “sovereignty,” but nevertheless was inscribed into 
the postwar Constitution; the emperor was made into a symbol. And yet, we still 
have not cut off the head of the emperor. Scholarship still treats the emperor as a 
historical agent.8  
 The alternative—the method for cutting of the king’s head—is to perform the 
type of discourse analysis that we find in Foucault, the incredibly ambitious project of 
exhaustively reading the literature of more discreet arenas of power’s operation. This 
is not my project; it would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 What this project does, instead, is look at writers whose approach to the 
emperor system takes a close look at how the emperor of the postwar, Hirohito, was 
represented in the discursive space of the given moment. Nakano Shigeharu (Chapter 
Three) and Sakaguchi Ango (Chapter Four) attempt to seize on the opportunity of the 
fall of the Japanese Empire to represent the humanity of the emperor by severing 
him from the very the institution that keeps him captive, the “emperor system.” 
Depicting Hirohito as human and nothing more is, I believe, a step toward “cutting 
the head off the king.” I argue that it is a more nuanced form of critique than, for 
example, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) could perform in its advocacy of 
                                                 
8 For Foucault, to “cut off the head of the king” means to analyze power beyond the 
framework of the state and its law, which includes the authority of the king. Thinking 
beyond the agency of the emperor alone is insufficient. However, it is a first step, 
especially as the emperor of the postwar is defined to represent the sovereignty of 
the people.  
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“abolishing the emperor system” (tennōsei haishi) because the JCP assumed that the 
emperor of the postwar remained an agent of power as the nations wealthiest 
landlord. Fukazawa Shichirō (Chapter Five) too, who depicts a literal decapitation of 
the imperial family in the text I discuss, subverts the very centrality of state, law, and 
king in his presentation. Mishima Yukio (Chapter Six), on the other hand, very 
consciously and intentionally constructs a version of “emperor system ideology” that 
attempts to re-center the emperor as the “creative agent” of Japanese culture, a 
move that conceals actual state power by depoliticizing its representation altogether. 
However, in that very act, Mishima discloses how the representation of the 
emperor—a trivial figure of weekly gossip magazines—undermines any such notion.  
1.3  Discursive spaces 
 I primarily look at texts written at two points of time: the immediate postwar 
(around 1946) and the time marked by protests of the renewed U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty in 1960. In choosing two points in time, I am explicitly not attempting to write 
a genealogy of the representation of the emperor; I rather want to capture a 
snapshot of each moment by looking at how a constellation of elements and forces 
combine and make way for the texts under consideration. I characterize these 
moments as “discursive spaces” in which I can put into dialogue the authors and 
texts, to read between and across them. My use of “discursive space” comes from 
two sources: Etō Jun’s book The Closed Linguistic/Discursive Space: Occupation 
Censorship and Post-war Japan (tozasareta gengo kūkan—senryōgun no kenetsu to 
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sengo nihon)9 and Karatani Kōjin’s essay “The Discursive Space of Modern Japan: 
1970 = Shōwa 45” (kindai nihon no gensetsu kūkan. 1970 = shōwa 45)10.  
To Etō Jun, the linguistic/discursive space (gengo kūkan) of the postwar 
period was “closed” due to the oppressive censorship policies of the Occupation. I 
want to adopt his notion of “discursive space” while disputing Etō’s claim by 
demonstrating what stinging and subversive critique was possible within that very 
space. Exhibit A for my claim is the postwar writing of Nakano; Exhibit B is that of 
Sakaguchi. This is not to apologize or even minimize the anti-democratic nature of 
the Occupation, but to make the case that, in line with Foucault’s teaching, we 
cannot analyze power as simply the representation of the authority of the state (or 
occupying power as it were). As I will discuss, the ability to represent the emperor in 
the discursive space of the early 1960s becomes much more “closed off” than in 
1946.  
On the other hand, Karatani’s notion of “discursive space” (gensetsu kūkan) 
gets closer to my understanding; he measures points in time and does not reproduce 
a flat, chronological genealogy when conceiving of history. Instead, he attempts to 
                                                 
9 Etō, Jun.  ozasareta gengo kūkan  senryōgun no kenetsu to sengo nihon. Tokyo: 
Bungei Shunj , 1989. Translation: Etō Jun.  The Sealed Linguistic Space: The 
Occupation Censorship and Post-war Japan," trans. Jay Rubin, part 1, Hikaku Bungaku 
Zasshi, 2, 1984, pg. 1-42; part 2, Hikaku Bungaku Zasshi, 3, 1988, pg. 1-23. 
10 In Karatani, Kōjin. Rekishi to hanpuku. Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten,  004. Translation of 
the essay: Karatani, Kōjin. Seiji Lippit, trans.  The Discursive Space of Modern Japan.  
Japan in the World,  ed. Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993, pg. 288-315. 
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capture each moment through a convergence or constellation of historical, literary, 
and cultural events that indicate for him a repetition or recurrence of history. He 
maps these historical recurrences directly onto the era names corresponding to the 
period of reign of the Meiji and Shōwa Emperors. In his model, he finds direct 
parallels between the era dates (nengō) of the two periods, such that, for example, 
the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution (Meiji 22) roughly corresponded the 
promulgation of the postwar Constititution (Shōwa  1), and the suicide of Nogi 
Maresuke (Meiji 45) corresponds to the suicide of Mishima Yukio (Shōwa 45). He 
finds seven such historical recurrences.  
What is troubling about Karatani’s “discursive space” is that to draw his 
historical parallels, he choses a temporality that reproduces imperial time: he 
restores the time of the emperor. (His model also ignores the Taishō Era, a common 
tactic of imperial histories). I am being a little unfair; he does this to show the 
importance of thinking in terms of relational structures and demonstrate the very 
arbitrariness of the Christian calendar and all forms of periodization. His intention is 
to “make explicit the fact that each nation’s ‘era/world’ is only a communal, illusory 
space, and that a plurality of worlds (eras/worlds) exist simultaneously, maintaining 
relations with one another.”11 Yet, can we not think of other temporalities that blast 
out of both imperial time and Christian time? In Chapter Five, I argue that Fukazawa 
articulates one way, but in Chapter Six, I argue that Mishima’s notion of continuity 
                                                 
11 Karatani, 1993, pg. 290.  
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(imperial time) is perfectly corrupt. This leads me to one more issue with Karatani’s 
“discursive space”: while critical of Mishima, Karatani re-centers him in Shōwa 
history, as its end. Isn’t it about time that we interpretively cut off Mishima’s head 
too?  
Thus, in borrowing the terminology of “discursive space” from both Etō Jun 
and Karatani Kōjin, I both acknowledge my indebtedness to them, and take the 
opportunity to push back against their models and imagine something different. 
Incidentally, one of the texts that helped me formulate my thoughts on the emperor 
and “disrespect,” Watanabe Naomi’s Introduction to the Literature of “Disrespect” 
(Fukei bungakuron josetsu)12, adopts Karatani’s model wholeheartedly. Just like for 
Karatani, the “disrespectful” representation of the emperor—and the suppression of 
it—witnessed similar historical recurrences between Meiji and Shōwa. While his 
analysis is fascinating, I do not find the calendric coincidences between periods 
particularly illuminating. Watanabe’s text’s major contribution to my thinking for this 
dissertation is how he traces the shift from the prewar and wartime form of 
“disrespect” codified into the criminal code since the Meiji period as lèse majesté 
(fukeizai) to the postwar manifestation of it, mere “disrespect” (fukei). The juridical 
form of “disrespect,” the form regulated by the state until the end of World War II, 
turned into something that could only be regulated outside of the state apparatus. 
Returning to Foucault once more, disrespect (fukei) of the emperor in the postwar—
                                                 
12 Watanabe, Naomi. Fukei bungakuron josetsu. Hihyō K kan Sōsho, 17. Tōkyō:  ta 
Shuppan, 1999.  
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and the suppression of this disrespect—provides us with yet another opportunity to 
“cut the head off the king,” and to draw attention to the ways the power itself can be 
represented without reference to the law.  
1.4 Temporality 
In my dissertation, I conceive of temporality not in terms of continuity and 
tradition, of the inheritance of the past, but rather interruption, discontinuity and the 
smashing of tradition itself. Walter Benjamin, in his famous essay “The Work of Art in 
the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,”13 reveals the importance of historical 
continuity for the idea of tradition, and what new forms of technology do to 
undermine a durational identity of an object. Tradition points to that which endures 
uniquely without change through time, is transmitted through time by historical 
testimony, and endows the object with a historical authenticity or authority. 
However, for an object, all of this is jeopardized by its technological reproduction: 
What withers in the age of the technological reproducibility of the work of art 
is the latter’s aura. This process is symptomatic; its significance extends far 
beyond the realm of art. It might be stated as a general formula that the 
technology of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of 
tradition. By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass 
existence for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to reach 
                                                 
13 Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility." 




the recipient in his or her own situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced. 
These two processes lead to a massive upheaval in the domain of objects 
handed down from the past—a shattering of tradition which is the reverse 
side of the present crisis and renewal of humanity.14 
To me, Benjamin is not expressing an aesthetic preference for the temporality of 
interruption over that of continuity: he is being descriptive and analytical. 
Technological reproduction has not merely brought the same object closer: it has 
changed the object itself. The aura, which Benjamin defines as the apparition of a 
distance, is destroyed because of society’s desire to “get closer” to things. 
Temporally, the transmission, or handing down, from the past is met with a sharp 
interruption; historical continuity can no longer be explained through the durational 
identity of a unique object. This has profound implications for the field of perception 
because the object is no longer viewed as unique. Benjamin’s analysis goes beyond 
interpretations of societal phenomena for the sake of political means; rather, he is 
developing a theory of perception and cognition in which the way the world is seen 
and understood has undergone radical change through processes unique to 
modernity. The mode of production has changed our perception and cognition of 
objects, which in turn fundamentally changes the objects themselves.  
 It is my conviction that as the modes for representing the emperor changed 
throughout the twentieth century, so too did the emperor. I do not necessarily agree 
                                                 
14 Ibid, pg. 104. (My italics). 
13 
 
with Benjamin that this necessarily entails a shattering of the aura; we must also ask 
how the hyper-visible makes the invisible all the more enticing. However, the 
endurance of an object through time requires that the modes of perception and 
representation also remain fixed. In the absence of this, the object cannot endure. 
(To me, perception is fundamentally tied to existence). Therefore, as the ways 
perception and understanding change with new forms of technology and 
representation—our frame for viewing the world—the object too must change. This 
is true whether the “object” is the emperor or the work of art.15 To this extent, it is 
incredibly important to track transformations in the public representation of the 
emperor, whether in academic discourse or mass media. All of the texts I analyze 
track these changes to a degree. The end of the war, too, brought about a change in 
perception that fundamentally reconstituted perception of the emperor, and 
Sakaguchi traces this most persuasively. Moreover, just as the emperor does not 
endure as an identical object through time, I want to understand the “emperor 
system”—as the representation of the emperor for the production of nationality—




                                                 
15 I believe this is also a reason why philosophers like Watsuji must deny that the 
emperor is objectifiable; he must instead be an active/practical subject (shutai) so as 
not to be susceptible to change.  
14 
 
1.5 Influences  
 This project came together as an attempt to respond to a number of 
challenges posed by scholars whose work drew me to the topic. For example, in a 
zadankai (“dialogue”) with Naoki Sakai, Harry Harootunian says, “When I was a 
student (and I was a product of a Japan studies program in an American university) 
one of the things I discovered… was that in the various courses in Japan studies, the 
status of the emperor was never problematized.”16 Thus, I wanted to problematize 
the status of the emperor and the “emperor system”; it turns out that it is still in 
need of much scrutiny. From Naoki Sakai, I learned the necessity of “deconstructing 
nationality” and finding ways to demonstrate how “’nationality’ is continually 
deconstructing itself”17 and much more. One way I’ve learned to deconstruct 
nationality from him is to recognize the United States role in the production of 
nationality in Japan, and to give recognition to how the postwar emperor system is 
truly a U.S. invention. Tak Fujitani’s analysis of the invention of the optics of the Meiji 
Emperor was also central to my thinking on how the emperor system was reinvented 
in the postwar. My dissertation is an attempt to do precisely that. Brett de Bary’s 
already close and sensitive readings of Nakano Shigeharu and Sakaguchi Ango drew 
me back again and again to the texts, and she helped me discover how fruitful their 
writings could be for tackling many of these challenges. I’ve learned from all of the 
                                                 
16 Harootunian, Harry and Naoki Sakai. "Dialogue: Japan Studies and Cultural 
Studies.” Positions, Fall 1999 7(2), pg. 593-64.  
17 Sakai, Naoki. “Nationality and the ‘Mother Tongue.’” Deconstructing Nationality. 
ed. Brett de Bary. Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 2005, pg. 33.  
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scholars above of the role of Japan studies in the U.S. in reproducing and 
perpetuating many of the problems identified above, and their writings and methods 
of teaching are models for how the field can be productively reconfigured and 
practiced. Therefore, my project has these scholars and their writings in mind 
throughout, and is but one attempt to develop these ideas together.  
1.6 Chapter summaries 
In the next chapter, Chapter Two, I explain how the emperor system was 
fundamentally restructured and reinvented with Japan’s defeat in World War II. 
Unlike the official ideology suggested, the emperor system was not “retained” or 
“preserved,” as this assumes that the postwar system was related to what had come 
before. The language of its invention, however, was in fact premised on connection 
with the past, but only to give the illusion of continuity. This required a leap back in 
time, an erasure of the early Shōwa period, the Taishō period, and most of the Meiji 
period, and in some cases, all of it. I attempt to show that the postwar narrative of 
the new emperor system also reconfigured its articulation of the emperor’s duality, 
the “king’s two bodies.” I trace the debates within the Diet over the fate of Japanese 
“national body” (kokutai) within the new postwar Constitution in order to show the 
centrality of “respect” or “reverence” for the discourse of the continuous emperor 
system. This sets up my discussion in the subsequent chapters of how the opposite, 
disrespect of the emperor, was represented during the postwar period.  
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In Chapter Three, I argue that Nakano Shigeharu, in his Goshaku no Sake and 
other essays, performs a discursive analysis of the emperor system by understanding 
how it is represented by the government, the media, and even those critical of the 
emperor. Despite that the postwar emperor system was a complete invention of the 
Occupation that was then realized through cooperation with the Japanese 
government and beyond, its strength was its ability to portray itself as continuous 
with the past, to give the illusion of continuity. The narrator of Goshaku no Sake 
demonstrates that the inability of the Communist Party and others to recognize that 
the emperor system of pre-defeat had been destroyed resulted in misguided critique; 
in fact, by critiquing an emperor system as if it were continuous with the past, they 
could not abolish it, but only reproduce it. The narrator’s solution is to take the 
emperor at his word, and radically recognize him as human, to sympathize with him 
as human and nothing more. This means to strip him of his symbolic function and to 
extricate—indeed, liberate—him from the “emperor system.” It is also to subject the 
emperor to scrutiny as someone responsible for war, as a puppeteer during the war 
and a puppet afterward. Moreover, the text theorizes the nature of “disrespect,” and 
I conclude that its articulation of disrespect can only be that which threatens the 
symbolic order.  
Chapter Four begins with a comparison of Nakano Shigeharu’s and Sakaguchi 
Ango’s conception of the emperor system. The themes and manner of critique in 
Goshaku no Sake resonate with Sakaguchi’s “Words Humbly Dedicated to the 
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Emperor” in two ways especially: they both strip the emperor of any symbolic value 
by treating him like a human, and both demonstrate how the understanding of the 
emperor is mediated by his public representation. Sakaguchi’s essay theorizes the 
nature of “disrespect” as originating in the act of constructing false systems and 
values itself. He further deconstructs the grounds for legitimating the symbolic 
emperor system when he compares the emperor to celebrities; “affection” for the 
emperor is as historically contingent and mutable as “affection” for celebrities. In the 
second half of Chapter Four, I analyze Sakaguchi’s much more famous Darakuron. In 
that text’s exploration of the fundamental human nature to respond to urges and 
desire, it shows the very constructed nature and inhumanity of moral systems—
especially the emperor system—that portray people as somehow above those urges 
and as virtuous. I make the case for understanding daraku not as depravity or 
immorality, but deconstruction itself.   
In Chapter Five, I first trace the shift in the representation of the emperor 
beyond the postwar period as the effort to remilitarize Japan provides challenges to 
sustaining the image of a democratic and pacifist emperor. By 1960, Japan has 
entered into a new discursive space. The emperor is mobilized for competing views, 
but in a way that promotes divisiveness, not reconciliation. For this reason, I suggest 
that the practical ramification of this is that the emperor becomes the symbol of 
disunity. I then analyze Fukazawa Shichirō’s controversial story, Fūryū Mutan, which I 
argue captures and problematizes the constellation of events and images of the time 
18 
 
by scrambling them up in the space of a dream. The subversive power of this text is 
its violation of the rules of proper decorum and of proper representation, which I 
characterize as a true literary performance of daraku as Sakaguchi understood it, a 
stripping away of morals. I argue that Fukazawa establishes a taboo-free zone that 
allows readers to cathartically transgress what is deemed sacred. I analyze the critical 
response to the text, and especially that of Nakano Shigeharu, for the ways the 
response connects and implicates Fukazawa in the Right-wing terrorism that came 
after the story’s publication. I reject this, and argue that a discursive shift from 
literary representation of the emperor to the question of terrorism is paralleled by 
literary representation of terrorism in the name of the emperor.  
In Chapter Six, I argue that in juxtaposing the coups d’etat of the 1930s and 
Right-wing terrorism of 1960, Mishima establishes a moral equivalence between the 
two. In doing this, he legitimates terrorism in the name of “culture,” effectively 
erasing history and politics. I argue that this constitutes a backhanded yet active 
disruption in the discourse on the freedom of speech of the 1960s. I take a detour to 
explain Kita Ikki’s attack on the theory of kokutai and his demystified conception of a 
political emperor. These theories were important for the coup of February 26, 1936, 
and I argue that because the coup was so central to Mishima’s theory of the emperor 
system, Kita’s thought can be productively deployed to dismantle Mishima’s theory. 
Moreover, as “internal critique” to the emperor system, Mishima’s text can be read 
as a lucid and articulate attack on the emperor system itself. I conclude that what his 
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text discloses, in its anxiety to find one shred of evidence that makes Japan’s 
emperor system different from other nationalities elsewhere, is that in fact it has 
nothing particular about it at all. I follow this with a brief discussion of Mishima’s 
Orientalism within his essay, “On the Defense of Culture.” He formulates a 
philosophy of Japanese culture that strictly adheres to a foreign fantasy of what it 
should be. As I argue throughout the chapter, “culture” for Mishima means one 
thing: bushido.  
I conclude by connecting these texts to the present moment and showing that 
many of the critiques and questions raised of the emperor system are still equally as 




CHAPTER TWO:  
THE RESTRUCTURED EMPEROR SYSTEM OF POSTWAR JAPAN  
 
Japan’s Two Bodies: The “National Body” Amidst War Defeat 
2.1  The embodied voice speaks 
In the highly dramatic announcement on August 15th 1945 that Japan had 
surrendered to Allies forces to end World War II, known as the Jewel-Voice Broadcast 
(gyokuon hōsō), the voice of Hirohito, the Showa Emperor, could be heard for the 
first time by his subjects over broadcast radio as he explained that Japan had 
accepted the terms of the Potsdam Agreement.  “Should we continue to fight,” he 
said in highly elevated and stilted language barely recognizable to the ordinary 
citizen, “it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the 
Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.” 
The war, however, was not completely fought in vain: “We have resolved to pave the 
way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable 
and suffering what is insufferable.” It was no less than a devastatingly tragic irony of 
waiting only until after Japan had been firebombed and atomically bombed into near 
oblivion—that they have suffered the insufferable—to spare Japan from “ultimate 
collapse and obliteration.” And somewhat of an about-face for an ideology that 
gloried the entire population dying together as brave soldiers with the slogan ichioku 
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gyokusai, the “shattering of one hundred million jewels,” before defeat would be 
accepted. It does raise an important question for conceiving Japan’s identity moving 
forward: what is lost and what is preserved when a nation undergoes defeat in war?  
At the conclusion of this surrender speech, Hirohito provided his 
interpretation. The official translation reads, “Having been able to safeguard and 
maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and 
loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.”18 The “structure of the 
Imperial State” is in fact a translation of the term kokutai, made up of the characters 
for “nation” and “body,” and the emperor intended to point to Japan’s particular 
emperor-centered conception of state in which a supposed unbroken line of 
emperors descended from the gods who created the islands that make up Japan. 
However, the notion that Japan’s kokutai had been preserved was far from self-
apparent, as the fate of the emperor, Japan’s constitution, and its political system 
would soon be in the hands of the Occupation under Douglas MacArthur. Clearly, at a 
time when Japan’s fate and identity could not have been more fraught and perilous, 
it was necessary to insist that amidst the heartache and rubble, one thing remained: 
the essence of Japan, the kokutai.  
Conservative historians in Japan today claim that this preservation of the 
kokutai (kokutai goji) was actually the key condition for Japan’s acceptance of 
                                                 
18 Hirohito. “Imperial Rescript on Surrender (Gyokuon Hōsō).”  The World and Japan  




surrender, asserting that there was no such thing as an “unconditional surrender” 
(mujōken kōfuku) as is widely believed. Indeed, the Japanese government had 
communicated that they would accept the Potsdam Declaration “with the 
understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which 
prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”19 However, the U.S. 
accepted Japan’s surrender and responded to their qualification by rejecting it: 
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese 
government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the 
surrender terms.”20 There is no further evidence to suggest that the emperor would 
be guaranteed a role in the makeup of postwar Japan—this argument can only be 
made retrospectively because the emperor was given a role in the end. What such an 
argument exposes, though, is that preserving the ideology of the emperor system 
toward the end of World War II was far more important to the government than 
sparing lives of the people of Japan, not to mention the imperial subjects left behind 
in Japan’s colonies. The reluctance to surrender until August of 1945 had little to do 
with the acknowledgement at the upper levels of government that Japan could not 
possibly emerge victorious from the war; the outcome had been obvious for months. 
Rather, it was based on hopes for a resolution to war in which the emperor—and the 
sanctity of the imperial institution—would escape unscathed. The notion that it did is 
                                                 
19 Moore, Ray and D. Robinson, ed. “The Constitution of Japan” [CD-ROM]. University 
of Princeton Press: Princeton, 1998, index number RM025.TEXT2.P2 
20 Ibid, index number RM026.TEXT2.P2.   
23 
 
a complete fantasy.  
Hirohiro’s surrender speech—his “Imperial Rescript on Surrender”—may have 
proclaimed that the kokutai had been preserved and that the nation would continue 
on as a unified family. I believe that the very claim that the kokutai had been 
preserved betrayed the fact that it had been shattered; this is what had been waged 
and lost in war. I see the surrender speech as the first performance of what would 
become the postwar emperor system, a radically different form of “emperor system” 
than had existed during the war or prior to it. The performance made the body of the 
emperor manifest, presenting it before the nation in the most tangible and piercing 
way possible, through simultaneous broadcast throughout the nation for the first 
time of the emperor’s nikusei, his natural voice (more literally, “embodied voice”). 
Perhaps the emperor was brought before the nation in order to convince it that 
Japan had indeed lost the war, and because it was thought that only the emperor 
could initiate the long process of healing. Or perhaps it was meant to uphold the 
illusion that the emperor had retained his authority all along, that the emperor could 
now take credit for saving Japan, after all.  Yet, this mobilization of the body of the 
emperor, the embodied voice, marked the discursive shift toward representing the 
emperor as primarily human, as sympathetic and pitiable.  
This was by no means denial that the emperor was a “living god” 
(arahitogami), a god made manifest in human form. But the human emperor of the 
Imperial Rescript on Surrender bore little resemblance to the human emperor 
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represented prior to Japan’s defeat, the military leader on horseback. Therefore, the 
emperor’s performance—the final act of war and first act of peace—already 
demonstrated an intention to radically restructure what constituted Japan and the 
emperor’s role in it. Kokutai in the postwar could not possibly be represented as it 
had before. I am contesting the notion that any essence of kokutai can exist outside 
its representation, especially if we are to understand kokutai as a form of nationality 
that merely portrays itself as particular and unique to Japan. It is a discursively 
constructed concept that must be historicized and shown to be contingent.  
This claim—that Japan’s kokutai remained unchanged—was in fact made 
repeatedly over the course of modern Japanese history as it moved from feudal to 
capitalist to imperialist state: during the Meiji Restoration of 1868, with the writing 
and promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution, 
1889), and during the 1930’s effort to “Clarify the Kokutai,” to name a few.  
In these moments, as well as the postwar understanding of the new status of 
the emperor, a pattern emerges in which dualities become a primary mode for 
thinking of both nation and emperor. These dualities, such as finite and 
transcendent, particular and universal, legal and cultural, form and essence, human 
and god, modern and ancient allowed thinkers to manipulate definitions of Japan 
(and its kokutai)—often claiming that only one aspect of the duality had been 
altered—such that a fundamental essence was never at threat.  
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With the intervention of U.S. Occupation of Japan from 1945, these 
dualities—which I’ll frame in terms of the multiple bodies of both nation and 
emperor—were fundamentally restructured so as to give the illusion of continuity. 
Yet, this did not mean that Japan’s postwar was to be continuous with Japan’s 
immediate past as aggressor in Asia. Rather, skipping a generation back in time, the 
postwar was to be continuous with the early Meiji period (1868-1912).  
2.2  Emperor System as Duality 
I’d like to briefly reflect on the nature of these dualities with reference to 
Ernst Kantorowicz’s highly influential text written in 1957,  he King’s  wo Bodies  A 
Study in Mediaeval Political Theology.21 Beginning by looking at the legal writings of 
English crown jurists, Kantorowicz traces a genealogy of the theory of kingship that 
attempts to resolve issues of mortality, impermanence, succession, and the relation 
of king and subject. The king has two bodies—the Body natural and the Body 
politic—and these bodies form an indivisible unit. Kantorowicz quotes in his text that 
“The Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all 
Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident, to the Imbecility of Infancy or Old Age, 
and to the like Defects that happen to the natural Bodies of other People.” Hence, 
this Body natural is mortal, finite, and prone to mistakes and defects. He is mutable 
and exists in time. On the other hand, to quote again, “The Body politic is a Body that 
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cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy Government, and constituted for the 
Direction of the People, and the Management of the public weal, and this Body is 
utterly void of Infancy, and old Age, and other natural Defects and Imbecilities.” This 
body represents the “Immutable with Time.” The Body natural was certainly 
subordinate to the Body politic in this scheme, but was still augmented, or made 
more perfect and immune from attack, precisely because of the Body politic and the 
inseparability of the two.  
I am by no means the first to discuss  he King’s  wo Bodies in relation to the 
Japanese emperor. However, the tendency is to apply it very ahistorically to make 
assertions about Japan’s emperor valid from antiquity to the present. Following 
scholar Takashi Fujitani, my reason for invoking  he King’s  wo Bodies is not to 
suggest a universal theory of kingship that includes the Japanese emperor, but rather 
as a way to think through the dualistic ways that the emperor was represented 
specifically since Japan’s modernity. In a section of his book Splendid Monarchy22 
titled “The Emperor’s Two Bodies,” Fujitani discusses the writings of Suematsu 
Kenchō who, after studying at Cambridge University in 1881, theorized the Japanese 
emperor as having a duality with similarities to English notion of the “king’s two 
bodies.” He also remarks on Origuchi Shinobu’s discussion of the imperial accession 
ceremony, Daijōsai, in which the “imperial spirit” entered a new emperor through 
the process of a Shinto ritual. For Fujitani’s analysis, it is critical that neither 
                                                 
22 Fujitani, T. Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 1998.  
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Suematsu nor Origuchi were objectively describing the dual nature of Japan’s 
emperor that existed throughout time, but rather contributing to the essentially 
modern production of the emperor’s duality. To quote Fujitani, “I want to remember 
and problematize the fabrication of the particularly modern binaries that centered on 
the monarchy as part of a critique of the modern imperial institution and the modern 
nation-state.”23  
My objectives are very much in line with Fujitani’s statement. Yet, I deal with 
the aporetic circumstances that produced representation of a dualistic emperor in 
the postwar (a human that is still considered holy as well as a symbol of peace and 
democracy). Fujitani’s analysis focuses on the construction of the Meiji state and 
emperor, and the dual representations of the emperor as transcendent god on one 
hand and modern military leader and political sovereign on the other. Fujitani 
brilliantly shows how the invention of modern mnemonic sites, rituals, and costumes 
very carefully crafted the dual image of the Meiji emperor as ancient Shinto priest as 
well as military leader and sovereign. This duality was literally built into the 
geographic landscape with Japan’s two capital cities of Tokyo (the newer, modern 
capital where government affairs took place) and Kyoto (symbolizing antiquity and 
timelessness). The governing elites took great lengths to cultivate the transcendent 
emperor who stays hidden from public view as he performs Shintō rites, while 
emphasizing the human side of the military commander immersed in society. To 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 159 
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quote, “Emperor Meiji was thus emperorship as well as emperor, mystical but 
palpable, transcending and yet directing, divine but human, and exempt from all 
human failings but responsible for all national accomplishments.”24  
With Japan’s defeat in 1945, the dualities of emperor established during Meiji 
faced major restructuring. After much deliberation and planning, most of which 
happened well before Japan ever surrendered, MacArthur made the executive 
decision to spare the emperor from any wartime responsibility whether through 
inclusion in the war tribunal or abdication. The Occupation officials believed, highly 
paternalistically, that Japanese people were so attached to their emperor that the 
nation would have crumbled without such a unifying leader, no matter what his role 
in the atrocities for which other military leaders were blamed, and that retaining the 
emperor as pacifist would serve U.S.’s strategic interests, even dominance, in Asia 
affairs.  
Even if MacArthur wanted to retain the imperial institution, it still leaves open 
the question, “Why this Emperor? Why Hirohito?” After all, Hirohito was 
blemished—he would forever be the face of Japan’s most militarized and aggressive 
past, even given all swift and sustained efforts to write a new narrative for him, 
performed through a coordinated effort by the Occupation, the government, and the 
emperor himself, as well as the discursive nexus that reproduced that narrative. 
Kantorowicz notes that during the English Civil War (1642-51), the fiction of the 
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“king’s two bodies” provided jurists with the means to essentially pit King Charles I 
against King Charles I, where, Parliament could, “in the name and by the authority of 
Charles I, King body politic,” mobilize “the armies which were to fight the same 
Charles I, king body natural.”25 Theoretically then, the continuity of the king’s body 
politic (the eternal and immutable body of the king) allows for the removal of any 
king in his human, mortal form. Thus, Kantorowicz notes, the Puritans cried out, “We 
fight the king to defend the King.”26 This is precisely what one young Japanese 
politician, Nakasone Yasuhiro, advocated in 1952 when he recommended that the 
emperor abdicate so that “the crown prince [could] become emperor” and “the 
moral foundation of the monarchy firmed up and made eternal.”27 
Perhaps it was MacArthur’s lack of imagination, or just failure to distinguish 
the emperorship from the emperor of Hirohito himself—in other words, the failure 
to imagine that the emperor as Body politic was greater and more robust than the 
Body natural of Hirohito—that led to his insistence that he remain emperor, despite 
calls from within the imperial family that Hirohito abdicate.28 If MacArthur’s objective 
                                                 
25 KTB, 21 
26 KTB, 18 
27 Bix, Herbert P. "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan." JPRI Occasional Paper 
No. 17, September 2000. University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim. 
[http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op17.html] 
Nakasone was not the only politician to call for the abdication of Hirohito.  
28 Watanabe Osamu. “The Emperor as ‘Symbol’ in Postwar Japan.” Acta Asiatica, no. 
59, October 1990, pg. 105. Watanabe says that in the immediate postwar, “Konoe 
and other members including Imperial Princes Takamatsu and Higashikuni tried to 
save the emperor system by persuading the emperor to abdicate as the only way for 
him to escape responsibility for war.”  
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was the stability of the imperial house and institution, then he could have looked 
back only twenty years, at the death of Taishō Emperor, who was removed from his 
former role because he was deemed mentally ill and unfit to reign by the time of his 
death. Is this not precedent for how an infirmed and defective body natural was 
replaceable and did not threaten the emperorship, the Body politic? We can only 
speculate futilely whether, counter to MacArthur’s scheme, retaining Hirohito—a 
potential war criminal—on the throne did more damage to the imperial house than it 
did good. It certainly has been a key element in Japan’s postwar inability to reconcile 
with its past.  
At best, retaining Hirohito the man created issues of continuity nearly 
impossible to sustain through logic. However, the emperor, the Diet, and the 
Occupation devoted much energy to giving the illusion of continuity by severing the 
image of the wartime Hirohito from the postwar Hirohito, in essence giving him a 
new body. Postwar Japan, too, required a completely new body—a completely new 
kokutai—to overcome the logic of interruption, revolution, and utter loss of identity. 
It is this sleight of hand, this intentional deception, that I believe constitutes a rather 
mystical transference of identity for Japan and its emperor. Both instances involved a 
strict disavowal of the immediate past and complete affirmation of Meiji (both Meiji 
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the emperor, 1852-1912, and the Meiji Period that marks his reign, 1868-1912), such 
that Meiji represented Japan not at a modern juncture, but Japan as eternity.29  
The immediate tasks for the Occupied Powers of postwar Japan were to 
separate Shinto from the state, fearing its potential for rousing ultranationalism, to 
restructure Japan’s political system from a constitutional monarchy into a 
democracy, to retain the emperor as a symbol of national unity, and all the while to 
give the impression that all of this was done organically by the Japanese people. For 
example, while a team of young international scholars drafted Japan’s pacifist 
postwar constitution, this was done in secret. Likewise, despite rather sweeping 
censorship policies and practices, publishing that the Occupation engaged in 
censorship violated the terms of what was publishable. Moreover, although the 
conviction of MacArthur and his advisors that the emperor was indispensable for 
bringing unity to a defeated Japan, polls seemed to indicate quite the contrary—that 
the emperor was of little concern to a nation starving and struggling to find shelter.30 
                                                 
29 Of course, the ideology was not internally consistent, and despite especially 
Hirohito’s nostalgic affiliation with his grandpa Meiji, others such as Watsuji Tetsurō, 
who I will discuss below, sought to eradicate the Meiji Era—and  political emperor—
from history altogether.  
30 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, 1999, 304. 
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Therefore, in the face of indifference to the emperor, the Occupation had to in effect 
make him visible, make him needed.31 
2.3  The Man, the Myth, the… Broom? 
Hirohito’s “Declaration of Humanity” (Ningen Sengen), delivered on January 
1st 1946 drafted by American advisors but thoroughly revised by Hirohito himself and 
aides, aimed to irreversibly sever Shinto myths from the emperorship. Importantly, 
he proclaimed, “The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual 
trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not 
predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese 
people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.” John Dower 
describes how the emperor did not actually reject his divinity, manipulating the 
Japanese version of the text through ambiguous language, what Dower describes as 
“cutting smoke with scissors.” However, Hirohito’s intentions are completely 
irrelevant. What matters is the significance of the speech for the representation of 
the emperor.  
As significant as this “declaration of humanity” (and denial of divinity) was 
Hirohito’s full recitation within the body of the text of the Charter Oath of 1868. A 
foundational document of the Meiji Restoration, the Charter Oath declared the use 
of assemblies and open discussion or public opinion, that high and low will unite to 
                                                 
31 Despite people like Etō Jun’s claim that the postwar constitution was imposed 
(oshitsuke kempō), can we not rather say that it was in fact the emperor that the 
Occupation imposed on Japan (oshitsuke tennō)??? 
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carry out administrative affairs, and that “absurd customs” of the past must be 
abandoned. In many ways, it can be seen as a declaration of intent to establish a 
parliament based on wide participation and reject the seclusionist and anti-foreign 
discourse (jōi) while embracing principles of international law.  Despite its 
“democratic” tone, though, it was a document largely aimed at elite landowners and 
rival anti-imperial forces in an effort to bring them into the fold of the new Meiji 
State. Hirohito invoked the Charter Oath in the context of postwar reconstruction to 
rewrite his own narrative based on the supposedly most open, progressive, and 
democratic documents of the Meiji Era. It further allowed him to bypass and discredit 
the actual and substantial movements toward liberal democratic reform represented 
by “Taishō democracy.”32 This marks the second performance of the new postwar 
emperor system, an attempt to redefine the kokutai to represent a nation in which a 
human emperor can embody the eternal democratic values of Japan.  
                                                 
32 See Harootunian, Harry. "Hirohito Redux-Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan 
by Herbert P. Bix". Critical Asian Studies. 33, no. 4, 2001. pg. 623. The postwar 
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Just like his grandfather Meiji, who embarked on his “Great Imperial Tours” to 
visit the entire territory of Japan and teach the people that they were his subjects33 
(as well as subject them to his gaze), Hirohito traversed Japan, visiting every 
prefecture except for Okinawa, to collapse the distance between himself and the 
citizens of Japan, to represent his humanness.  
Two important writers, Sakaguchi Ango and Nakano Shigeharu, writing in the 
immediate postwar, reflect on these tours by Hirohito and his now being a mere 
human. Sakaguchi is quick to defend newspapers that sarcastically called the 
emperor a “broom.” They were right, he said, because, “wherever the emperor goes, 
whether city or country, there is a clean sweep—just like a broom.”34 To Sakaguchi, 
there is incredible irony that the emperor conducted these tours to present himself 
as a human like any other Japanese, and yet, is welcomed like no other Japanese 
could be. He says, “If His Majesty cannot go into these completely unadorned cities 
and country towns as just another citizen, what the hell is the point of talking about 
the emperor as human being!” In Nakano’s story “Five Cups of Sake,”35 the narrator, 
a middle school principal, recounts witnessing the emperor when he visited his town 
as part of a tour to celebrate the new constitution. The visit was brief, mechanical, 
                                                 
33 See Splendid Monarchy, pg 46-55; see also Ruoff, Kenneth J. The People’s Emperor  
Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 2001, 22.  
34 Sakuguchi Ango. “Tennō Heika ni sasaguru kotoba [Dedication to the Emperor His 
Majesty]” Sakaguchi Ango Zenshū. Chikuma Shobō, 1998.  
35 Nakano Shigeharu, trans. Brett de Bary. Three Works By Nakano Shigeharu. Cornell 
East Asia Papers: Ithaca, NY, 1979; Nakano Shigeharu.“Goshaku no Sake.” Nakano 
Shigeharu Shu. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1979, pg. 405-424.  
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contrived, and virtually unceremonious; he was shocked how quickly the nation had 
moved on, how his town had relative indifference to emperor’s visit, and how no 
mention whatsoever was made of the Constitution. Yet, wasn’t it the meticulous 
construction of the Constitution that was to determine the course Japan would take 
from that point on?  
This Constitution, flimsily sold as an “amendment” to the Meiji Constitution 
(or the Constitution of the Empire of Japan), sought to establish continuity by 
retaining some similar forms despite a total restructuring of sovereignty and the role 
of the emperor. Article 1 states: “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of 
the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom 
resides sovereign power.” As with Hirohito’s surrender speech, preservation of 
nationality/national body (kokutai goji) was central to this discussion. Whereas 
earlier discussion of kokutai centered around the sovereignty of the emperor, the 
unbroken line of emperors, and the fact that Japan never been invaded by foreign 
powers, this type of definition would no longer hold if Japan were to maintain any 
continuity. In other words, the hitherto attributes of kokutai (Japan’s 
nationality/national body) had been completely invalidated with Japan’s defeat and 
the demystification of the emperor. Parliament was left with a conundrum: how 
could the kokutai be maintained and still be compatible with a democratic form of 
government and human emperor? 
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For the argument, members of the Diet employed a distinction that was not 
new to discourse among legal scholars, separating Japan into two bodies, the kokutai 
(“national body”) and the seitai (“governmental body”). Whereas the first, kokutai, 
refers to everything transcendent and eternal about Japan’s reified essence, seitai, 
on the other hand refers to the political form of government or rule that happens to 
be in existence at any particular time. It was argued that whether the seitai 
(governmental body) was a constitutional monarchy or a democracy did not matter. 
What matters for the preservation of the kokutai is whether the emperor remains at 
the center of the nation. Democracy, so government ideologue argued, was now 
compatible with the kokutai, the national body, because, it was claimed, the emperor 
not only held a central place in the hearts of the Japanese, but that the will of the 
emperor was indistinguishable from the will of the citizens of Japan. This type of 
“democracy” in which the hearts and wills of the emperor and citizens were totally 
aligned was, according to the argument, nothing new. Rather, it had always existed, 
and Japan was only now “awakened” to its truth. This line of argumentation, though 
unconvincing to many (including within the Diet), was made by a wide array of 
influential public figures such as Minister of State Kanamori Tokujirō, the historian 
Tsuda Sōkichi, and philosopher Watsuji Tetsujirō. Though sophisticated, it was a pure 
invention of the postwar to legitimize a type of emperor system—whether in cultural 
or political terms—that had never existed before.  
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Projecting Japan’s new postwar reality into Japan’s eternal past, via the Meiji 
Era or the moment before its inception, involved a glaring omission: the literal body 
of Japan—its geography—was fundamentally altered from the late 1800s to the 
postwar. Once an Empire stretching to Taiwan, Korea, Manchukuo and beyond, 
Japan’s postwar body was significantly smaller. In fact, rather than insist that Japan 
had expanded and shrunk though half a century of imperial exploits, the narrative for 
continuity—just like for the emperor—had no choice but to disavow its recent past, 
and eliminate reference to Empire. This is despite the fact that Empire was not simply 
an accident of the past half century, but rather a central element for the production 
of nationality in Japan. 
Thus, we have multiple tropes for considering the two bodies of Japan: Japan 
as kokutai (national body) versus Japan as seitai (governmental body); Japan as the 
broader territories ruled under the Japanese Empire versus the defeated and 
retreated version of Japan proper after 1945; and the Japan that is identically 
mapped onto the dual images of the emperor—Japan as eternal, transcendent, and 
divine versus Japan as mutable, imperfect, and quotidian. These tropes, however, are 
ideological and my contention is that they were strategically and intentionally 
deployed by both Japan and the Occupation in the postwar to conveniently write a 
rosier narrative of the past century that disavowed Japan’s immediate past as 
aggressor in Asia, and allowed for a tenuous continuity between the earlier Meiji 
period and Japan in the postwar.  
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Moreover, postwar Japan’s emphasis of the human, “everyman” quality of 
Emperor Hirohito did not mean that he was reduced to one body, the mortal and 
imperfect king, the Body natural. Rather, he still had two bodies: that of human and 
that of Humanity, that of emperor and that of emperorship. He was portrayed both 
as human (sympathetic and pathetic, pitiable and pitiful) as well as the model, the 
archetype, of Japan’s democratic and pacifist citizen, while his family (especially his 
son Akihito and his son’s wife Michiko) typified the modern nuclear family of Japan’s 
emerging economic middle class.  
In the case of Japan, these dualities, the double-bodied natures of both nation 
and emperor, have been critical to establishing the continuity of Japan through time, 
and especially as it bridged the divide between everything that came before Japan’s 
loss in World War II and everything that came after. However, two bodies of nation 
and the two bodies of emperor—are constantly manipulated and constructed to 
produce the illusion of both continuity and concreteness. Thus, I find it critical to turn 
to those thinkers who understood the dual nature of nationality, keyed into its 
artifice, and helped expose its true nature—that nationality is a construct.  
 In the next two chapters, I will argue that, in their careful critique of the new 
construct of the emperor in the postwar, the postwar emperor system, both Nakano 
and Sakaguchi seek to explode the narrative of the emperor’s two bodies. This is not 
merely to deny that the emperor is divine, but to separate the human emperor from 
the emperor who represents “Humanity” and citizen—to separate the emperor from 
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the “emperor system”—and to reject any notion that democracy can be compatible 
with even a “symbolic” emperor. As such, their writings demonstrate how such an 
“emperor system” is performatively produced and reproduced through discourse. 
Thus, both authors, rather than advocating an explicitly political means for abolishing 
the emperor system, seek to undermine it by historicizing its very representation, its 
very discursive production.   
2.4  The fate of kokutai: in the Diet and out  
 Just as preservation of kokutai seemed to be a sole concern for the 
government in the lead up to surrender—more important in fact than sparing the 
lives of soldiers and citizens—it was central to the debates on the status of postwar 
Constitution in the Diet as well as the public sphere. The draft assembled by the 
Occupation was ultimately used, although each party represented within the Diet 
drafted their own versions. Among them, only the draft by the Communist Party 
called for an abolition of the emperor system, whereas the others differed on the 
specific status of the emperor. Rather opportunistically hoping to garner votes, the 
Socialist Party included in their proposed draft of the constitution the retention of 
the emperor, with the first clause stating, “Sovereignty shall reside in the State (a 
corporation which includes the Emperor).”36 Other drafts, with the hope to make the 
emperor’s powers more explicit, making him the supreme commander, or the 
“superintendent,” of sovereignty” (tōchiken no sōransha), while at the same time 
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ensuring that the emperor’s status depends on the support of the people.37 Yet, the 
heart of the debate over the kokutai, and whether it had been preserved or 
destroyed, occurred after it became clear in early-to-mid 1946 that the Occupation 
draft would most clearly resemble the final product.  
 For some, it was a foregone conclusion that the kokutai had been maintained 
because it was considered unchanging and unalterable. This still required significant 
justification before the members of the Diet. On October 16, 1946, Minister of State 
Kanamori, an early advocate of the emperor-organ theory (tennō kikan setsu), led an 
impassioned defense of the kokutai, attempting to demonstrate how a constitution 
that placed sovereignty with the people could still retain its kokutai. In question was 
not simply the legal continuity of Japan and its constitution, which was to be an 
amendment of Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution, but its existential continuity. 
Kanamori believed that both the legal and existential identities could be preserved:  
If the identity of the State is consistent through the past and the future, and if 
the identity of the fundamental principles of State law is equally provided 
logically, I think the bringing about of Result B through Process A can be 
clearly provided legally. Then the question comes to the fore whether the 
State, in the past and in the present, has undergone a change in its 
fundamental aspects, that is, whether it has forfeited its identity, and 
                                                 
37 Especially the draft proposed by Konoe, who was advised by Sasaki Sōichi. Ibid, 
index number RM088.  
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consequently whether it has lost the consistency in the fundamental structure 
of its law. I conceive of all the issues involved on the premise that the identity 
is maintained. A revolution, in the sense we ordinarily use, is not taking place 
in Japan.38 
It is clear that the identity of the state was not merely a question of legal 
interpretation for Kanamori, but rather a fundamentally existential problem. To deny 
continuity of the state, in others words, would be for the state to cease to exist, at 
least as something that endures through time, which was to him unacceptable. In this 
model, revolution was impossible; continuity of the state was a given, but he was 
willing to address the legal issues nonetheless. Legal continuity of the state was 
guaranteed through the process of amending the constitution, he argued. However, 
the continuity on the level of “fundamental aspects” of the identity of the state was 
less a question of legality than a question of perception. Some scholars, Kanamori 
says, conceived of the “location” of sovereignty being transferred from the emperor 
the people as a fundamental change in the identity of the state, a radical shift in the 
kokutai. However, because the emperor, too, is a “citizen” under the draft of the 
constitution, he still retains sovereignty. More important for Kanamori is the fact that 
the kokutai has not changed, but perception of it has changed. He says, “The question 
before us is not whether the kokutai has changed or not, but in what sense our 
                                                 
38 Ibid, index number RM426.AM.SP8.P8 
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understanding of it has changed.”39 He is suggesting that sovereignty has actually 
always belonged to the people (including the emperor) because of their relation to 
the emperor; the emperor’s sovereignty was merely an expression of the people’s 
consolidated communal will. This rests on the assumption that the emperor has 
always been, and will always be, the “center of adoration” (akogare no chūshin) of 
the Japanese people; the linkage of the hearts of the people of Japan with the heart 
of the emperor constitutes the unchangeable character of the State and the 
continuity of identity for Japan. The postwar constitution and circumstances, so he 
argues, is able to awaken people to the fact that this intimate relationship with the 
emperor—this “adoration” and alignment of wills—also entails shared sovereignty.  
Thus, the kokutai has in fact not changed, but people’s perception of it has.  
Kanamori’s defense of the kokutai within the postwar Constitution, while 
facing fierce skepticism by Diet members and constitutional scholars alike, not to 
mention criticism from the newspapers, became the dominant grounds for the 
official government position that the kokutai had not changed.40 In this sense, it was 
a powerful vindication and legitimization of the Occupation efforts to restructure 
Japan, and demonstration of the complicity between U.S. and Japanese ideologues in 
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justifying use of the emperor for their mutual purposes. Regardless, his logic is 
exceedingly bizarre. Kanamori suggests that, by virtue of the connection between the 
emperor and the people of Japan, who have always had mutual affection for each 
other, the identity of the state is unchanging and unchangeable.  Yet, he offers little 
evidence for the claim that the emperor was ever the “center of adoration” of the 
people. This does not prevent him from saying, “Going back to past history as far as it 
is known to us, and considering our present frame of mind, to say that the country 
has been unified with the Emperor as the center of adoration, as I put it, is in the final 
analysis to say a stern fact.” He merely asserts this to be true. Similar language had 
also been used in imperial rescripts, notably the “Declaration of Humanity” with the 
line, “The ties between me and my people have always been formed by mutual trust 
and affection.” If this were the case, laws such as the Article 74 of the Meiji Criminal 
Code, which legislated against disrespectful acts against the emperor and imperial 
house, would have been unnecessary: the emperor would have trusted and loved the 
people enough to know that they would never disrespect him, and the people would 
naturally treat the emperor—the center of affection—only with the utmost dignity. 
To Kanamari, however, the emperor’s rule was never coercive, and the population 
was obedient purely by choice.41 He said that certain laws and myths throughout 
                                                 
41 Sakai comments on how the claim to a non-violent origin of the nation was a 
recurring trope in the postwar, by philosophers like Watsuji Tetsurō and historians in 
the U.S. and Japan alike.  It appears that Watsuji and Kanamori had similar 
consultants: “Watsuji claimed that, just as the Japanese people freely and voluntarily 
chose to continue the institution expressing its totality in the figure of the emperor 
after the Second World War, the same entity freely and voluntarily started the same 
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history could have had “potent effects” on people’s obedience, but that overall it was 
“self-willed.”42 He does not specify the difference between coercion and “potent 
effects” (are we to assume they are different?), or explain how it might be possible to 
obey the emperor freely and independently according to free will and choice when 
an alternative choice was not made available. Nevertheless, Kanamori connects this 
supposed “obedience by choice” with the notion that this constituted shared 
sovereignty with the emperor and people. It should be clear here Kanamori is simply 
confusing the notion of sovereignty with the concept of the social contract, in which 
society willfully accepts security offered by the state authority by subjecting 
themselves to it; obedience by no means entails sovereignty. Despite this mix-up, it 
does not change the fact that Japanese history has a rich history of coercive military 
force against its people in order to turn them into “imperial subjects.” Japan’s 
colonial efforts in Asia of kōminka, forced assimilation, is one example, and one 
analogous to how the government treated “mainland” (naichi) Japanese people 
during the Meiji effort to consolidate politically and standardize language and 
culture.  
                                                                                                                                            
institution at the initial stage of the imperial tradition. That the people could freely 
and voluntarily choose the emperor system was testified to by the fact that the state 
was first organized on the basis of unification by religious authority without the use 
of military coercion. As those who are familiar with the general field of Japanese 
studies in the United States would probably note, this is a prevailing hypothesis that 
has been repeatedly stated by some historians of Japan.” Sakai, Naoki. “Return to the 
West/Return to the East: Watsuji Tetsurō’s Anthropology and Discussions of 
Authenticity.” Translation and Subjectivity  On ‘Japan’ and Cultural Nationalism. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pg. 106-7. 




Furthermore, for Kanamori to assert that the postwar constitution would 
awaken people to the notion that they have always possessed something like 
sovereignty through their connection to the emperor assumes a notion of 
sovereignty that is fundamentally apolitical. Otherwise, history would have to be 
rewritten to account for the democratic tendencies of ancient Japan. Could we speak 
of Heian democracy? Kamakura republicanism? He would also have to account for 
the periods of history in which the emperor was politically subordinate to the feudal 
lords, as in, most of Japan’s history. Needless to say, Kanamori unproblematically 
assumes that Japan has had continual identity as state (kokka) and nation (kokumin) 
without taking into consideration the historical circumstances that led to the 
emergence of these forms within the past several hundred years.  
Most troublesome about Kanamori’s argument, though, is his notion that 
kokutai, which is for him in essence a question of affect (affection, akogare), can exist 
independent of perception. For him, the affection toward the emperor unifies the 
people of Japan and gives them a sense of belonging to the nation—this is the 
“unalterable” nature of kokutai. Yet, only now (in the early postwar) are people 
awakening to the nature of this belonging. What this suggests to me is that Kanamori 
believes that one can have a feeling of belonging to the nation—a feeling of 
kokutai—without being aware of it. Can kokutai exist on a subconscious level? Is it 
something one can become awakened to its through cognition? 
It’s critical here that we understand kokutai not as some mystical or peculiar 
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concept to Japan, even if it was frequently invoked to make the case for Japan’s 
uniqueness. Rather, kokutai is “nationality” itself. Naoki Sakai has drawn attention to 
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s understanding of kokutai, which for him as a direct translation of 
the term “nationality” as defined by J.S. Mill. Fukuzawa says, “Kokutai refers to the 
grouping together of a race of people of similar feelings, the creation of a distinction 
between fellow countrymen and foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and 
stronger bonds with one’s countrymen than with foreigners.”43 These feelings of 
communality, or community, are based on shared language, history, race, religion or 
geography. It is what Fukuzawa calls the “sentiment of nationality” or kokutai no jō, 
which Sakai notes is a near exact rendition of Mill’s “society of sympathy.” Thus, we 
can understand nationality to be deeply connected to this affective aspect of relating 
oneself to others. For Kanamori and others in the postwar, the emperor is at the core 
of this affective aspect of nationality that can unite people.  
Yet, Kanamori’s notion of awakening to a new sense of kokutai—nationality—
is disturbing because it assumes that nationality precedes being cognizant of it: one is 
Japanese prior to one’s understanding of that fact.44 It exposes that sentiment is 
actually unnecessary because the way one feels, the sentiment or affective aspect of 
nationality, actually has nothing to do with understanding. At any point, one may 
                                                 
43 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, trans. David Diltworth. An Outline of the Theory of Civilization. 
Sophia University: Tokyo, 1973, pg. 23. (Japanese text referenced online at: 
http://project.lib.keio.ac.jp/dg_kul/fukuzawa_title.php?id=77) 
44 To be clear, I referring to nationality only in the sense discussed here, not in terms 
of state citizenship.  
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“awaken” to discover what it is. This is the logic I’m deducing from Kanamori’s 
argument: it is not that one is Japanese because one love the emperor; it’s that one 
is Japanese, and therefore, one loves the emperor. To be Japanese is to love the 
emperor. One does not have to prove that love because it is a given fact. Therefore, 
Kanamori need not reference any empirical evidence to demonstrate the love that 
Japanese people feel toward the emperor; it is the very nature of their existence. 
Kanamori’s entire argument that the kokutai has not changed is based on a 
tautology: the kokutai has not changed with the postwar constitution because the 
emperor is still the “center of adoration” for the Japanese people, just as he has 
always been; however, since being Japanese for Kanamori means to love the 
emperor, his conclusion is embedded in his premise.  
Unlike Kanamori, I want to treat “nationality” (kokutai) as a fundamentally 
discursive concept. it has no essence, it is mutable and contingent, and can only be 
understood as an abstract and imagined sense of belonging to a larger community, 
and measured by how this imagination is represented in texts and performances. It is 
not something that one can discover through an “awakening” because it does not 
precede understanding, but follows from it; nationality is constructed within the 
individual. The Japanese emperor’s relation to nationality was developed and 
articulated most cogently by Meiji ideologues, but reproduced through a discursive 
nexus—produced by the media as well as religious, legal, cultural, and educational 
institutions—that for the first time brought the emperor into widespread visibility to 
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the greater public, and contributed to a sense or “sentiment” of national imagination 
that included the emperor. From the beginning of the Meiji Period through the end 
of the Second World War, however, there was no consensus on the precise relation 
of the emperor to nation, and contesting camps and factions led to the need to 
“clarify the kokutai” or define its “essential qualities” (kokutai no hongi). We should 
see these efforts as expression of anxiety and insecurity over the fact that the kokutai 
was not immediately apparent, not a given. The postwar constitution, therefore, 
provided an opportune moment for politicians to once again reassert the nature of 
the kokutai. However, this constituted what I understand to be the invention of the 
postwar emperor system. It was a chance for politicians to reject past definitions of 
kokutai and concretize a new definition that would be compatible with the postwar 
democratic order. That they chose to represent kokutai as having essential 
democratic qualities and existing unchanged throughout Japanese history was an 
arbitrary choice, but an exceedingly convenient one for realizing the demands of the 
Occupation.  
2.4.1 Sasaki: the kokutai is gone  
Others were less sympathetic to the new constitution precisely because it 
would radically alter their understanding of the kokutai. Sasaki Kōichi, a 
constitutional scholar and advisor to Kido Kōichi, rejected the constitution on the 
grounds that it entailed an outright negation of the kokutai as it had been 
understood up to that point, and yet it need not be that way. The main problem as 
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he saw it was the complete removal of the political function of the emperor in the 
new constitution. The kokutai, he argues, rests on two points: the emperor “holds 
the right to govern united in his hands” (i.e. rules as the supreme commander, 
tōchiken wo sōran), and that this right is given solely by his lineage (i.e. Japan’s 
hereditary monarchy). It was never the case that a secondary requirement, the 
consent of the people, accompanied the justification based on lineage. Never had the 
emperor reigned by virtue of the sovereign will of the people.45 In designating the 
emperor a symbol, the constitution took away all substance from the emperorship; 
thus, Sasaki argues that if it is to preserve the kokutai, the constitution must give the 
emperor a positive political function. Sasaki also holds that the Meiji Constitution 
provided provisions for the irresponsibility [having no accountability] of the emperor, 
and that removing the emperor’s political function could actually make him 
vulnerable to future laws that might seek to punish him. This is distinct from other 
arguments (including Watsuji’s below) that sought to eliminate any political function 
for the emperor specifically in order to keep him immune from bearing responsibility 
for the war.  
 For Sakaki, any argument that insists that there is compatibility for the 
kokutai and “emperor system” (tennōsei) in the new constitution would gut the 
terms of any substance (he uses the two terms interchangeably for the most part). 
Until the new constitution, the emperor system necessarily meant that the emperor 
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was supreme commander (sōransha) by virtue of his lineage. He claims that it has 
always meant that and nothing else. He says,  
In my opinion, the “emperor system,” which has formed the distinctive 
character of the Japanese State, stands abolished in the bill. Where on earth 
is the reason for abolishing the emperor system? ... In the current discussion 
on the Constitution, any system of government with the emperor as an organ 
of the State seems to be held as the emperor system. But if you use the term 
“emperor system” in that sense, you commit, I believe, a great error. You can, 
of course, give any definition to a term, as long as the substance is clearly 
indicated. However, the “emperor system” in the sense in which the system 
has hitherto been understood is something very different. 
Although Sasaki makes the claim that the draft of the postwar constitution (which 
would be the final version) essentially would abolish the emperor system, he by no 
means advocates that. He wants the postwar constitution to codify the emperor’s 
political role as supreme commander, and make the postwar emperor system 
completely compatible with the Meiji Constitution. However, in arguing that the draft 
of the new constitution would “abolish the emperor system” as it had been known 
and defined, he exposes that the postwar emperor system would be pure construct, 
and manipulation of terms and definitions in order to give the illusion of continuity 
despite no such substantial continuity.  
 This to me is the value of looking at the postwar debates on the emperor 
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system: the very instability in how the terms and definitions were perceived allowed 
for their constant manipulation to fit any scenario regarding the fate of the emperor. 
Some, like Sasaki, were concerned with retaining legal and political continuity for the 
emperor based on precedent, and others showed willingness to invent a new 
emperor system in complete alignment with the wishes of the Occupation forces and 
the wishes of Douglas MacArthur. I believe that the debates within the Diet were 
meant to deflect attention away from the role that SCAP played in the invention of 
the postwar emperor system. The absence of any mention of SCAP’s role is blatant. 
That the debate moved beyond the Diet in the public sphere of discourse suggests 
the keen sense of urgency in guaranteeing that new emperor system be perceived as 
legitimate.   
2.4.2 Watsuji’s “cultural community”    
This reproduction of the postwar emperor system, therefore, could not be 
limited to government ideologues; it had to be buttressed and legitimated across 
spheres and academic disciplines. The philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō is a prime 
example, and he set out to refute Sasaki’s acknowledgment that the postwar 
constitution would abolish the emperor system and kokutai in a rebuttal titled, 
“Seeking advice from Professor Sasaki on the debate over whether the kokutai has 
changed.” According to Watsuji, Sasaki had divided the kokutai into two categories, 
the political and the spiritual (seishinteki gainen). Sasaki’s primary reason for arguing 
that the kokutai had changed was based on its political aspect, as sovereignty was 
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transferred from the monarch to “the people.” For Watsuji, however, this constituted 
a fundamental confusion for Sasaki: sovereignty has nothing to do with the kokutai, 
and rather is covered by the term seitai (governmental body, form of state), which 
has itself changed many times throughout history.46 The emperor since Meiji was 
defined as a supreme commander (sōransha), and the new constitution negates the 
possibility that he could continue as such. But, this is to simply analyze circumstances 
since the Meiji Period.47 There were many periods of Japanese history in which the 
emperor was not sovereign, with sovereignty instead held during those periods by 
feudal rulers. Watsuji accuses Sasaki of shortsightedness, judging his standard of 
kokutai based only on the Meiji Constitution, which Watsuji considers an aberration 
in the context of the long arc of Japanese history.  
It should be noted, here, that Watsuji needs to discount and discredit the 
transformation of kokutai in the Meiji Period because it was precisely during the 
Meiji Period that the emperorship was designed to have a quintessentially modern 
function. The emperor system was not defined to conform to the Meiji Constitution; 
it was invented for its purposes. For Watsuji to give legitimacy to the Meiji 
developments in the definition of kokutai—especially giving the emperor a political 
function—would also be to recognize its modern quality, its historically contingency. 
                                                 
46 Watsuji Tetsurō. “Kokutai henkōron ni tsuite sakaki hakushi wo kou. [Seeking 
advice from Professor Sasaki on the debate over whether the kokutai has changed]” 
Watsuji  etsurō Zenshū, Vol 14. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1962, pg. 355 
47 Ibid, pg. 359.  
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Thus, he has to minimize its significance and demonstrate the developments of Meiji 
had no bearing on the essence of the emperor system.  
Watsuji locates the nature of the Japanese emperor in ancient history, in its 
primitive and traditional origins (honrai no dentō, genshiteki dentō). Looking to the 
etymological sources for an alternative reading for tennō (emperor), sumeramikoto, 
he says that the sumera is related to the word suberu, to unify, that mikoto is a polite 
honorific, and that therefore the name for emperor, sumeramikoto, is a word used to 
“honor the act of unification.”48 Watsuji claims that the existence of the emperor, 
though ritual practices and festivals, enabled the people of primitive groups to be 
conscious of their communality, the “living totality” (ikita zentaisei) of their group. 
From the beginning, the emperor was the symbol of group unity (shūdan no tōitsu no 
shōchō). Eventually the nature of the emperor would go through transformations and 
“metamorphoses” (Watsuji uses the English word here), and the “nature of the 
emperor developed into being sovereignty of the supreme commander (tōchiken no 
sōransha).” Yet, if separated from that function, the emperor’s essence would still be 
as the expression of unity (tōitsu no hyogensha). He says,  
That the emperor is the symbol of the unity of the Japanese nation (nihon 
kokumin) is a fact piercing through Japanese history. The emperor is the 
expression of the living totality of primitive groups, and politically, is the 
expression of the “unification into one totality” of the countless lands (kuni) 
                                                 
48 Ibid, pg. 363.  
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that divided the people of Japan (nihon no piipuru). This collective, or the 
totality of the people, is a subjective (shutaiteki) totality, and cannot be 
grasped as an object (taishōteki ni). This is the precise reason why it can only 
be expressed as a ‘symbol.’ Perhaps a symbol can be many things, but we as a 
nation have ceaselessly upheld the tradition of this symbol chosen by our 
primitive ancestors who followed the natural law of shared humanity (jinrui 
tsūyū). This allows us to perceive the core significance of the emperor.49  
To Watsuji, then, only the totality can be active subject (shutai) or practical agent.50 
Since totality is abstract, it cannot be understood in a concrete form, as an object 
(taishō). Hence, the totality can only be perceived through its expression. The 
emperor is not the totality itself; if two things are identical, one cannot symbolize the 
other. The emperor is rather the expression of the totality; only the people as totality 
(or community) can be the active agent, whereas the emperor, as its expression (or 
symbol), is passive.51 If legal interpretations have failed to understand this concept of 
symbol, Watsuji says, refer instead to philosophy, which has long dealt with it.  
Watsuji sees the postwar Constitution as not only compatible with this notion 
                                                 
49 Ibid, pg. 364.  
50 Naoki Sakai discusses at length how Watsuji uses “subject” in the Kantian sense of 
the term, but ultimately through his usage, evacuated shutai of its meaning of 
“practical agent”: “What is achieved in his use of the term shutai is, in fact, a 
displacement of the practical relation by the epistemic one,” or the subject as 
shukan. Sakai 1997, pg. 145.  
51 Sakai has noted that this insistence on the emperor’s passivity had a direct 
implication for the emperor in the postwar: he could not be held responsible for the 
actions of the nation. Sakai 1997, pg. 106.  
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of the emperor, but actually allowing for an interpretation that brings the emperor 
close to being able to “rule as a supreme commander.” The first clause of the 
Constitution of Japan stipulates the emperor’s role as the “symbol of state,” and 
further, that his position is derived “from the will of the people with whom resides 
sovereign power.” This suggests, Watsuji says, that the emperor is the symbol of the 
will of sovereignty. As an expression of the unity of the people and their will, the 
emperor is the symbol of sovereignty.  
 Watsuji, though, is careful to separate “state” (kokka) from “nation” 
(kokumin) arguing that the state has not always existed. If “nation” implies “state” for 
the reader, he suggests substituting in another word like “people” (jinmin), or 
“masses” (minshū), as long as the emperor is still the symbol of the unity of the 
“people” (piipuru) of Japan.52 He insists that this unity has nothing to do with the 
state, and is not a political unity, but a cultural unity:  
The people of Japan formed a single cultural community (bunka kyōdōtai) 
through [shared] language, history, customs, and all cultural activities. The 
emperor symbolizes the unity of the nation or the masses as this type of 
cultural community. The tradition of respecting the emperor that has always 
existed throughout Japanese history is the awareness of this unity.53 
                                                 
52 Watsuji, pg. 367.  
53 Ibid, pg. 367.  
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Watsuji is certainly correct to historicize the political nature of the Japanese state. 
However, his assertion that the Japanese nation—and its culture, history, and 
customs, and hence, its “will”—has always respected the emperor relies on the false 
assumption that the Japanese nation has always existed as a unified totality. As Sakai 
says,  
Although the totality of the nation cannot be objectified or made visible—that 
is, brought into cognition without expression—it is predetermined that it 
exists. It has to be noted that Watsuji was not merely saying that many 
people existed in the country but that those people living there had already 
formed a unified whole as a nation with a synthesizing will.54  
Given Watsuji’s quote above, it should be clear that it was not only predetermined 
that the nation existed, but that it existed with unified will, unified language, unified 
history, and unified customs. This leads me to another reason why I believe that 
Watsuji had to define the Meiji Period as an aberration: the entire national project of 
Meiji was not the realization some abstract notion of a “general will,” but rather the 
very creation of nationality itself. In other words, language, history, and customs had 
to be unified, if not through historical revisionism and ideological convincing, then 
through coercive practices and compulsory education. A sense of community in 
Japan had to be created during Meiji because it had never existed before; not in any 
unified fashion during the Edo Period, and certainly not in any unified fashion in 
                                                 
54 Sakai, 1997, pg. 106.  
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antiquity. Watsuji is careful to conceal the modern and coercive aspects of the 
formation of nationality by asserting its primitive origins.  
 Watsuji concludes his essay that rejects Sasaki’s argument that the kokutai 
had changed by questioning the value of using the term kokutai anymore anyway.55 
That is not because he believed that the kokutai had changed; insofar as kokutai 
meant the “symbol of the unification of the Japanese nation,” it had not changed, 
and in fact is consistent with—and an even more accurate representation of—the 
kokutai of antiquity. However, if kokutai that refers to the respect for the emperor 
(sonnō) is to be confused with the feudal loyalty of subject to lord, he says, it’s not a 
term worth keeping.  
 This defense of the compatibility of the emperor’s role in the postwar order 
with the entirety of Japanese history, while more schematic perhaps, differed little 
from Minister of Kanamori’s claim that the emperor constituted the “core of 
affection” for the “Japanese people.” It can be seen as consistent with the 
overarching official narrative in the postwar that, in its very effort to demonstrate 
the emperor system’s enduring and unchanging nature into the postwar, exposed it 
as completely historically contingent and discursively constructed. Moreover, this 
narrative actively sought to characterize the historical and political developments 
since the beginning of the Meiji Period as aberration, imperfectly lining up with 
Hirohito’s own postwar narrative, which certainly disavowed the emperor system of 
                                                 
55 Watsuji, pg. 368.  
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pre-defeat Showa, essentially a rejection of his former self, but elevated the 
democratic ideals of early Meiji as the true eternal kokutai.  
 The idea that the Japanese nation had always “revered” the emperor or 
considered the emperor as their “center of affection” was necessary for postwar 
ideologues to assert because it was very clearly the case that Emperor Hirohito was 
not universally revered and not the center of everyone’s affection. Therefore, I will 
now turn my attention to several authors who, in the several years after Japan’s 
defeat, drew attention to the disrespect of the emperor in the immediate postwar by 
representing that disrespect and theorizing it. These writings serve not only as a 
denunciation of the theories of Watsuji and Kanamori on empirical grounds, but as a 




NAKANO SHIGEHARU AND THE EMPEROR’S ASCENT TO CITIZEN 
 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter and the next are attempts to understand the nature of disrespect 
toward the emperor in the immediate postwar by reading authors who comment on 
the disrespect itself: Nakano Shigeharu and Sakaguchi Ango. Their sensitive and 
nuanced writings demonstrate an immediate grasp of the fundamental changes to 
the emperor system brought about by war’s end, and offer lucid critiques of those 
who failed to understand the postwar emperor system in its specificity.  I cross-read 
Nakano’s fictional Goshaku no Sake with other non-fiction essays that address the 
emperor system by Nakano in order to demonstrate that we cannot conflate the 
narrator of that text with Nakano himself, but also to highlight similarities. The 
narrator’s perspective on the emperor system allows for expression from a 
completely different vantage point than Nakano, that of an educator deeply 
concerned with his students’ understanding of the emperor system for which he 
served as collaborator during the war.  
As a meditation on the representation of the emperor throughout the 
discursive landscape of the immediate postwar, Goshaku no Sake analyzes the role of 
media and how the ideology of the emperor system is reproduced even—and 
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especially—by publications like the communist Akahata (Red Flag) by hanging on to 
an anachronistic understanding of the emperor system rather than grasping its new 
reality; misplaced criticism does not undermine but rather sustains and reproduces it. 
The text’s representation of disrespect itself and the reconfiguration of how the 
emperor ought to be treated—as human and nothing more—ultimately undermine 
the symbolic order and expose the constructed nature of the system.  
3.2 The context: coopting the embodied voice 
In May of 1945, two-hundred fifty thousand Japanese protestors descended 
onto the Imperial Palace grounds to decry the stark food shortages, a protest known 
as Food May Day.56 Far from a threat to the body of the emperor—but certainly an 
attack on the image of the sacred emperor inscribed in the Meiji Constitution—a sign 
and its carrier, a Communist laborer named Matsushima Matsutarō, became 
embroiled in what became the “Placard Incident.” The sign read:  
詔書    shōsho    Imperial Edict            
国体はゴジされたぞ  kokutai wa goji sareta zo The kokutai is maintained!                                                  
朕はタラフク食ってるぞ chin wa tarafuku kutteiru zo The royal belly is full!                                                            
ナンジ人民飢えて死ね  nanji jinmin uete shine Die of hunger you people!                                                       
ギョメイギョジ  gyomei gyoji   Imperial signature 
                                                 
56 Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, 1999. p. 264.  
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The placard was satirical in multiple layers, written as if an official document in the 
first person of the emperor, and with a clever mixture of formal language and slang. 
Chin is the equivalent to the royal “we”, and nanji is a pronominal address to subjects 
of the king. Markedly absent, though, is the word “subjects” (shin), which would 
normally follow nanji, replaced with the word for “people” (jinmin) instead. Kutteiru 
resembles “chow down” more than “eating,” and the emphatic zo is colloquial. The 
use of katakana in place of kanji, especially for the imperial signature, gyomei gyoji, 
has the additional comedic effect of being out of place. Most stinging is the satirical 
presentation mocking the imperial rescripts, dictates from the emperor often used 
for patriotic education, as well as Hirohito’s famous surrender speech broadcast for 
the entire nation.  
Although I have translated “chin wa tarafuku kutteiru zo” as “The royal belly is 
full!” a more literal translation might read, “I’ve gorged myself as fat as a blowfish!”  
Such distance from the privileged life of luxury that the emperor enjoys to the 
deprivation of Japanese people suffering from food shortages was nakedly apparent. 
This contradiction could not be whitewashed simply by stating that “The kokutai is 
maintained!” as had been done by the emperor and politicians. This second line on 
the placard suggests the great affront people must have felt to be told that the 
nation-state they had experienced prior to the humiliating defeat had somehow 
maintained its kokutai at the expense of all else. The placard here equates this 
insistence of maintenance of the kokutai with a complete disconnect from the reality 
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and pain of Japan’s citizens. It can be read as a highly stylized way of saying, “I have 
maintained my throne at your expense,” and then stamping it with the official seal.  
Matsushima was indicted for lèse majesté, but under pressure from the 
MacArthur and SCAP officials, the court dropped those charges; he was convicted 
instead of defamation (meiyo kison) of the emperor and sentenced to eight months 
in prison. Fortunately for Matsushima, the promulgation of the Constitution 
happened to coincide nearly perfectly with his conviction, and a general imperial 
amnesty meant his immediate release.57 MacArthur made a statement praising the 
court’s decision to prosecute the case as defamation rather than lèse majesté:  
The decision of the Japanese prosecutors to drop accusations against men 
charged with lèse majesté is a noteworthy application of the fundamental 
concept, embodied in the new constitution just adopted by the National Diet, 
that all men are equal before the law, that no individual in Japan—not even 
the Emperor—shall be clothed in legal protection denied the common man… 
In his new role the Emperor will symbolize the repository of state authority—
the citizen.58 
MacArthur did not close the door to prosecution for defamation, saying that “all 
public ofﬁcials be protected against unwarranted defamation or viliﬁcations in 
licentious disregard of the respect to which they as free individuals in a free society 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 267.  
58 Quoted in Kawagishi, Norikazu.  007.  The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan.” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law. 5, no. 2: 308-331, pg. 328 
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and as the public representatives of a free people are fully entitled.” In other words, 
lèse majesté did not apply, but defamation did because the emperor’s new position is 
that of an individual citizen who deserves no special legal protection.  In 1947, an 
appeals court changed course once more and found Matsushima guilty of lèse 
majesté. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, but was thrown out due to 
the applicability of the earlier imperial amnesty.59 Thus, the courts failed to 
conclusively rule out whether lèse majesté could be prosecuted, and hence, if the 
emperor deserved special legal protection under the current constitution.60 Yet, since 
Matsushima’s was the last case in which the issue of lèse majesté came before the 
court, the reluctance to invoke it since has de facto made it null.  
The significance of “Placard Incident” is that lèse majesté, fukeizai, had for 
practical purposes become fukei; the “dis-respect crime” had lost its criminality (zai) 
and become mere disrespect. Supposedly, Japan had entered into an era of open 
                                                 
59 John Dower perceptively notes that despite the Supreme Court threwing out 
Matsushima’s appeal and thus avoiding truly confronting the question of lèse 
majesté, the amnesty granted at the proclamation of the constitution was an 
opportunity to spread the narrative of the emperor’s benevolence: “From the 
imperial perspective, this was all a splendid way of demonstrating how the emperor’s 
magnanimity extended even to his most ungrateful subjects.” Consequently it’s 
exactly that kind of logic—that the emperor could still operate as if the ruler/subject 
divide persisted, let alone have the dignity to be magnanimous—that Nakano’s 
narrator explodes in Goshaku no Sake.  See Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan 
in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999. 
60 Legal scholar Norikazu Kawagishi notes that the case’s significance lies in the new 
system of judicial review that allowed for a plurality of opinions, thus making the 
judicial process more democratic, as opposed to what he called the “monopoly on 




discourse on the nature of the once untouchable “emperor system.” This, however, 
was tempered by SCAP censorship policies, which might allow for critical discourse 
on the emperor system itself, but not if that discourse highlighted the Occupation’s 
central role in its production. That did not stop Nakano.  
3.3 The text: Goshaku no Sake 
Nakano’s short novel Goshaku no Sake61 (Five Cups of Sake) is written in the 
form of a letter from a middle school principal (I will refer to him throughout as “the 
narrator”) to a friend from his school days who shared his leftist, if not radical, 
leanings in their youth. The letter is overtly a reflection on the new constitution and 
the celebrations that marked its promulgation (November 3, 1946) but it explores 
subtle thoughts on age, the responsibility of the teacher, and the nature of morality 
and consciousness in Japan’s new postwar order.  The narrator’s mood—colored by 
the five cups of sake, a government ration to usher in the constitution, that he’s 
imbibed—is tinged with regret, bitterness, and perhaps a candor reserved for a close 
friend with whom he can confide. Although he promises no conclusion, the narrator 
                                                 
61 Nakano Shigeharu, trans. Brett de Bary. Three Works By Nakano Shigeharu. Cornell 
East Asia Papers: Ithaca, NY, 1979; Nakano Shigeharu.“Goshaku no Sake.” Nakano 
Shigeharu Shu. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1979 (referred to below as GNS for 
simplicity). Reading de Bary’s translation of this text spurred my interest in pursuing 
further investigation of Nakano, and I am greatly indebted to her labors. In this 
chapter, I include references to both the translation and the original. I use some of de 
Bary’s translations with slight alterations, but have also included some of my own. If 
the translation is by de Bary, I indicate it by referencing her translation first in the 
footnote (ex. de Bary, pg. 94; GNS, pg. 411), and if mine, the Japanese text is 
referenced first (ex. GNS, pg. 410; de Bary, pg. 91). 
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provides sharp observations and reflections that paint a clear picture of his 
frustration with fellow teachers, students, the government, and most of all, the 
Communist Party for its failure to be a true moral guide and educator in the postwar. 
For the narrator, the understanding of the emperor and the emperor system in its 
new form, as specified in the new constitution, is absolutely central to postwar 
morality and awareness. Therefore, he ties his encounters with the emperor—
whether in debates, postcards, newsreels, or constitution-promoting tours—at all 
times with the response of those around him who similarly witness the emperor, but 
represent him differently. The general sentiment of those around him is either total 
indifference or fierce antipathy. The principal/narrator, on the other hand, views the 
emperor with sympathy (dōjō). This sympathy could be interpreted as a mere 
reflection of many Japanese people in the immediate postwar who understood the 
individual emperor as a pawn of greater forces, or for someone who bore a great 
sense of guilt (not responsibility) for the great loss of Japanese lives during the war, 
who too was a victim of Japan’s war.  However, the narrator had something else in 
mind. He was not sympathetic toward the emperor because of a desire to retain him 
as monarch or because of a latent allegiance to the emperor or the emperor system. 
Rather, it is through the radical recognition of the emperor as no more than a human 
being—thus bringing the awareness of the emperor in line with the meaning of the 
postwar constitutional emperor and declaration of humanity—that the narrator can 
establish the conditions for dismantling a wartime ethos that is antithetical to the 
realization of democracy in the postwar. It is precisely by sympathizing with the 
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emperor as an individual that enables the most stinging critique of the emperor 
system and those who perpetuate it. Goshaku no Sake further demonstrates how the 
question of the emperor system has as much to do with the consciousness of the 
Japanese people as it does governmental structure, and that fundamental political 
and ideological reform is intimately bound to understanding itself.62  
An influential writer of proletarian literature and left-wing thought during the 
interwar period, Nakano Shigeharu faced incarceration on and off in the early 1930s 
under the repressive Peace Preservation Law, eventually (1934) recanting his 
Communist Party ties in what is known as tenkō, “conversion” or “apostasy.”63 
Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, Nakano once again became active in Communist 
Party politics, which was once again legalized, and debates over the nature of the 
emperor system. Goshaku no Sake was his first literary work in the postwar, and the 
first work of fiction to depict the emperor in his present form.64 Nakano’s short non-
                                                 
62 This is also stressed by Brett de Bary in her introduction to her translation of 
Goshaku no Sake and two other works: “By proposing an alternative approach of 
‘sympathy of the Emperor as a human being,’ the narrator offers a radical critique of 
the centuries-old tradition of Emperor worship. He demands that the new, 
democratic consciousness, if it is to be thorough-going, must acknowledge that the 
Emperor, too, is an individual.” de Bary, Brett. “Introduction.” Three Works By 
Nakano Shigeharu. Cornell East Asia Papers: Ithaca, NY, 1979, pg. 15-16.  
63 Nakano himself became a central figure for understanding the of phenomenon of 
tenkō, and his novel Mura no Ie (“The House in the Village”) is considered 
representative of tenkō literature. Yoshimoto Takaaki analyzes that work in his 
 enkōron (“On Tenkō”).  
64 Watanabe, Naomi. Fukei Bungakuron Jōsetsu. Hihyō K kan Sōsho, 17. Tōkyō:  ta 
Shuppan, 1999, pg. 149. Watanabe says, “With the emphasis on a protagonist who 
attempted to separate the ‘emperor’ from the ‘emperor system,’ for the first time in 
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fiction essays on the postwar emperor, some of which will be discussed ahead, 
featured acerbic criticism toward the emperor system, and the “sympathy” that 
Goshaku no Sake’s narrator feels toward the individual emperor was perceived by 
many as conciliatory or even approving.65 Literary critic Etō Jun, for example, 
understood the principal’s sympathy towards the emperor as representative of the 
ambivalent tendencies within Nakano himself, and further evidence of his 
internalization of the loyalty to the emperor which came with his tenkō. He 
interpreted the narrator’s sympathy as representing the honne (or, the true and 
unspoken feelings) of Nakano himself. 66 Yet, to read Goshaku no Sake as either a 
channeled voice of Nakano himself or as evidence that Nakano has tempered his 
scathing and lucid critique is to project the narrative back onto the author rather 
than to deal with the representation of the emperor and emperor system that the 
text confronts. Hence, we should be wary, as literary critic Watanabe Naomi points 
out, of the “reactionary tendency to turn Nakano Shigeharu the novelist into 
                                                                                                                                            
modern Japan’s literary climate, Nakano vividly detailed the image of the present 
Emperor.”  
65 This stems in large part from the tendency to conflate the voice of the narrator 
with that of Nakano himself, which brings with it its own host of problems. Scholar 
Reiko Abe Auestad’s sensitive reading of Goshaku no Sake argues against this very 
trend to equate author and narrator, and I concur. Abe Auestad, Reiko. “Nakano 
Shigeharu’s ‘Goshaku no Sake.’” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, pg. 79-107.   
66 Eto Jun. Shōwa no Bunjin. Tōkyō: Shinchōsha, 1989, pg. 8 . 
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something safe.”67 Rather, I’ll ask, what is at the root of the narrator’s sympathy and 
how that can be connected to a new sense of national morality? 
The narrator of Goshaku no Sake writes his letter as he drinks his last ounces 
of sake. As a principal, though, with a sense of responsibility, he shies away from 
joining others at the bar, and instead seems to relish in the agony of drinking alone at 
home. His first mention of the emperor system, importantly, is rather indirect, but 
shows how he perceives it as intimately bound to education and morality; his 
students, who had been turned into idiots during the war, began to think for 
themselves when engaging in the debate on the emperor system.  They demanded 
the ability to independently form school councils in exercise of their democratic 
rights, but the teachers, demanding oversight, prevailed in blocking them from doing 
so. To the narrator, the teachers had failed to give the students “just the right push” 
they needed to sustain such activism. The teachers did not encourage and allow 
them to grow, and the student activism that had begun in the early postwar was 
already stagnating.68 The narrator, however, lays the most blame at the feet of the 
Communist Party, which had failed to push the students.  
The narrator continues throughout the text to fault the Communist Party for 
failing to realize the potential for democratic reform in the postwar, not from the 
perspective of an insider per se, but as an educator who has invested hope in the 
                                                 
67 Watanabe, Naomi. Fukei Bungakuron Jōsetsu. Hihyō K kan Sōsho, 17. Tōkyō:  ta 
Shuppan, 1999. pg. 142. 
68 GNS, pg. 410; de Bary, pg. 92-4. 
69 
 
Party to fill the moral vacuum left in the wake of Japan’s defeat, and to be the 
beacon of ethical guidance that could replace the strict educational codes in place 
since Meiji, typified by the Imperial Rescript on Education. Yet, the narrator’s critique 
of the Party is never unqualified: he credits the Communist Party for inciting the 
emperor system debates, which, along with the newly formed Communist Youth 
League, in turn kindled the middle-school students’ passion and cleverness (“tick, 
tick… as if the hands on the face of the watch had started moving again”69).  
In the narrator’s meandering letter, full of reflections on people’s attitudes in 
the new postwar climate, the defining event is significant for its pure lack of climax. 
The emperor and empress appeared in public for a ceremony meant to celebrate the 
new constitution. The event, however, bore no sign of its purpose and shocked the 
narrator not only for its mechanical execution but the vacuous response from those 
gathered.  
When the emperor arrived, not everyone took off their hats, but I took mine 
off. The emperor stepped up on the platform and doffed his own hat. A cheer 
went up. Some mechanical pigeons flew into the air. The emperor left. My 
watch, which read 3:35 when he appeared, read 3:36 when he left. The whole 
process had taken exactly one minute. But when the ceremony was over, I 
was stunned by what began to happen… It was as if nothing had changed.70 
                                                 
69 GNS, pg. 410; de Bary, pg. 91.  
70 de Bary, pg. 94; GNS, pg. 411.  
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The ceremony was marked by brevity and contrivance.71 Some people took off their 
hats, while others did not, signaling the postwar instability over how one greets the 
emperor—while his legal status was stipulated by the constitution, the ramifications 
were yet undecided. The mechanical pigeons, a subtle inclusion by Nakano, 
paralleled both the mechanical movements of the emperor and the artificiality of his 
role, which had been scripted and choreographed by others.  
The way that the ceremony ended reminds the narrator of early morning 
mobilizations that would take place during the war. They would gather, perform their 
drills, and disperse as if it had never happened. Likewise, the Emperor arrived, was 
seen, and once again, the crowd dispersed. Yet, he does not merely connect wartime 
mobilizations with its news postwar ideological form, and the capacity to 
compartmentalize and integrate national events into daily life. Rather, he perceives a 
complete severing of form and content: the celebration to usher in the constitution 
had no relation to the constitution itself. He heard no one mention even the first 
                                                 
71 Takashi Fujitani describes Hirohito’s funeral procession in a remarkably similar 
fashion to this: "Then, at last, we all could see the head of the motorcade coming 
down the avenue. Many people took down their umbrellas. Some bowed their heads 
or put their hands together, while others, camera in hand, took pictures. The 
procession passed quickly, so quickly, in fact, that we could barely catch a glimpse of 
each car that went by… Then, suddenly, it was over. No sooner had the procession 
appeared, than it was gone… The people around me and across the avenue appeared 
dumbfounded for a moment, but they soon understood that there would be no more 
cars coming.  Fujitani realizes that the procession wasn’t designed for the spectators, 
but for the millions watching the live appearance on television. The spectators served 
the purpose of a “live studio audience” in the made-for-television event. Fujitani, 
Takashi. "Electronic Pageantry and Japan's 'Symbolic Emperor.' The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 51. Nov. 1992, pg. 824-850. 
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syllable, ken, of kenpō (constitution), and doubted whether even the Emperor and 
Empress had even uttered the word.  
 The narrator is deeply invested in the possibilities for democratic reform—
even revolution—that the constitution supposedly signifies, and that it could teach. 
He is willing to “stuff it with meaning until it bursts,” but quickly realizes after 
observing the artifice of the ceremony and the indifference of the crowd that he was 
in the vast minority.  
 As readers, we can wonder what the narrator, who appears so earnest, could 
have expected. He would have been well-aware of the contradiction and hypocrisies 
that plagued the postwar occupation and retention of the emperor, and despite that, 
he maintains faith in the new constitution and people until this highly subjective 
moment when he bore witness to the apathy of both the emperor and people. 
Deeply conscious of the irony that the emperor, who two years earlier played the 
role of military leader, now had the task of promoting a democratic and pacifist 
constitution, how could the narrator have been surprised in the least? Is not the 
nature of ceremony itself always artifice? I believe that this is precisely the point: the 
contrivance of the ceremony, the promotion of the constitution by the emperor, and 
even the flimsy attempts by SCAP to give the false impression that the constitution 
was authored by Japanese people and not SCAP authorities, created the perfect 
grounds for critique. With all of the elements for critique—and thus education—
aligned, the failure to capture them productively is the lost opportunity that the 
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narrator feels so acutely. Moreover, for him, this is not merely a rational critique of 
the current political order, but fundamentally a question of affect, of feeling 
(kankaku).  
 He imagines two contrasting visions following the dispersed ceremony, that of 
the people returning to their homes, and that of the Emperor and Empress returning 
to their palace. Both sides breathe a sigh of relief, but there is a sharp difference in 
feeling between the relief one feels upon returning home from the hustle and bustle 
of the daily grind and its dangers and diseases, and the relief one feels when escaping 
into the secluded world that necessarily is inaccessible to the rest of the people, 
“where human life stirs not a single echo.”72 The narrator wants the Community 
Party to tap into this affective difference—“a feeling on one’s skin”—and to teach the 
people to feel it. In other words, one cannot accept that the difference separating 
the emperor and the people has been collapsed by the constitution when at such as 
basic level, as basic as the sigh of relief upon returning home, a great rift remains and 
reinforces the hierarchical order of pre-defeat Japan.   
 The constitution, for the narrator, could be the opportunity to expose this rift, 
not only because of its content, but also for the circumstances surrounding it, 
especially the deceptive tactics of its inception and promulgation. This deception was 
typified by the collusion between the Japanese government and SCAP occupying 
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forces to give the illusion of Japanese agency in forming the postwar order. The 
narrator bemoans,  
So many aspects of our situation are exemplified in the Constitution; it could 
be used to teach us so many things. The morning it went to the Diet, or 
perhaps the day before, SCAP announced in the newspapers that the 
preliminary draft had been written by a Japanese. This is our Constitution, 
supposedly being created by Japanese, and yet the government has had to 
beg the foreigners to announce that a preliminary draft was written by a 
Japanese! Can our people accept the abject position of their government in 
silence? And why couldn’t the Communist Party have been the first to 
perceive this and to call out to the people?73  
It is perfectly fitting with the critique of the narrator, and complete validation of his 
argument, that the Occupation censors—the Civil Censorship Detachment—deleted 
the all but the first and last sentences of this passage in the original publication of 
Goshaku no Sake.74  Mention of SCAP here in Goshaku no Sake was a bold inclusion 
by Nakano because the censorship policies of the Occupation forces prohibited both 
reference to the fact that SCAP contributed to writing the constitution and criticism 
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of SCAP for having any role in the creation of the constitution.75 The text suggests 
that the narrator himself, who cannot even drink at a bar in fear of being perceived 
as having committed impropriety, fears censorship if not censure.76 He worries at the 
beginning of the letter that he might be purged from his role as educator. At the 
same time, censorship itself is not made an explicit issue in the text, which ironically 
would have been censored as mentioning that SCAP could participate in censorship 
after having liberated Japanese writers from the strict policies of imperial Japan was 
grounds for censorship.  
The narrator continues to act in his neutral arbitrating role as principal, to 
reveal his thoughts in the safe space of a letter to sympathetic friend, and is so intent 
on finding fault with the inability of the Communist Party to step into its role of moral 
leader that it makes one wonder if the narrator wants to deflect his own inability to 
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do so. On the other hand, he too acts boldly in his role of educator, has every 
intention of “properly dealing with the problems” at hand, and pushes the students 
to grasp how an affective mode of understanding is essential for attacking the root of 
the problem: the failure to realize the democratic potential of the present. Thus, 
within the narrator we can witness tensions pulling him in two directions: he is 
fearful of reprisal and annoyed by misunderstandings of his students, who are not 
afraid to ridicule him, while at the same time he embodies the type of perceptive, 
principled, and moral guidance that he so repeatedly demands of the Communist 
Party.  
 The greatest and most consistent insight of the narrator is his delicate 
separation of what is continuous and what is discontinuous from pre-defeat to post-
defeat. This insight covers the Constitution, the emperor, the emperor system, and 
the symbolic infrastructure that reproduces them; it also includes the recognition of 
what is continuous and discontinuous among attitudes toward these. The 
Constitution was to be the most momentous codification of newness and 
discontinuity from the past, and yet, remnants from pre-defeat completely 
obstructed a change in perception. For example, the narrator is baffled that the 
emperor “had the constitution promulgated” by the Privy Council. “What does that 
mean?” he asks, curious how the emperor, whose authority is stripped by that very 
constitution, would even pretend to have such power as to authorize a constitution 
written by the occupying powers. Upon viewing an image in the newspaper of the 
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ratification of the Constitution, the narrator expresses shock that the event was 
staged in front of a gold screen, the same gold screen used during the war:  
Was that a new gold screen that was standing behind them while they 
conferred? Or had they taken the old one which was damaged in the bombing 
and restored it?... If they really wanted to restore the screen, couldn’t that 
have at least transformed it into something entirely new, something to go 
along with the emperor’s change to civilian clothes? Utterly shameless gold 
screen.77 
This seemingly inconsequential part of the backdrop is indicative of much larger 
trend that is the central target of the narrator’s critique: the meticulous care involved 
in giving the illusion of continuity of the emperor system despite its fundamental 
restructuring, no less a restructuring dictated by the occupying forces, and in 
particular, the United States. It was a mixed message: Japan’s democracy is new, but 
it is perfectly compatible with the past; it is rupture, but rupture sanctioned by the 
emperor’s revision of the Meiji Constitution.  
The priority of the postwar government was to repair all elements related to 
the image of the postwar emperor system. Despite the ostensible democratization of 
Japan and the restructured role of the emperor and supposed strict separation of 
state Shinto from governmental affairs, the government’s priority was to maintain 
absolute continuity with the optics of wartime Japan in everything but the emperor’s 
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business suit. This is why the gold screen is so offensive to the narrator, so 
shameless. It represented a symbolic disavowal of discontinuity itself.78 It 
represented hostility to the new democratic order, and discord with the emperor’s 
wardrobe change. This discord of form and content is the moral issue that needs to 
be addressed, and the narrator directs his frustration at the Communist Party and 
their publication, Akahata, for not spelling it out. He says that if establishing national 
morality (minzoku dōtoku) is a main objective for the Party, isn’t it sabotaging itself?  
 Nakano Shigeharu himself singles out the emperor as a prime impediment to 
moral awareness in the postwar. In his short piece entitled “Morality and the 
Emperor”79 from February 23rd 1946, published in Akahata, he bluntly characterizes 
the emperor himself as counterfeit. I will quote the short text in its entirety:  
People demand morality. Even if what they see is painful, they demand one 
thread of morality that will pierce through every aspect of their lives. They 
hate when democracy is faked by merely repainting the sign because such 
fakeness leads to moral decay in their lives. If “might is right and justice its 
servant” and if a heron80 tries to pass as a crow, the spiritual basis for the 
people’s sincere effort will lose its support. Imposters deploy every method 
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and excuse so that the voices of the people who demand morality will have to 
submit to their sheer power.  
Yet, among all imposters, no one has displayed as much fakeness as the 
emperor. Yesterday a god, today a human—no one has exhibited such 
willingness to play the crow. During the rescript on New Year’s Day, he didn’t 
so much as burp in the direction of those who died in war; immediately after 
impressing his stamp (hanko) to require mandatory rice deliveries to the 
government as well as financial capital relief, he used those same hands to 
change into a sports jacket and headed out in his royal train to visit the war-
ravaged sites. There is no single other person who is as counterfeit. The 
emperor is the Counterfeiter King. And it’s this crow that is the source of 
corruption of the people’s morality. 
Nakano here responds to what we might call Hirohito’s official wardrobe change, the 
“Declaration of Humanity,” in which he stated that “the ties between Us and Our 
people… are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine” on 
January 1, 1946. Goshaku no Sake, focused on the Constitution’s promulgation during 
November of the same year, seems to parallel the logic of “Morality and the 
Emperor” despite its change in voice and style. To Nakano, “repainting the sign”—i.e. 
changing the appearance of the emperor—is the source of moral decay; to the 
narrator, restoring the gold screen does the same moral disservice by obstructing 
awareness of the profound change that is supposed to be taking place. To Nakano, 
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the hand used to sign into law oppressive levies that burdened the citizenry during 
war was the same hand used to button-up the postwar emperor’s sports jacket that 
he wore to console those same victims of war; to the narrator, the gold screen that 
was present in the Diet when Japan declared war was the same gold screen that 
served as backdrop for the ratification of the postwar pacifist Constitution. The 
emperor’s hand and the gold screen were the same objects as before, but what they 
signified had flipped; the only marker of change was Hirohito’s wardrobe. The 
continuity of the objects masked the radical rupture with the past.  
 Nakano deals with the question of “morality” here—just as the narrator of 
Goshaku no Sake—to sharply direct his focus to a role of the wartime emperor that 
was smuggled into the postwar in order to assert continuity in the face of its absence. 
Maruyama Masao, in his influential 1946 essay “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-
Nationalism,” describes how morality during the war was inseparable from the 
kokutai, which included all “internal values of truth, morality, and beauty” as well as 
scholarship. All of these were to be performed in the loyal service to the nation and 
emperor, in whom absolute values are embodied because he is “the eternal 
culmination of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful throughout all ages and in all 
places.”81 Since morality was embodied in the person of the emperor himself, 
morality was connected to proximity to him and the ability to carry out the affairs of 
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the nation on his behalf, a vertical structure with the emperor at the apex, which for 
Maruyama meant that military generals were able to carry out grave atrocities 
because the morality of service to the nation superseded all else. Yet, the vertical 
chain reached even the bottom of the society; each group within society was ordered 
in relation to its proximity to the emperor; the lowest group had to pay deference to 
the group one order of magnitude closer to the emperor, and on and on. Whatever 
the merits of Maruyama’s specific argument, it is enough to demonstrate the 
interconnectedness between nation, emperor, and morality in the ideology of 
wartime Japan. In postwar Japan, and especially after the emperor’s “Declaration of 
Humanity” and the promulgation of the Constitution, the premises for this 
interconnectedness were exploded, and they should no longer have cohered. Yet, 
they persisted. In the postwar, nation, emperor, and morality were reconstituted and 
reconnected as if there were continuity between pre- and post-defeat Japan. When 
Nakano argues, then, of the postwar emperor embodying the antithesis of morality, 
and the cause of moral decay, he does not mean to pose an alternative, positive 
formulation for morality, as was clearly the explicit goal of Maruyama as well as the 
narrator of Goshaku no Sake. Rather, he is deconstructing morality as it was 
reconstituted in the early postwar, in the mirror of its wartime model.  
Thus, for Nakano, the “Declaration of Humanity” is the perfect ground for 
deconstructing morality. An emperor who was “moral” would not ignore those who 
died in war (he “didn’t so much as burp in the direction of those who died in war”) 
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and defile their graves by insisting that the reason they went to war—the divine 
emperor—was never valid.82 Likewise a “moral” emperor would not disavow the 
brutal war for which he himself was supreme commander and turnaround overnight 
to proclaim that he was the moral embodiment of Japan’s democratic order, which, 
by the way, always existed, if we are to believe the intent of quoting the entire 
Charter Oath. Needless to say, for Nakano, to treat the postwar symbol emperor as 
an individual human is to relinquish him of the burden of acting as arbiter of 
morality.  
Fake, imposter, counterfeit, source of morality’s corruption—these are not 
words reserved for an emperor that Nakano treats sympathetically; “Morality and 
the Emperor” is bubbling with antipathy. It is also evidence of the danger of equating 
the voice of the narrator, who is sympathetic toward the emperor, with that of 
Nakano himself, and why we must reject, following Watanabe, any attempt to turn 
him into something “safe.”83 This does not mean, however, that the narrator, who is 
sympathetic to the emperor, is safe either—quite the contrary. Nakano’s 
representation of the type of observational analysis performed by the narrator of 
Goshaku no Sake equally unveils the counterfeit status of both the postwar emperor 
and emperor system, and offers profound insight into how they were both 
                                                 
82 Mishima Yukio completely agrees on this point, although he does so from a 
completely different perspective. See especially my discussion of Eirei no Koe.  
83 In fact, toward the end of Goshaku no Sake, the narrator’s language for the 
emperor system mirrors the language Nakano had used for the emperor here, 
demanding the emperor’s liberation from the moral degradation of the emperor 
system. GNS, 418.  
82 
 
represented (by the government) and perceived (by the public), giving us one 
example of how someone might have seen through the artifice. The narrator, a 
principal, speaks from a perspective that Nakano himself does not inhabit, but that 
many others in the postwar did, a fact that speaks both to Nakano’s sensitivity as a 
writer and may have made the text resonant with its readers.  
Moreover, the representation of the “Declaration of Humanity” in both pieces 
gives us a clear image of two possible, but very different, readings. In “The Emperor 
and Morality,” the individual emperor had agency in crafting his new image: 
“Yesterday a god, today a human—no one has exhibited such willingness to play the 
crow [and to conceal that he is a sagi, a heron/fraud].” Later in Goshaku no Sake, the 
narrator cites the “Declaration of Humanity” as most forceful demonstration that the 
emperor is completely imprisoned and subordinate to the totalitarianism of the 
emperor system, with no agency: “Has there ever been, anywhere, an individual so 
violated (jūrin sareta) as to be forced to say, ‘I am not a god’ (ore ha kami de nai)?”84 
For Nakano, the emperor is a fraud, and for the narrator, he is a captive and pawn. 
Both positions are deeply rooted in truth: the emperor was complete captive, 
especially to Douglas MacArthur and SCAP as well as the Imperial Household Agency, 
and at the same time, had an active role in performing and narrating his role. At 
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least, his role as performer was a condition of his imprisonment, and he proved to be 
a highly obedient captive.   
3.4  The responsibility of an educator 
 In his role as educator, the narrator of Goshaku no Sake seems most 
concerned with instilling conscience among his students, who, in their newfound 
vigor in questioning authority have not only embraced the Communist Party 
(presumably they are members of the Communist Youth League), but use it and 
Akahata to attack their principal, the narrator. This is why the inability of Akahata to 
convey to these students the nature of the postwar emperor system—especially as 
something that they must also perceive at an affective level—is so frustrating to him. 
Without being able to convey this to students, they behave as mere partisan hacks 
more likely to form their critique based on affiliation rather than analysis.85 At an 
impasse, the narrator does not know how to further push his students, even while 
knowing what undergirds their misunderstanding:  
At the root of their problems, I would like to suggest, is their conception of 
the emperor and the emperor system. Their inability to distinguish between 
the individual and the institution. It is because of this distinction that the 
question of abolishing the emperor system is inseparable from the task of 
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establishing a sense of national conscience. To put it another way, what we 
have to think about is the liberation of the emperor as a human being.86 
This quote, the central thesis of the narrator’s long letter, succinctly encompasses 
the questions he grapples with throughout, the questions of continuity and 
discontinuity, morality, the Communist Party’s postwar role, and the centrality of the 
emperor and emperor system. The narrator is frustrated to hear his students speak 
of the emperor in terms of the value of his land and capital. It demonstrated that 
they, parroting the reinstated Communist Party of the postwar, treated the postwar 
emperor system no differently than when the term was coined in the Comintern 
Theses of 1932, in which the emperor was dubbed Japan’s greatest landlord87; they 
treated it anachronistically.  And despite yet another narrative that originated in the 
Meiji Era that clearly delineated separation of the body of the emperor with the body 
politic as symbolized by the emperor—the narrative of the emperor’s two bodies—
this analytical framework was lost on them as well.   
Polling done in 1946 supports the narrator’s observation that many were 
unable to distinguish between the emperor and the emperor system. Respondents 
overwhelmingly supported the emperor system, but used “emperor” and “emperor 
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system” nearly synonymously.88 Yet, these same supporters believed that the military 
leaders should face responsibility and that the emperor should stay outside of 
politics, suggesting that they actually did not support the pre-defeat emperor system; 
in other words, they supported an “emperor system” but not the wartime one. SCAP, 
very aware of the confusion, invented the postwar emperor system by capitalizing on 
the inability of others to make the distinction89; by retaining the emperor and 
destroying the wartime emperor system, SCAP could reconstitute the postwar 
emperor system any way it pleased and still ensure popular support, which it did in 
the form of the symbolic emperor system.  
 More shocking is that while popular sentiment supported the postwar version 
of the emperor system as invented by SCAP (and approved by their Diet), the 
Communist Party continued to reject the emperor system based on its prewar and 
wartime form, completely ignoring that it had already been completely destroyed. 
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Therefore, in Goshaku no Sake, the Communist Party and the narrator’s students 
want to abolish something that no longer exists; this anachronism is what the 
narrator sees as the biggest hindrance to conceiving of the postwar order and the 
emperor’s role in it. Furthermore, in failing to acknowledge the nature of the 
invented and constructed postwar emperor system, the Party’s critique was vacuous, 
misleading, and ultimately, impotent. That is why the narrator wants the Party to 
rethink its strategy if wants to establish national morality. As he says, “abolishing the 
emperor system is inseparable from the task of establishing a sense of national 
conscience,” but he doesn’t mean the emperor system of pre-defeat. The narrator 
wants to abolish the postwar emperor system, a system fraught with contradiction 
because it combines a supposed “human” emperor and a “symbolic” one in which 
hierarchical and anti-democratic structures are reconstituted. Therefore, to “liberate 
the emperor as a human being” means to take the “Declaration of Humanity” 
seriously and to refuse to give him a symbolic role in which he, like his wartime form, 
is the arbiter and embodiment of truth, morality, and beauty. In essence, the 
Communist Party’s focus on the wartime emperor system—again, opposing 
something that no longer exists—contributes to the reproduction of the postwar 
emperor system because, in its misplaced opposition and negation, it is unable to 
articulate substantive resistance. It reproduces the “system” by insisting that it still 
exists, preventing radical treatment of the emperor as human. This is what the 
narrator means when he calls for the liberation of the emperor as a human being 
from the emperor system; it means exposing that SCAP destroyed it once and for all.  
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 This interpretation is critical for understanding the sympathy that the narrator 
feels for the emperor. He would not feel sympathy for the emperor that mourns the 
suffering of his subjects—such sympathy would serve to reinforce the emperor as 
tied to the emperor system, in any form. Nor would his be sympathy for an emperor 
that symbolizes national unity—that too would bind the emperor to the emperor 
system. Rather, the narrator is sympathetic to the human emperor that, were he 
freed, would have no symbolic or moral function. He’s sympathetic to a human 
whose every move is choreographed and line scripted because he sees that as 
complete imprisonment. In a democratic Japan, the emperor and his family, who 
supposedly are models for that democracy, are the only ones not liberated. Yet, if 
that were the case—if any one individual were exempted from democratic 
freedom—it would cease to be democracy. This, I believe, is why the narrator wants 
the Communist Party to shed its anachronistic view of the emperor system, and 
instead demand that the emperor be released from bondage, as it might do for any 
other oppressed person. This is the radical recognition of the emperor as a human 
being: taking democracy to its logical conclusion in addressing the emperor system.  
3.5 Representing the representation: Media in Goshaku no Sake 
The narrator documents a critical juncture in the media’s representation of 
the emperor as human. Mass media had presented images of the Showa Emperor as 
military leader on his white horse, a legacy of the first mass-media emperor, Meiji, 
whose dual images of Shinto priest on one hand and generalissimo on the other were 
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carefully crafted to project the image of an emperor that was both god and man, 
ancient and modern. Yet, the postwar portrayal of the Showa emperor was intended 
to collapse the distance between the emperor and his subjects, to be able to see him, 
with his meek stature and compassionate expression, as an “everyman,” as just 
another citizen. Other than the narrator’s first encounter with the emperor 
documented in his letter—the brief, impersonal, and anti-climactic ceremony for the 
constitution—his “observations” of the emperor, and the inferences he draws from 
them, are completely mediated by fragmented images, newsreels, essays, and the 
people around him, a collage. In fact, Goshaku no Sake is as much a response to the 
role of media, and its consumption by the masses, in the production of the postwar 
emperor system as it is a critique of the government and SCAP. It is no less than a 
discursive analysis that decenters the object of critique (the emperor), and instead 
focuses on how the object is presented and represented, and further, how that 
representation is represented.90 This is why it is so critical to the narrator that the 
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Communist Party, as expressed through its publication, Akahata, give a 
representation that reflects the mechanism at work in the construction of the 
postwar emperor. They have missed the clues in the media, such as the gold screen, 
which the narrator could have only known about through a printed picture.  
While the postwar afforded unprecedented opportunity for mass media to 
represent of the emperor’s humanity, it had already been playing a crucial role in 
portraying the emperor since the Meiji Period. The narrator vividly recalls a 
watercolor depiction of a younger Showa Emperor’s visit to England on a postcard, 
carefully describing the scene of the young emperor, a diminutive figure in uniform 
was surrounded by commanding Brits in classy suits. Looking at the image, he 
imagines the type of infantilizing comments that the British might have made toward 
the emperor, who appeared like a lost child among them. Even though it was a 
sketch without dialogue, it was this representation of the emperor that was so clearly 
conveyed; the narrator, ashamed at how meek the emperor seemed next to the 
others,91 covered the postcard with his hands out of a “sense of racial solidarity” 
(jinruiteki dōhō kankaku). There is no doubt that the form of narrator’s sympathy 
                                                                                                                                            
Role of the West and Asia Binary." South Altantic Quarterly, 99 (4). Fall 2000, pg. 803. 
(my italics). I am arguing that through Goshaku no Sake, Nakano critiques both the 
production of this discourse and ways in which it is consumed and validated. To the 
narrator, Akahata reproduces the discourse by constantly misrecognizing the 
problem, but recognizes that it is only one factor in the larger discursive complex.  
91 The postcard that the narrator describes here seems to parallel the exact type of 
diminutive and infantilized emperor represented in the side-by-side photograph of 
Hirohito and Douglas MacArthur, and surely evoked similar responses of shame and 
pity. It makes me wonder if Nakano had this very photograph in mind, and 
intentionally disguised it as the scene in the postcard in order to avoid censorship.  
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here—which seemingly could be easily absorbed by the family-state ideology—is 
troubling, but even his refusal to deny this affective response paints a much more 
nuanced picture.  
 In the next medium of representation, a small newspaper article, a reporter 
had asked the public to give thoughts on the Crown Prince (Hirohito) becoming 
regent after the emperor (Taishō Emperor Yoshihito) became ill and unfit to rule. The 
narrator couldn’t quite understand why a reporter would ask the public to respond to 
such a matter.  
To tell you the truth, this in itself was something quite new to me. Wasn’t it 
just a matter of course that the Crown Prince became Regent when the 
emperor fell ill? What was the purpose of reporting people’s reactions to 
this? I was given to understand that in Tokyo, unlike the countryside, this is an 
event.92  
What seems like mere rambling thoughts of the narrator, and of little relevance to 
the analysis of the emperor system, is actually quite important; it points to the 
growth of the representation of emperor and the inclusion of the public in forming 
this representation. The emperor system could not be, and never was, a unilateral 
application of violence or coercion upon the people, although violence was always at 
its disposal; rather, it demanded that people respond and shape it reciprocally. Only 
though this willing and non-coerced participation (whether emotional investment in 
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the form of sympathy or the resolution to die in battle for the emperor93) could it 
truly be legitimated. In the example above, the state did not initiate the call to 
respond to the emperor’s illness and Crown Prince’s assumption of the regency. A 
newspaper reporter sought responses from the public, thus serving a critical function 
in the production of the emperor system: he called on them to react, asking them to 
respond emotionally to the status of the emperor.  
This example also presages the proliferation of media representation that 
would come about with the postwar, and uncannily parallels the production of 
nationalism and reconstitution of emperor system ideology in the nation’s 
participation in the representation of Hirohito’s decline and death nearly seventy 
years after he had assumed regency in 1921.94 In the article itself, a sailor expressed 
pity for the empress (kōgōsama ga o ki no doku desu), which the narrator 
understands years later to mean that he felt pity for an individual caught up in the 
machinery of a political system in which “family” was completely erased. There is no 
household (katei) nor is there family (kazoku) for the empress. Nothing more than a 
pure expression of politics, the individual members of the imperial family have 
                                                 
93 See Tanabe Hajime. “Kokka no dōgisei (The ethicality of the state).” Tanabe Hajime 
Zenshu, 8. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963,  01-220. Such texts attest to the fact that 
resolution to die for the emperor was not the norm, but had to be justified 
philosophically. It is also the case that a vast majority of kamikaze pilots were 
coerced into their act.  
94 See especially Sakai, Naoki. “Return to the West/Return to the East: Watsuji 
Tetsurō’s Anthropology and Discussions of Authenticity.” Translation and 
Subjectivity: On ‘Japan’ and Cultural Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997, pg. 72-5.  
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neither family nor can they express shame. It’s on these grounds that the narrator 
feels both sympathy (dōjō) and pity (ki no doku) for them. Rather than embodying 
democracy in the postwar, they are expressions of totalitarianism in which the 
individual is negated and sacrificed. When the narrator speaks of liberating the 
emperor from the emperor system, it is about liberating the body of this emperor, 
and extricating the symbolic function that his captivity serves. 
Photographs of the emperor and his family were instrumental in the postwar 
representation of an emperor that can evoke sympathy—a human, a father and 
family man, just another citizen, one of us. The narrator contrasts these 
representations—new access into the private lives of the emperor and his family—
with those of the Meiji Emperor, who refused to be photographed, prompting some 
painters to portray him in the likeness of Emperor Jimmu and vice versa.95 He 
describes photographs published in the Yomiuri in which the empress wore modern 
clothes and the young crown prince (Akihito) mischievously smiled. These types of 
                                                 
95 Fujitani Takashi tracks the “spectacular transformation” of the Meiji Emperor, who 
was completely refashioned to project the image of a strong military leader between 
1872 and 1873. In 1872, he was photographed in full court-style sokutai clothing 
without facial hair and looking less than imposing in large flowing garments. By 1873, 
a photograph captured him in Western-style military uniform, brandishing a sword, 
and having grown facial hair. Yet, Edoardo Chiossone captures the most imposing, 
forceful, and dignified image of Meiji in a photographic portrait in 1888.This portrait, 
which Fujitani calls a “copy of a copy of a representation,” began as a sketch of the 
emperor himself, which came the model for the seated portrait of the emperor. This 
drawing was finally photographed, and the image became widely distributed in 
Japan. As Fujitani notes, “for most people in Japan in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, this simulacrum three steps removed was the emperor’s real 
presence.” Fujitani, 1998, pg. 174-178. 
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photographs aimed to collapse the distance between the people and their emperor 
as well as encourage affection for them. Yet, for the narrator, just like the staged 
ceremony for the constitution, the photographs are evidence that the emperor and 
his family are forced into compliance down to the pose and smile. They are told, 
“Look this way! Now, smile!” Rather than feeling affection, he is sympathetic to their 
complete captivity and suffocation.  
 The final medium that the narrator describes in his letter is film, in the form 
of newsreels. After suspecting that his students had misunderstood a newsreel of the 
emperor’s visit to a school in Chiba, part of his postwar imperial tour (junkō),96 he 
goes to view the newsreel for himself. The emperor he witnesses is “decent” and 
“womanly” and has a high-pitched voice. He is uncalculating, awkward, and merely 
following orders. The narrator describes the earnest attempt of the emperor to 
communicate with the students at the school in Chiba, but he cannot perform even 
the simplest task, such as waiting for the answer to the questions that he’s clearly 
been fed (which alternated between “Did your house burn down?” and “Do you need 
textbooks?”) before moving on to the next student. He bops along from student to 
student, taking his hat off and putting it back on, a completely absurd scene 
(tonchinkan na bamen).  
The narrator’s students interpreted the newsreel as reactionary, a thinly 
veiled attempt to instill adoration for the emperor as a god (tennō wo kami toshite 
                                                 
96 A tactic intended to draw more parallels between the Shōwa and Meiji Emperors.  
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agameru hōkō e) through manipulative editing, particularly because of its inclusion of 
female students who wept at the sight of the emperor and shouted “banzai.” Like in 
other episodes that the narrator recounts, his students were utterly incapable of 
understanding the emperor and emperor system at an affective level. Their lack of 
moral sensitivity (dōtoku kankaku) prevented them from understanding logically 
(rikutsu) that those same female students who cried before the emperor might have 
been their very sisters, or their future girlfriends or wives. The narrator is not 
suggesting that his students cry at the sight of the emperor, but that they must be 
sensitive to his ability to provoke tears, and to distinguish that those tears are in 
response to the postwar emperor, not their anachronistic understanding of the 
wartime emperor-god. In fact, to the narrator, the entire existence (zensonzai) of the 
emperor ought to be cried over. One ought to shed tears over the state of the 
postwar emperor, the mechanical human puppet depicted in the newsreel, whose 
awkwardness and complete inability to act natural in his new clothes—his prescribed 
role—drew mocking laughter from other theatergoers and scorn from his students. 
What he identified in his students and theatergoers as moral insensitivity, the 
narrator sees represented as a general trend in postwar Japan: moral impotence 
(dōtoku inpotentsu).97  
 The narrator seems to oscillate between accusing his students (and now the 
nation, although his students are the deepest source of his frustration) of 
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misunderstanding the nature of the problem on an intellectual or logical level, on one 
hand, and of being morally insensitive, on the other. However, intellectual awareness 
and moral sensitivity, or consciousness and conscientiousness, do not exist 
independently for the narrator; in fact, they mutually inform one another. The crucial 
intellectual (or analytical) problem exposed in the text is the persistent failure to 
identify that a) the emperor system of the postwar is a completely new construct,  
that b) it is independent of the wartime emperor system, but that c) its postwar form 
still promotes the illusion of continuity through carefully crafted narratives. The 
disavowal of some aspects of the wartime emperor system—the emperor’s political 
role, Empire, “fascism”—are minimized only for the purpose of insisting on the 
continuous and transcendent aspects of the imperial line.  
  An equally analytical issue is that the emperor as an individual human is 
distinct from the emperor system (just as the Body natural is distinct from the Body 
politic in the fiction of the “king’s two bodies”) and that conflation of the two is also 
an anachronistic interpretation that parallels pre-war and wartime ideologues that 
called for complete identification of emperor and state. What the invention of the 
postwar emperor system exposes is that the emperor as individual is independent of 
the emperor system because the wartime emperor system as such was completely 
dismantled by SCAP, and yet the individual human emperor was retained; the 
individual emperor and the emperor system were independent variables. In other 
words, when Hirohito proclaimed that the “kokutai had been maintained” in his 
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surrender speech, we should interpret it to refer to neither nationality itself nor the 
imperial institution. The only thing maintained was him, the individual emperor, the 
body of Hirohito.  
Why then is it a question of moral insensitivity and impotence? The failure to 
sympathize with or pity the emperor as a human being that is suffocated by the 
system, the failure to treat him with the moral decency that considers a fellow 
democratic citizen as an equal (if one is to be serious about following through with a 
democratic revolution), and the failure to demand that he be liberated from captivity 
meant that the nation missed every opportunity to reach the same conclusion by 
virtue of their moral sensitivity: that the emperor and the emperor system are 
distinct. The text is an empirical study of the various forms of media—photographs, 
postcards, newsreels, articles—that provide every clue necessary to draw the same 
conclusions as the narrator, but the inability to do so demonstrates a problem of 
morality, and once again, a problem of education. The Communist Party failed to 
point this out, and thus failed to act as moral guide in the postwar. If we can include 
then the various forms of media (print, sound, moving image, etc.) in the systemic 
production of the representation of the emperor in the postwar without 
problematizing this very representation, then that media only serve to reinforce and 
reproduce the emperor system in its new postwar form, even if the media contain 
the elements for its deconstruction (mechanical pigeons, the gold screen, the forced 
smiles in the photographs, the clumsy emperor). Nakano’s sensitive portrayal not 
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only of this collage of representations in the media but also the response from the 
narrator and those around him—the representation of the representation—give a 
profoundly rich context to how the emperor system was understood in the postwar 
and the rapid drive to concretize the position of the emperor within it.98  
3.6 The Puppet and the missing Puppeteer 
 The genealogy of the narrator’s sympathy for the emperor, in his citation of 
several pre-defeat images, sets up what becomes for him anger directed at the 
emperor for his own failure to behave in a human and moral manner toward what 
appears to be a former friend. He gives us two scenes of the Emperor of Manchuria, 
Pu Yi, a mere puppet ruler of the Japanese Empire. The first, which was part of 
another newsreel, featured the Shōwa Emperor, who had gone to Tokyo station with 
his family to greet the arrival of Pu Yi and his wife. With awkward movements and 
gestures, the emperor had appeared to the narrator as completely “decent,” with 
little concern for vanity and putting on airs of dignity. The narrator could sympathize 
with this earnest, unassuming, even aloof scholarly attitude that the emperor 
                                                 
98 Consequently, published over a decade later, Nakano’s Nashi no Hana (“Pear 
Flowers”), 1957-8, is also deeply concerned with how representation is mediated 
through magazines, photographs, newspapers at the end of the Meiji Era, marking 
the decline of oral narratives and storytelling. With reference to Walter Benjamin’s 
writing on the storyteller, Miriam Silverberg provides an excellent analysis of this 
text, which she says, “provides a commentary on the reproduction and 
commodification of culture as it documents the entrance into village life of the 
nationwide print culture that had been both a platform and target for Nakano’s work 
during the second half of the 19 0s.” Silverberg, Miriam. Changing Song: The Marxist 
Manifestos of Nakano Shigeharu. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pg. 16.  
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displayed. The second scene is of Pu Yi’s interrogation at the Tokyo War Crimes 
Tribunal, which the narrator had read about in a newspaper article. Despite being a 
puppet, lawyers attacked him, asking whether he believed that being forced to be a 
puppet at the risk of losing his life if he disobeyed was grounds for evading 
responsibility. To the narrator, it was a monstrous (shūkai) scene. The emperor and 
the people watched on as the lawyers sadistically attacked Pu Yi, while no one 
pointed out the contrast between the puppet and the puppeteer, the Emperor of 
Manchuria and the Emperor of Japan. It becomes clear that the narrator’s 
“sympathy” for the postwar emperor begins to unravel, or can only be considered 
with significant qualification. He tries to imagine a scene in which the emperor went 
to visit the “unlucky former emperor,” Pu Yi, to ask for forgiveness. Had the emperor 
done that, the narrator would have been able to forgive him, but he of course had 
not. While the narrator makes it clear he believes that the emperor system is to 
blame for the emperor’s inability to act in such moral human decency—calling once 
again to liberate the emperor from the emperor system and its moral corruption—it 
is clear that the narrator, in his inability to forgive the individual emperor, holds him 
personally responsible, if not for war crimes themselves, then for the moral 
insensitivity of keeping silent while Pu Yi and others take the fall. Consistently, 
Goshaku no Sake is structured to withhold final judgment on the emperor’s war 
culpability, but to expose the naked inconsistencies and hypocrisies in prosecuting 
the war without scrutinizing the role of the emperor, or even asking whether he is 
the most appropriate symbol for the new democratic order. The Japanese 
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government and the Occupation that have reconstructed the emperor system are 
responsible for this moral corruption, but so is the emperor himself, and the narrator 
lays the blame squarely at the feet of the Communist Party for not guiding the people 
toward a moral understanding of this:  
How can we talk about the “rebirth of the nation” without confronting the 
task of establishing a sense of national conscience (dōgi), national morality 
(dōtoku)? And out of what will a sense of national conscience be born if we 
cannot deal concretely with the emperor and the emperor system?99  
To deal with the emperor and emperor system concretely would be to expose them 
to scrutiny both in the courts and in public discourse, and not pretend that they can 
somehow be cleanly extricated. It would mean, as Nakano writes in his essay 
“Patriotism and Treason,” that the true moral path does treat the puppets as 
puppets, but in doing so, also treats the puppeteers as puppeteers.100  
 This is the closest the narrator gets to dealing with the concrete question of 
the emperor’s war responsibility, but utilizes parallel logic to a text that Nakano 
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In “Literature and before literature” (bungaku to bungaku izen no koto), for example, 
he makes the issue of Pu Yi and Hirohito, puppet and puppeteer, a question of 
national morality: “When we as Japanese consider the problem of war as our own 
problem and as the nation’s problem, where could we find any justice and pride as 
Japanese if we treat the former emperor of Manchukuo as a coward and idiot while 
refusing to lay a finger on his originator, the emperor of Japan?” See NSZ, Vol. 1 , pg. 
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wrote entitled, “The Emperor and War Crime Responsibility.”101 That is, he 
demonstrates that the tribunal’s scrutiny of the various actors involved in the Pacific 
War provides the most cogent and obvious indictment of the emperor and the 
emperor system. The scrutiny of Pu Yi, the puppet, pointed directly back to the 
puppeteer, Hirohito.102 Likewise, those Japanese high officials who claimed 
innocence because they were forced pointed directly back to the authority that 
“forced” them, Hirohito. Nakano begins the essay by mentioning how the Shidehara 
Cabinet made the announcement that the people bore no responsibility for war 
crimes, which Nakano believes was made in response to widespread retaliation for 
the government’s implication that the people were responsible, notably with Prince 
Higashikuni’s call for “mass repentance” (ichioku sōzange) of all the people of Japan. 
The government, too, believed all generals were equally innocent. To quote from 
“The Emperor and War Crime Responsibility,” 
They say that they fought only because they were “at the mercy of fate.” The 
guys arrested—senior statesmen and people of their ilk—continued to insist 
that they bore no responsibility, that they were forced into it, and that they 
were against the war in their “heart of hearts.” Yet, they insisted that they 
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102 Of course, this raises another issue, which was that the postwar emperor Hirohito 
was also a puppet of the Occupation. See Fujitani Takashi’s analysis of “Reischauer 
Memo,” and the memo itself, in which Reischauer called on the US to spare the 
emperor from war responsibility and maintaining him for use as a puppet far more 
effective than Pu Yi ever was. Fujitani, Takashi, "The Reischauer Memo: Mr. Moto, 
Hirohito, and Japanese-American Soldiers." Critical Asian Studies 33:3.Routledge, 
2001, pg. 379-402 
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still had not betrayed their principles, and that they did not fear being killed. 
It was simply that the emperor declared war, and therefore, they absolutely 
had to follow along because “the emperor’s words have the force of law 
(shōshōhikkin 承詔必謹),” and “the way of the loyal subject is action (shindō 
jissen臣道実践).” The guys in the Diet said the same thing: they had no 
responsibility for war crimes. And their reason… they didn’t really give one.  
In denying agency for their actions—and each individual convicted as a Class A war 
criminal had pleaded “not guilty”—they suggested that true guilt and responsibility 
existed at a higher level of the command, which could only mean the emperor, who 
had the sole authority to declare war. Deep within their hearts they opposed the 
war, but their loyalty demanded absolute obedience to the emperor, whose words 
had the “force of law.”103 Nakano asks that if the government feels that the people 
were not guilty, and if the military, cabinet members, and senior statesmen, etc. all 
bore no responsibility either, where possibly could responsibility be placed? The 
answer could only be that the emperor bears the most “concentrated and solidified 
responsibility for war crimes.” Nakano concludes the essay, saying,  
It’s interesting that the emperor’s senior statesmen, the emperor’s 
governmental Cabinet ministers, the emperor’s army generals, and Emperor’s 
                                                 
103 In her detailed analysis of the Trial of Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann, Hannah 
Arendt discusses how such unquestioned loyalty to a ruler in carrying out affairs of 
state constitutes the “banality of evil.” Eichmann repeatedly justified his actions by 
claiming, “the Führer’s words had the force of law.” Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in 
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Diet members would all corner the emperor into being the highest ranking 
culprit of war crimes. They call out for maintaining the emperor system. At 
the same time, they corner the emperor into being the highest ranking culprit 
of war crimes.104 
Just like the narrator of Goshaku no Sake, Nakano takes the evidence of the 
tribunal not to prosecute those on trial, but to demonstrate its logical conclusion—
the emperor bears the greatest responsibility for war crimes—and to show how the 
conspicuous absence of the emperor at the trial must be problematized. Yet, what 
distinguishes the voice of Nakano here with that of the narrator is the narrator’s 
fiercely moral reading of the interrogation of Pu Yi at the trial. It was not merely that 
the scrutiny of the puppet should have meant the scrutiny of the puppeteer, the 
emperor, but that the emperor who had greeted Pu Yi without pretense and as a 
“decent” man not long ago could observe the abuse and humiliation Pu Yi endured at 
the trial without having the moral human decency to reach out to him, to apologize. 
The emperor’s behavior is contrary to the spirit of democracy, and this is the moral, 
sensitive, and sympathetic understanding of the trial and of the nature of the 
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3.7 Descent/Ascent: the language of democracy 
 Goshaku no Sake demonstrates, perhaps more than anything else, the critical 
importance of scrutinizing the representation of the present emperor and emperor 
system, and that lack of care and precision can trap this representation into targeting 
an emperor system that had ceased to exist after Japan’s defeat. Targeting the wrong 
emperor system can reproduce its very undemocratic elements and make it 
impossible to engender the type of national morality necessary for democracy. In this 
sense, the text is not really about the emperor or the emperor system at all. Rather, 
it is about how the discourse that addresses the emperor is in dire need of reform, 
and how an opportunity is being missed to raise consciousness at the critical juncture 
of the early postwar, when so much was in flux.  
 The narrator draws attention to an article in Akahata that aimed to critique 
the language used to refer to the transition from the role of emperor to citizen, 
“descent to the status of subject.”105 The articled mocked the idea as ludicrous, as if 
there were a stairwell separating the “emperor” (kimi) from his “subjects.” Rather 
than make the descent, the article urges the “descendents of the gods” to return the 
rice and gold they took from the people and to go back to the “Plain of High 
Heaven.”106 Despite the satirical and mocking tone of the article that appropriates 
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the very language of the emperor only to turn it on its head, the narrator objects to 
the article’s failure to fundamentally question the distinction between emperor and 
subject, let alone the categories themselves. He asks, “Where does the status of 
‘subject’ belong?” To the narrator, such mockery by Akahata ignores the actual 
power (jissai no chikara) the emperor exerts. Use of languages such as “descent to 
the status of subject” must be rejected because in democracy there are no subjects. 
The existence of subjects implies subjugation, and language that smuggles in these 
defunct semi-feudal categories into the postwar is hostile to the realization of 
democracy. The people ought not be subjects of the emperor, and neither should the 
emperor and imperial family be subjects of the people. Rather than employ language 
that suggests a loss or fall or descent from status, the narrator recommends the 
opposite: that they be “elevated (hikiageru) to the status of full-fledged citizen 
(kokumin).”107  
 The narrator’s critique of Akahata is rooted in his concern that the 
Communist Party is perpetuating a hostile attitude—most importantly in the minds 
of his students—toward the emperor and the emperor’s family that treats them as 
inhuman, failing to see that they themselves do not constitute the emperor system; 
rather, they are prisoners of it. Akahata’s hostile attitude is the “opposite of 
abolishing the emperor system (tennōsei haishi no gyakuten),” or, in other words, it 
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is its very reproduction. The narrator worries that, if encouraged, the students’ 
hostile attitude will lead to their “snubbing” the emperor and feeling superior. But, 
he says, “the truth is that at best the students will be swept up by a democratic 
emperor and forever look up to him as an object of worship in their hearts.”108 The 
narrator demonstrates here how easily distain for the emperor, by reproducing the 
anachronistic relations that keep him distant from citizens rather than integrating 
him as a human, can be flipped to its opposite, emperor worship.109 Treating the 
emperor sympathetically, but only as a human being separate and distinct from the 
emperor system, is radical in that it does not recognize the premises on which the 
emperor system is based. These premises—feudal, antidemocratic, based on 
hierarchical distinctions between people—are deeply embedded in language, and 
even those opposed to the emperor system end up reaffirming and replicating them 
through language. When I say that the narrator is performing a discursive analysis, I 
refer specifically to this point: that the power of the emperor system is also exercised 
through and within language, and so, the emperor system cannot be challenged 
without fundamentally challenging the representation of the emperor and emperor 
system. The narrator calls specifically for a morality that radically opposes 
representation that perpetuates the emperor system by unproblematically adopting 
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treat the pride of the Japanese nation [日本民族] and the morality of the Japanese 
nation. The problem of patriotism in Japan, to the extent that ‘emperor’ and 
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its language. Instead, he demands freedom for all, including the emperor, and a 
conscience that cannot allow for the imprisonment of anyone. Thus, “The abolition of 
the emperor system is a question of practical morality. I want them to think about 
the fact that the more people turn their noses up to snub the emperor, the longer 
the emperor system will survive.”110 This, in essence, is a reformulation of the 
meaning of “emperor system abolition” (tennōsei haishi). Whereas the Communist 
Party’s version of emperor system abolition includes attack on the emperor and his 
family, the narrator demonstrates how such attack does no more than reproduce the 
conditions for the emperor system’s perpetuity. It is the system that needs to be 
attacked, and somewhat counter-intuitively, sympathy for the emperor—because it 
allows understanding of how the emperor is a tool, a puppet, and a captive of the 
system—is a much more potent form of attack.  
3.8 The postwar emperor system as sick mutt 
While the narrator is highly suspicious of his students turning up their noses 
and snubbing the emperor, this does not mean he advocates sparing the emperor as 
individual to critique. He is suspicious of ridicule of the emperor and how that can flip 
to affection. On the other hand, substantive critique is necessary. This is 
demonstrated most effectively with the May Day sign (“The kokutai is maintained! 
The royal belly is full! Die of hunger you people! Imperial signature”) because it 
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accurately reflects the reality that the imperial family made no sacrifices as the 
nation suffered.  
In their critique of the Placard Incident, why did the Communist Party ignore 
the very words of the sign when it was those words that best critiqued the 
emperor system? It’s insulting (bujoku) to call a healthy dog a sick mutt, but 
there’s nothing insulting about calling a sick mutt a sick mutt so long as it’s 
properly handled. But why didn’t the Party appeal to the people that it’s the 
existence of the emperor system that is defamatory (meiyo kison) to the 
Japanese people? The person who made the sign didn’t insult the emperor at 
all. 
By way of analogy, the emperor system of the postwar, especially 1946, was a sick 
mutt. The point of the quote, however, is not the comparison per se, but rather to 
critique the Communist Party for its failure to speak directly to the problems of the 
emperor system; exposing the corrupt nature of the emperor system has nothing to 
do with the insult itself, and especially nothing to do with an insult directed at a mere 
individual, the emperor. The language play is precise in its reference to insult: the 
person who wielded the sign was originally accused of lèse majesté (fukeizai), an 
affront to the dignity of the king, but later, due to pressure from SCAP, that legal 
ruling morphed into defamation (meiyo kison) of the individual emperor. Yet, to the 
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narrator, accurate representation—calling a “sick mutt a sick mutt”111—cannot 
possibly be an insult (bujoku). The Communist Party argued that the sign-holder, 
Matsushima Matsutarō, had the right to hold the sign, but they were silent about the 
actual contents of the sign, which held the more significant meaning.112 The narrator 
flips the language of the court on its head: Matsushima did not defame or insult the 
emperor, but the existence of the emperor system defamed the people. Yet, how can 
an existence be defamatory? How can the emperor system itself, not something 
uttered by the emperor or the government on the emperor’s behalf, be analogous to 
a statement that causes harm to the image of the entire population of Japan?  
The answer lies in the ontological and discursive nature of the emperor 
system; with Japan’s defeat, Hirohito’s renunciation of divinity, and the new 
Constitution, for the emperor to be anything other than a citizen—to continue a 
performative function with every move scripted, etc.—was an anachronistic 
application of the technologies that maintained the “emperor system” prior to 
Japan’s defeat. Additionally, the renewed calls (especially by the Communist Party) to 
abolish the emperor system (tennōsei haishi) without recognizing its new form 
actively reproduced the discursive nature of the emperor system itself, and thus 
failed to recognize that the emperor system as such had ceased to exist, and that a 
newly reconstituted form continued to exist by virtue of its discursive reproduction. 
Therefore, the emperor system as a discursive or linguistic act is defamatory; it 
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injures the reputation of the people, and hinders the possibility for democracy by 
symbolizing a feudal relation dependent on the hierarchical model that separates 
between ruler and subject. To call for the abolition of the emperor system alone, 
then, is nonsensical. The narrator seems to call for the abolition of the type of 
discursive representation of the emperor system that reproduces it, the type of 
representation that privileges the emperor over the citizen. This is far more radical 
than the one-sided call for the mere decapitation of the emperor system because it 
attempts to deal with the diffuse way that power operates through discursive 
formations. Only by understanding the emperor as human, with the full implications 
that he could no longer be treated as a relic from the ancient or even recent past, 
could the nation establish the “national morality” required of a democratic society.  
The way the new emperor system was implemented exposed it as a corrupt, 
“sick mutt”; the government claimed that the emperor was a citizen on one hand 
while constantly privileging (legally and elsewise) him over the citizens on the other. 
Within the postwar discourse that disseminated the fantasy that the emperor was 
spiritually united with the people, the May Day sign accurately represented the 
actual relationship of the emperor to the people: completely out of touch. The 
emperor was not “with the people” as he had claimed in the surrender speech,113 
and then continued to insist upon afterward.  
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 The May Day sign was threatening—and originally deemed an act of 
fuzaizai—because it threatened the very representation of the emperor that the 
government and emperor himself were working so hard to craft, an image of a 
deeply caring individual who mourned the pain of the people of Japan, an image of a 
lovely man who, too, was victim. They hoped that the people would feel sympathy 
for this type of emperor. In his essay “Patriotism and Treason,” Nakano dissects the 
vacuity of this discourse by contrasting the emperor with a ruler who actually 
demonstrated her care for her people, not just said it: 
The newspapers wrote that the repatriated Japanese [soldiers] were without 
home. Those without home are shut out from employment. To be without 
home is to have no fixed address. It’s to be a vagabond. It’s improbable that 
the resume of a vagabond without home and without fixed address would 
even be looked at. In an announcement made by the emperor-appointed 
Minister that was reported in the newspapers, the emperor said that he is 
“with the people” (tennō wa kokumin to tomo ni aru). On this point, when it 
comes to the issue of having a home, it’s clear just how the emperor is “with 
the people.” According to an American newspaper, Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands completely liberated her white palace, which was the smallest in 
Europe, giving it to victims of war. She herself apparently lived in a six-room 
apartment, offering two of the rooms to victims of air raids. Now, who is with 
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the people, and where does this happen? It’s completely understandable that 
those who use others’ money and labor to build large estates and residences 
and vacation homes, and then refuse to lend or offer them to war victims and 
returnees, would feel a connection “deep within the heart” with the emperor 
who is with the people. Hey Wilhelmina, what kind of Dutch are you!? As 
someone writing from a small nook of an Eastern country with a deep 
historical connection to yours—even based on this fact alone—I pray for your 
good health.114  
The description in Goshaku no Sake of the emperor’s role in the ceremony for the 
constitution, in which he and the empress make their one-minute appearance and 
then retreat into the solitude of their palace, stands in stark contrast to Nakano’s 
perception of Queen Wilhelmina. The emperor could not be more distant from the 
people, whereas Wilhelmina could not be closer. Nakano continues his critique:  
Those that attempt to preserve their own bonds, own capital, own land, and 
the privileges of rank though male lineage all get together and without 
hesitation go before others and scream in the National Diet things like [the 
emperor] “constitutes the base of the citizen’s hearts,” and “is connected at 
the heart,” and “is the center of affection,” and “is the center of the bond at 
the deepest roots.” It’s natural to question their moral foundations.115 
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As I discuss in Chapter Two, the central concern for members of the Diet in the 
debate over the drafts over the constitution was whether the kokutai had been 
maintained. The claim that it had been maintained hinged not on the political role of 
the emperor, but his trans-historical status in the hearts of the Japanese people. 
Thus, those like Kanamori Tokujirō argued that the emperor was the people’s “center 
of affection” (akogare no chūshin). In this text, Nakano asks what kind of emperor 
people like Kanamori love, because they refuse to be specific in their language. They 
concede that the emperor is just another citizen (nihon kokumin), so their love 
cannot be directed at a divine figure. The logical conclusion from Nakano’s inquiry is 
thus:  
They love the emperor, they have affection for the emperor, which means 
that what they love is a lump among the citizens who pays no income taxes, 
does not labor, and eats without earning it—naturally they love the emperor 
of this specification. And if that’s the case, they won’t admit it.”116  
What Nakano exposes here is that the individual emperor is erased in the 
construction of the postwar emperor system. Whether he (or any other emperor) 
could be the object of love was irrelevant to Kanamori because his concern was the 
construction of an ideological system that justified the new postwar order put into 
place by SCAP and the government. Because there was no concrete basis for 
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asserting the “affection” that the people have for the emperor, or the care that the 
emperor feels for the people, it could only be posited as a theoretical abstraction.  
 I believe that narrator’s letter in Goshaku no Sake is written with these 
premises in mind, and that they provides the best mode for understanding the 
nature of the narrator’s sympathy (dōjō) for the emperor. His sympathy is only 
directed at the individual human emperor as someone who is erased by the emperor 
system. His sympathy is hostile, antithetical, and even threatening to the postwar 
emperor system as such because it aims to replace something that purports to 
represent democracy with actual practical democracy: a democracy that cannot 
stand for even one individual held captive to despotic rule. This type of sympathy 
(dōjō) and pity (ki no doku) is the opposite of affection (akogare). The failure among 
many Japanese critics (Etō Jun among others) to see this critical difference is why 
Goshaku no Sake has been seen as Nakano’s apology for his criticism of the emperor. 
On the contrary, Goshaku no Sake presents perhaps his most lucid critique because 
the narrator demonstrates how the power of the emperor system is operative in 
discourse, and that only at the discursive level is deconstruction of the emperor 
system possible.  
 While sympathy is not a question of affection, it is a question of affect. It is 
the ability to feel emotion and concern—not derisive callousness—for those 
oppressed. The narrator sees the supposed objective of the Communist Party, 
establishment of a sense of national morality, as completely worthy, and in line with 
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his objectives as principal for his students. However, its writings demonstrate the 
failure to represent the emperor with moral sensitivity, and the Party ends up 
strengthening the very system its aim to topple, and sabotaging its role as leader in 
establishing this national morality.  
3.9 Conclusion: disrespect the Man, not the man 
Ironically, the highest form of respect—treating the emperor like an equal—is 
the text’s most subversive and disruptive aspect, and thereby it is “disrespectful” to 
the social order that maintains and reproduces the emperor system. Based on the 
narrator’s insistence on the moral dimension of distinguishing the emperor from the 
emperor system, I would like to propose a new way of thinking about the 
transformation of fukeizai from the prewar/wartime legal discourse to the fukei of 
the postwar represented by the taboo against depiction of the emperor, the 
Chrysanthemum Taboo. In the postwar, the juridical and criminal form of fukeizai, 
lèse majesté, ceased to exist by decree. Its postwar remnant, fukei—“disrespect” 
toward the emperor—must operate under the premises that a) the emperor is 
distinct from the emperor system, b) the postwar emperor system is a completely 
new invention and construct of the postwar, and that c) fukei itself poses absolutely 
no threat to the human emperor or his family, but that it does threaten the symbolic 
order built to conceal the violence perpetrated by both Japan and America through 
construction of a peaceful, democratic, and nonviolent emperor. Postwar fukei, then, 
means radical respect for the human who is called emperor (including the respect to 
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be treated “equally” as a war criminal under the blind eye of justice), but disrespect 
for the bureaucratic, governmental, and even discursive “system” that prohibits 
makes such “respect” possible. “Disrespect” towards the emperor, if it is to begin to 
dismantle the emperor system, must always oppose the elements through which 
power is operative. It must expose fraudulence and corruption in the attempt to 
reconstitute the emperor system into one that appears peaceful and democratic. 
Instead, it must represent the emperor in the only way compatible with democracy: 




SAKAGUCHI ANGO AND THE EMPEROR’S DESCENT TO PLAIN HUMAN 
 
4.1  Overview 
Sakaguchi Ango, who wrote from and of the rubble of a demolished Tokyo in 
the immediate postwar,117 eschews easy labeling. His lack of political affiliation and 
aversion to political forms makes his work no less political, and his famous validation 
of “falling into decadence” in his Darakuron  (“Discourse on Decadence”) makes him 
no less concerned with issues of morality. His writings spread the gamut of styles, 
freely mixing between them, and disrupting categories and genres themselves, a 
veritable assault on what constitutes “literature,” let alone “pure literature.”118 Even 
the school that he’s frequently placed in, buraiha (“libertine”), which opposed 
rational argumentation and reification of culture and politics in favor of more flesh-
based grounds for inquiry, is merely a label to which Sakaguchi does not uniformly 
conform. What made Sakaguchi so forceful in the immediate postwar was his 
thorough negations of the values associated with war. As Karatani Kōjin points out, 
“To a people recently liberated from the repressive moral indoctrination and cult of 
the Japanese spirit so integral to wartime Japan’s emperor-based fascism, Ango 
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represented the postwar era’s inversion of all that regime held sacred.”119 At every 
turn, Sakaguchi dismantles systems—social structures, the emperor system, culture, 
the family—and the illusions and representations that hold them together, as well as 
the assumptions about the morality of individuals that they entail. This was readily 
apparent in his 194  essay, “A Personal View of Culture,” but most famously in his 
1946 essays, Darakuron (“Discourse on Decadence”) and its continuation, Zoku-
Darakuron. While these essays have garnered much attention in Japan, and recently 
in English-language scholarship as well,120 this is rarely in the context of the emperor 
system debate. It is another short essay from 1948, “Words Humbly Dedicated to the 
Emperor his Majesty” (tennō heika ni sasaguru kotoba), that most closely resembles 
the nuanced analysis of the emperor system we can find in Goshaku no Sake. I will 
begin this chapter by connecting the highly resonant themes of Goshaku no Sake and 
“Words Humbly”—most especially their theorization of the origins of disrespect and 
demonstration of the media’s role in the discursive production of the emperor 
system. Following that, I will explore the more famous Darakuron, a deconstructive 
text that aims to dismantle the emperor system not through political means but self-
interrogation.   
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4.2  Dear Your Majesty  
Sakaguchi Ango’s short essay from 1948, “Words Humbly Dedicated to the 
Emperor his Majesty” (tennō heika ni sasaguru kotoba)121, is a reflection precisely on 
the human status of the emperor, and the necessity for him to act as mere human 
and for others to treat him as such. It comes down to a question of respect, and the 
impossibility of disrespect if the grounds for proper respect are not in place. Just like 
the narrator of Goshaku no Sake, Sakaguchi is concerned with representing the 
emperor as honestly and accurately as possible, and developing the logical 
implications of taking seriously the human emperor. Despite not one mention of the 
words “emperor system,” the essay signifies an attempt to liberate the emperor from 
the emperor system through the exploration of the emperor’s humanity.  
Sakaguchi, too, examines Matsushima’s famous May Day sign (of the Placard 
Incident) and asks what makes it powerful. As the narrator of Goshaku no Sake 
pointed out, the words of the sign were not insulting (bujoku) towards the emperor, 
and by implication did not constitute lèse majesté, because of their accurate 
depiction of an emperor infinitely distant and unable to feel the suffering of the 
nation. Sakaguchi analyzes what precisely made it controversial and judges its merits 
as proper satire. To him, it was less crucial that the sign depicted an emperor who ate 
heartily while the nation starved, but that it employed the language of the 
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emperor—meant to emphasize the distinction between the emperor and all others 
beneath him—to stress the unbridgeable divide, and to great humorous effect. He 
says,  
There was also a big fuss over whether the placard which read, “I, Your Royal 
Highness, am eating like a pig,” constituted lèse majesté. However, I feel that 
the cause for the controversy around this placard on May Day was less the 
fact of the “eating like a pig” part and more for the existence of the bizarre 
usage of the first person pronoun chin (I, Your Royal Highness), and I wrote as 
much in a newspaper at the time. The satirical effect would be nearly lost if 
the phase were just “I (watashi) am eating like a pig,” employing the common 
first-person pronoun, watashi. Perhaps if you were satirizing a black 
marketeer, it might get a couple chuckles from the average citizen. But, if you 
satirize the emperor with “I am eating like a pig”—after all, black 
marketeers122 eat like pigs too—there is no reason that the people would 
laugh, thinking it odd that Japan’s the oldest family line couldn’t eat like pigs. 
The effect of the satire lies in the clever usage of the first-person pronoun, 
chin, and nothing else. We have to understand that if the word chin were 
omitted, the strange clothes of the Imperial wardrobe would be replaced with 
                                                 
122 The image of the black marketeer is somewhat of a recurring trope in Sakaguchi’s 
writings that depict the underworld in which he resides. Note especially his 
Darakuron, in which the very soldiers—once the embodiment of bravery and heroism 
by fighting for the emperor—who returned home alive after the war turn to the black 
market for survival.  
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a business suit, and with that, two pieces of ripe fodder for satire would fly 
out the window.  
While this may appear like Sakaguchi merely plays the role of humor critic, analyzing 
the sign for its ability to induce laughter and its worthiness of being properly called 
satire, he also exposes the nature of its threat. Use of the first-person pronoun, chin, 
captured the corruption and deceptiveness of the emperor’s wardrobe change into a 
business suit because it highlighted the distance between emperor and the people. 
The business suit itself was part of the strategic campaign to give the appearance 
that this distance had been collapsed, but chin was a reminder that this new 
narrative was fundamentally at odds with reality. The use of chin on the sign was also 
a direct reference to the surrender speech of August 15th, 1945, a speech that made 
sure to remind the nation that the kokutai had been able to be maintained (chin wa 
koko ni kokutai wo goji shiete), and that began with that royal pronoun, chin. In 
pinpointing “chin” as the comical and satirical force behind the sign, Sakaguchi 
demonstrates its threat to the representation of the “benevolence” of the emperor 
in bringing the war to an end and to the new narrative of an emperor who is one of—
and among—the people.  
In the essay, Sakaguchi analyzes what commands respect in order to 
challenge the claim that the May Day sign was disrespectful in the least. Respect 
requires substance. The fact that the emperor is name without substance, an “empty 
name” (kyomei), makes true respect for others impossible. That the emperor is from 
121 
 
the most enduring family line in Japan, therefore, commands no more respect than 
all descendants of cave men. Likewise, “refinement” (kihin)—so valued among the 
nobility—is without substance in that it teaches the children of nobility to treat 
others poorly and leads to nothing productive. “If you wanted to make a business of 
refinement, the best you could actually do is fraud.” Although I am condensing what 
is somewhat of a circuitous argument, Sakaguchi’s point is that the emperor is all 
style, no substance, and thus commands no respect.  
While his critique is specific to postwar representation of the emperor, the 
text can be read as an extension of his “Personal View of Japanese Culture” (Nihon 
bunka shikan), 1942, where he questions the meaning and value of “tradition” 
(dentō) and “national character” (kokuminsei) through explorations of sports, 
fashion, architecture and beyond. The kimono worn by maiko performers and 
dominating presence of sumō wrestlers may exude what Sakaguchi calls the “dignity 
of tradition” (dentō no kanroku), but tradition itself does not constitute anything of 
value. Throughout the essay, he argues that the people are much less concerned with 
preserving tradition than they are attending to their personal lives, the “necessities 
of life” (seikatsu no hitsuyō). “Without sufficient substance behind the dignity,” he 
says, “these traditions will eventually fade away. What matters in the end is neither 
tradition nor dignity but substance.”123 The essay, overtly a critique of Bruno Taut’s 
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overflowing appraisal of traditional Japanese culture and architecture, sets the 
grounds for Sakaguchi’s postwar critique of the emperor system, for which tradition 
(family lineage) and dignity (refinement) are equally meaningless without being 
backed up by substance.  
This “style” that he critiques in “Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor” 
points directly to the constructed nature of the image of the emperor and the 
production of the postwar emperor system. The Imperial Household Agency124 is the 
prime instigator of this style as it makes the emperor’s outfits, forces him to use 
special elevated language, including the word chin, and “weaves together a fictional 
solemnity out of the substance-less.” Despite the postwar effort to define the 
emperor as one among the people, the Imperial Household Agency is “obsessed with 
turning the emperor into something greater than other human beings.” Yet, as 
Sakaguchi notes, the effect is the total opposite. Only because they concoct such a 
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distinction—and because of the existence of the word chin—is satire possible. More 
perniciously, the existence of the word chin can turn a line like “I, Your Royal 
Highness” into the Lèse Majesté Incident (another term for the Placard Incident), 
turning a joke into a crime.  
Just as the narrator of Goshaku no Sake turns the logic of the accusation of 
fukeizai back onto the government when he says, “it’s the existence of the emperor 
system that is defamatory to the Japanese people? The person who made the sign 
didn’t insult the emperor at all,” Sakaguchi throws the blame back at those who 
construct the representation of the emperor. For the narrator, it is not the sign that 
is defamatory, insulting, or disrespectful. On the contrary, the discursive operation of 
the emperor system itself is an assault on the Japanese people. For Sakaguchi, the 
same discursive operation that attempts to control the public representation of the 
emperor provides the grounds for its critique and satire. The May Day sign itself is 
not offensive in the least because it merely exposes the emptiness of the 
representation. More importantly, since this representation is used as a complete 
stand-in for substance, it degrades and demeans those with substance, and to quote, 
“because ‘emperor’ is just an empty name (kyomei), humans themselves cannot be 
the recipients of true respect.” In other words, the postwar emperor system 
demands respect from the people of Japan despite having no substance. Such a 
system invites critique and denies due respect for those with substance.  
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To Sakaguchi, the attempt to concoct a fictional solemnity (kakū no igen) out 
of something without substance is to “invite derision, satire, and revenge.” Most 
absurd is the attempt to express this solemnity with the word chin, a homophone for 
a child’s word for penis (the equivalent of “pee-pee”); Sakaguchi recalls that the word 
afforded him much laughter as a child. On many levels, the May Day sign was 
appropriate (not disrespectful), satirical, and perhaps most of all, hilarious.  
4.3 The sentiment reserved for a celebrity 
Sakaguchi too pushes back against the prescribed or assumed affective 
response of people to their emperor, rejecting the notion that the emperor is, and 
has always been, the people’s “center of affection” (akogare no chūshin). He mocks 
as “exceedingly funny” the idea that when people rejoice as they see the emperor 
from the side of the road could be an expression of “eternal national sentiment” 
(eien naru kokuminteki shinjō). It’s more a type of hero worship. He notes that hero 
worship is not merely reserved for emperors and the like, but also for movie stars 
and Olympic athletes. They, too, have the ability—and perhaps even more so—to 
inspire jubilation and tears. He says, “This is called ‘popularity’ (ninki). Popularity is a 
fad; it is the preference of an era. Simply put, the emperor is popular. In particular, 
he is popular in the countryside. He is as popular as Tanaka Kinuyo, and nothing more 
than that.”125  
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Sakaguchi’s nonchalant—even silly—tone belies the sharpness of his critique. 
In one fowl swoop, he removes the grounds for legitimating the postwar symbolic 
emperor system: that the emperor is trans-historically and universally (throughout 
Japan) adored. Sakaguchi argues that the affection or sentiment (shinjō) people feel 
for the emperor is equal to or less than what they feel toward celebrities, that it is 
completely historically contingent (“the preference of an era”), and moreover, that 
not all people feel it. This is to say, in comparing the emotional sentiment that people 
feel toward the emperor with what they feel toward celebrities, Sakaguchi shows 
that “sentiment” is an empty category of legitimation. In the postwar, after all, the 
government could no longer claim a priori legitimacy for the role of the emperor, 
such as the unbroken line of emperors (bansei ikkei) or divine descent, having to rely 
exclusively on the claim that it aligned with the nation’s “sentiment”: what it wished, 
willed, or felt (yet this could never be put up for a national referendum that might 
confirm it). Just as any affection people may have felt before the war’s end was 
coincidental to the unbroken lineage, in the postwar scenario, the myth of unbroken 
lineage was merely a prerequisite for positing the notion that people felt some form 
of eternal and unbroken affection towards their emperors; in other words, affection 
could only be enduring if the object of affection also endured. Implicitly, Sakaguchi 
historicizes these narratives while explicitly refuting the validity of the present 
narrative in the present moment of 1948.  
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Moreover, the sentiment that people feel toward the emperor is specific to 
the postwar. Although a wartime emperor may also well have been “popular,” 
Sakaguchi limits his analysis specifically to the postwar phenomenon of the 
emperor’s popularity. People’s feelings toward the emperor are not based on who 
the emperor was prior to Japan’s defeat, but who he is now that Japan has lost the 
war, a loser who ought to be pitied, a “defeated emperor”:  
And yet, while Tanaka Kinuyo's popularity was earned by her own talent, the 
emperor's is not this way. It is merely a popularity borne of the defect of an 
era itself: Japan lost, Japan disappeared, and he himself disappeared, losing 
everything he was up to that point. But as if reacting desperately to such an 
annoyance, he said, "I didn't lose" (ore wa maketteinai zo) and the emperor 
was slapped on billboards putting on a bold front. That, and people favor him 
in sympathy (dōjō) for being a defeated emperor—that's about it. 
The emperor’s popularity—“a defect of an era”—was circumstantial, and due to 
Japan’s loss in war, which provided the prime opportunity to completely reinvent the 
emperor. The Japan and emperor as defined by prewar and wartime ideology ceased 
to exist. The premises underlying what made him emperor were stripped away. 
Therefore, for Sakaguchi, there was no salvaging something from the ruins of the 
past, only total reinvention. Likewise, peoples’ feelings toward the emperor could no 
longer be directed at the godlike figure and military leader who posed gallantly on 
horseback; the image was shattered and the objective of the postwar narrative of the 
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emperor needed to ensure that that very image remain shattered to make room for 
the image of a democratic, pacifist emperor. The postwar emperor could, under no 
circumstances, be the military emperor. However, as Sakaguchi keenly observes, the 
emperor’s favorability was not related to his symbolic role in representing a 
democratic Japan, but rather sympathy and pity for being a defeated emperor 
(haiboku no tennō).  
4.4  Respect for humanity 
The narrator of Goshaku no Sake criticized the Communist Party for its 
opposition to the emperor system because this opposition failed to account for how 
the wartime emperor system had been defeated; in responding to an anachronistic 
emperor system rather than the present one, it reproduced the conditions for its 
continuity. If the Communist Party truly wanted to establish a sense of national 
morality, it would have to represent the emperor from a moral standpoint that 
sympathized with the postwar emperor as a human, not a thing.  
Can we, then, distinguish between the sympathy of Goshaku no Sake and the 
sympathy that Sakaguchi discusses here? First of all, the narrator’s form of sympathy 
is designed to eliminate the postwar emperor system by recognizing the emperor as 
captive and liberating him. At the same time, it recognizes that many people in Japan 
may also share a form of sympathy for the emperor as well (thought perhaps 
uncritically), and essentially calls for the Communist Party to harness that sense of 
sympathy to the explicit end of dismantling the postwar emperor system. The 
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sympathy that Sakaguchi observes—the sympathy for a defeated emperor—lacks the 
reflexive and critical element of the narrator of Goshaku no Sake. Thus, he treats this 
sympathy with distain and disgust. Sakaguchi says, “The emperor’s popularity is free 
of judgment. It’s a kind of religious and fanatical popularity that has a way of being 
completely identical in nature to the relationship between a pagan sect leader and 
his followers.” Perhaps the most distinct difference between the narrator’s analysis 
and Sakaguchi’s here is that the narrator wanted to dismantle the emperor system 
from a critical perspective within the ideology—and herein lies Nakano Shigeharu’s 
brilliance in being able to represent that positionality—whereas Sakaguchi critiqued 
it as if from the outside. Despite this, both end up in the same place, affirming the 
emperor as a human being stripped of his shackles (imprisonment to the emperor 
system).  
Most importantly, however, is that the sympathy that Sakaguchi observes 
marks absolute discontinuity with the recent past, whether people understand their 
own feelings toward the emperor as continuous or discontinuous. It is sympathy 
aimed at specifically the postwar defeated emperor, and yet without the recognition 
of that emperor as human being. Rather, it is a blind faith by “fanatics.” He notes that 
agricultural youth groups still continued to bring offerings of rice to the emperor in 
the postwar, and he conjectured that half of the readers of his very article “will shed 
tears in the belief that imperial authority remains unabated.” While the narrator of 
Goshaku no Sake does not share the same condescending attitude as Sakaguchi in his 
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characterization of those who weep before the emperor—such as the schoolgirls 
who cry in his presence—we may speculate that Sakaguchi might have approved of 
the narrator’s form of sympathy toward the emperor: his sympathy is demystified, 
self-reflexive, and subversive.  
We can rephrase the question to ask whether the narrator of Goshaku no 
Sake would be critical of Sakaguchi’s analysis. Perhaps not: just like the narrator, 
Sakaguchi demands that the emperor be represented and treated as human being, no 
more, no less. Despite Sakaguchi’s condescending tone, especially toward country 
bumpkins who uncritically accept the emperor, he wants to dismantle the love, 
affection, and respect directed at something without substance and superhuman 
(chōningenteki), and replace it with the love, affection, and respect directed at 
something with substance.  
If the emperor is a human, he has to be more modest. Imagine if he were to 
ride on a crowded train just like we do, and suddenly a citizen catches on, and 
advises, "Come on now, emperor, please have a seat" (saa saa, tennō, dōzo 
okake kudasai). Continuing this type of natural respect (shizen no sonkei) is 
just fine. When the respect given to the emperor by citizens takes this form, 
Japan ought to become a true democratic state of proper decorum and deep 
human compassion (ninjō atsui).  
Sakaguchi’s proposal is very simple, yet somewhat unthinkable in a climate that 
continued to insist on the vast difference between emperor and citizen in spite of the 
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narrative of the human emperor. Respect for the emperor ought to mean treating 
him decently as a human being, as one might treat one’s neighbor or fellow 
passenger on a train.126 Perhaps we can find this behavior in the way the narrator of 
Goshaku no Sake tipped his hat to the emperor during the ceremony over the new 
constitution, a gesture of respect and response after the emperor tipped his own hat 
that involves neither fanatical prostration nor neglect. For both, this is an issue 
deeply related to national morality and conscience. Those who prostrate themselves 
on the ground before the emperor have lost touch with their moral principles (dōgi 
no konran). The alternative then to this moral corruption is proper treatment of the 
emperor. Sakaguchi says, “If the emperor does not become loved and respected 
according to the decorum with which one treats a human being, Japan will cease to 
have proper culture, decorum, and human compassion.”  
 Just as the narrator of Goshaku no Sake imagines an alternate reality in which 
the emperor has the human decency to embrace Pu Yi and apologize to the injustice, 
Sakaguchi envisions a day in which the emperor can emerge from his research lab 
(where he conducts biology experiments) and not be greeted with bows but rather 
common courtesy and respect. That, for Sakaguchi, would be the indication that 
humanity had been restored. To the extent that the people of Japan cannot 
                                                 
126 Sakaguchi perhaps was not thinking of treating the emperor decently in a short 
piece from 1946, “Short Essay on the Emperor” (tennō shoron) in which he believed 
the emperor should be stripped naked and be judged through scientific scrutiny. 
What he meant, however, was much in line with this essay: that the emperor should 
be judged on the merits of his humanity, not based on any connection to the divine.  
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transform their treatment of the emperor and continue to act as if the emperor were 
greater than other human beings, Japan is always at risk being quickly drawn back 
into war.  
Sakaguchi’s entire article, “Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor his 
Majesty,” is a reflection on what constitutes meaningful and substantial respect 
(sonkei) toward the emperor in order to deconstruct the meaning of disrespect 
(fukei) in the postwar context, and to reject the possibility that the Placard Incident 
was an example of lèse majesté (fukeizai). One cannot “respect” an empty name, a 
product of a long family line, refinement that inherently disrespects others, or a 
status that has not been earned or is without talent. The Imperial Household Agency 
and the emperor himself, in concocting an empty image through wardrobe changes 
and elevated language, create barriers to accessing the human emperor. Likewise, in 
an act of mutual complicity, people accept that image and narrative of the 
superhuman emperor and further interfere with the moral transformation necessary 
for Japan to have, in Sakaguchi’s words, “proper culture, decorum, and human 
compassion.” So long as the emperor acts like and is treated as something greater 
than a human being, he cannot be the recipient of proper respect. In the same sense, 
to speak of disrespect (fukei) is utterly meaningless. In fact, fukei itself is a complete 
byproduct of the system that prevents the possibility for true respect. In other words, 
fukei is possible only because the government insists upon recreating the postwar 
emperor as a transcendent being despite the human narrative, specifically 
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demanding he be treated as a dignified and solemn being whose ridiculous image 
stands in stark contrast to such description.  
At the end of the essay, Sakaguchi asks, “Hey, Your Majesty! Do you think you 
are above humbly being loved and respected as a human being?” If so, he concludes, 
it will invite two different responses. One the one hand, the faith of those “spiritually 
possessed by fox spirits” will increase, but on the other hand, he can expect there to 
be plenty of disrespect in the form of fukeizai, with puppets dressed up in business 
suits waving caps, and people mocking the emperor with his favorite phrase, “Oh, is 
that so?” (ah, so).  
 For the narrator of Goshaku no Sake, the existence of the emperor system is 
defamatory—and thus disrespectful—to the people of Japan. For Sakaguchi Ango, the 
existence of the emperor system is a complete impediment to the realization of 
proper respect in Japan, not just for the emperor but among people as well. For both, 
this is a fundamentally moral question, and democracy is contingent upon a radical 
recognition that the emperor is human and is treated like one.  
 Sakaguchi’s comparison of the emperor with celebrities like Tanaka Kinuyo, 
who to him is much more worthy of respect and admiration, speaks to his profound 
awareness that the emperor could no longer be treated as having the aura of a 
sacred object in the present media landscape. Through the narrator of Goshaku no 
Sake, Nakano Shigeharu traces the feedback loop of media that represents the 
emperor, the public that consumes that representation, and the media that proceeds 
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to represent public response to the emperor as if it were independent of the media’s 
representation of the emperor in the first place.127 Likewise, for Sakaguchi, terms like 
“respect,” “affection,” and “popularity” must be understood within the context of a 
cultural landscape attracted to celebrity. New forms of public consumption and 
representation of the emperor meant the stripping away of the emperor’s aura. Both 
Nakano and Sakaguchi fully understood this over a decade before Matsushita Keiichi 
coined the term “emperor system of the masses” (taishū tennōsei) or Mishima Yukio 
made similar conclusions about the cheapening of the emperor system two decades 
later—referring to the “weekly gossips emperor system” (shūkanshi teki tennōsei)—
in his “In Defense of Culture” (Bunka Bōeiron), which I discuss in Chapter Six.  
 Furthermore, while these texts by Nakano and Sakaguchi may even contain 
some obvious arguments about how the existence of the postwar emperor system 
will make realization of democracy in Japan impossible, the texts must be understood 
in the context of the immediate postwar. Among the populous, there could be no 
simple abolition of the mentality of the wartime emperor system, even if its formal 
elements had been eliminated by SCAP; in other words, removing the emperor and 
decapitating the system was not enough. Both authors sought to articulate their 
resistance to the postwar emperor system by eschewing the failures that Goshaku no 
Sake’s narrator sees in the discourse of the “abolition of the emperor system” 
(tennōsei haishi), and providing an alternative approach: what I’ve been 
                                                 
127 Exposing this same circuit seems to be the modus operandi of The Daily Show and 
Jon Stewart today.  
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characterizing as discourse analysis and the critique of the representation.  
Furthermore, both Nakano and Sakaguchi’s observations of the representations of 
the postwar emperor and emperor system are still equally as valid today as they 
were in 1946-8, when much was still in flux. These representations of the emperor 
system, not only as presented by the government but by the media and finally its 
consumers as well, constitute the discursive nexus of the emperor system that will 
function to reproduce it unless it can be fully deconstructed, not merely 
“overthrown” or decapitated. This deconstruction, I believe, is what Sakaguchi 
proposes with this notion of “falling into decadence.”  
4.5 Daraku as deconstruction 
 Darakuron (“Discourse on decadence”) presents societal systems as a 
schemes (karakuri) that combats human nature, make sure that people are kept in 
check from acting out their desires, and that aim to preserve an image of dignity or 
glory or beauty as defined by that framework. These systems concoct moral dictates 
and prohibitions that aim to combat human instinct and urges, and their practice is 
essentially deviation from an original state of being simply human. To shed this form 
of morality as dictated by social systems, then, and act on ones desires or needs—to 
be human—is to “fall into decadence.” “Decadence” (daraku) is not depravity or 
immorality, but rather a refusal to uphold the moral principles dictated by whatever 
societal construct is in operation. It is amorality. Sakaguchi does not espouse 
decadence for it’s own sake (“decadence is, in and of itself, always a trifling, 
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undesirable thing”128) because decadence must only be negational, a “falling away 
from the ‘wholesome morals’ (kenzen naru dōgi).”129 This purely negational aspect of 
Darakuron and Zoku-Darakuron demonstrates Sakaguchi’s deconstructive tendency, 
and I will argue that for Sakaguchi daraku is deconstruction itself. Despite this, I will 
also argue that Sakaguchi’s text is fraught with tensions that push his thesis in the 
opposite direction: while he deconstructs the emperor system by exposing its 
contingency, he does so in a way that also projects it into the eternal past and turns it 
into a fundamental—albeit arbitrary—feature of the Japanese state; likewise, while 
he deconstructs the self, and strips away the “false kimonos” that represent the 
individual as greater than human, he does so in a way that paints a picture of 
universal humanity.  
The first line of Darakuron, “The world changed within six months,” is 
followed by two examples: soldiers go off to war resolved to die as kamikaze pilots 
for their emperor, but the survivors among them return to peddle goods on the black 
market; soldiers’ widows, asked to stoically remain loyal to their fallen husbands, 
move on to other romantic relationships. “It’s not people that have changed; they’ve 
been like this from the very start. What has changed is just the surface of things, the 
                                                 
128 Sakaguchi Ango. "Discourse on Decadence: Part I and II" James Dorsey, trans. 
Literary Mischief: Sakaguchi Ango, Culture, and the War. New York: Lexington Books, 
2010, pg. 192; Sakaguchi Ango. "Darakuron (Discourse on Decadence)." Sakaguchi 
Ango. Chikuma Nihon Bunkaku 009. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō,  008, pg.  39.  
129 Dorsey, pg. 192; SA, pg. 239.  
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world’s outer skin (uwakawa).”130 With this, Sakaguchi suggests that people always 
act on human nature, but that moral codes can give the illusion that they act out of 
dignity, honor, and nobility. The end of war has not changed how people behave, but 
the illusion that they live or die by higher precepts has. This illusion—the “outer 
skin”—is the product of the ideology of the moral principles defined by the emperor 
system (a term that Sakaguchi repeatly employs in Darakuron) itself. The postwar 
could not sustain the image of glory. Implicit is notion that the value system that 
grounded these morals and set up technologies to enforced them ceased to exist. 
After all, the soldiers had to be coerced to die as kamikaze pilots, and the war 
widows were not only prohibited from romantic affairs, but the depiction of such 
affairs was prohibited (“the wartime regime intended these women to live out the 
remainder of their lives as chaste as saints, and they refused to permit any writing 
that might provide their fall into decadence”131). Without the government’s coercion 
of soldiers or the prohibition against widows being “unfaithful” to their deceased 
husbands—or even its depiction—the world could be observed in which humans act 
based on urges and needs, in other words, humanly.  
 As in “Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor,” Sakaguchi treats the 
emperor himself as nothing more than a human being that was represented as an 
illusion, comparing him to the high, noble values assumed of kamikaze pilots and 
widows of fallen soldiers: 
                                                 
130 Dorsey, pg. 175; SA, pg. 213.  
131 Dorsey, pg. 176; SA, pg. 214.  
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The heroism of the kamikaze is really nothing more than an illusion (genei); 
their real history as humans starts the moment they set up shop in the black 
market. The saintliness of the war widows, too, is but a pipe dream; their true 
history begins the second they start to dream of another man. The same is 
true for the emperor. He’s an apparition (genei) whose true history would 
only start the moment he becomes an ordinary man (tada no ningen).132  
This is one of the few instances in the essay in which “emperor” appears without 
being followed by “system.” Written within months of the emperor’s “Declaration of 
Humanity,” Darakuron here dispels the notion that the emperor’s renunciation of 
divinity turned him into the plain human (tada no ningen) that Sakaguchi articulates. 
In other words, his change of clothes did not constitute a “fall into decadence,” even 
remotely. In “Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor,” Sakaguchi challenges the 
people of Japan, including all of those in government and the Imperial Household 
Agency, to treat the emperor with the respect of an ordinary person and no more. 
The line quoted above carries that implication: it is critical that the emperor is 
treated and represented as plainly human, but in comparing the emperor to the 
pilots and widows, Sakaguchi shows that the emperor too is only as “dignified” as the 
ideology invents him to be. Kamikaze pilots act on their urges and necessities by 
selling on the black market after the war; widows do when they think of other men; 
for the emperor to become human, too, would mean acting independently on his 
                                                 
132 Dorsey, pg. 182; SA, pg. 225. 
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desires and needs. Can the emperor not act independently on his urges for the same 
reason as the pilots and widows, because of coercion and prohibition?  
The lessons of the narrator from Goshaku no Sake are instructive here: the 
emperor is captive to the emperor system that dictates his words and movements, 
and prevents the type of liberation that might allow his “fall into decadence.” The 
freedom to act on his urges mirrors his historical freedom to exert his own power: he 
has none. If he had exerted his own power historically, Sakaguchi argues, he would 
have been exiled to an island or the deep woods.133 In so far as the emperor is a pure 
expression of politics, there is nothing human about him. I interpret the text to mean 
that, for the emperor to become plainly human would require that he act 
(independently of his own agency) on his human desires and that he is treated and 
represented as human. Yet, this could only happen if, on the one hand, the ideology 
that allows him to be represented as noble, dignified, and refined is dismantled, and 
on the other, the technologies that enforce this representation through coercion and 
prohibition are destroyed.  
                                                 
133 Early Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain, in his 191  essay “The Invention of a 
New Religion,” also ridicules the notion that emperor-worship has been a historical 
norm in Japan: “The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its 
sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the beginning of 
authentic history down to within the memory of living men. Emperors have been 
deposed, emperors have been assassinated; for centuries every succession to the 
throne was the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have been exiled; 
some have been murdered in exile. From the remote island to which he had been 
relegated one managed to escape, hidden under a load of dried fish.” Chamberlain, 
Basil Hall. “The Invention of a New Religion.” 191 . Project Gutenberg Ebook, web, 




 While Darakuron is very much a call for liberation from those forces, 
Sakaguchi expresses a deep skepticism about that possibility based on his analysis of 
the human character and the institutions it builds. What makes humans human is 
their response to urges and desires in spite of whatever prohibitions and regulations 
are imposed on them. Correspondingly, institutions deeply understand of these urges 
and can appeal directly to them. Thus, he sets up an irony: the prohibitions of 
institutions are against human nature—they are “inhuman” (hi-ningenteki) and “anti-
human” (han-jinseiteki)—but the institutions are founded precisely by directing and 
manipulating those urges for its own benefit, which makes them “completely 
human” (mattaku ningenteki na mono). This is the nature of bushidō, the way of the 
warrior, and the emperor system operates identically:  
There is no innate truth in it [the emperor system], nor is it at all natural. Still, 
the emperor system represents a long history of innovations based on keen 
observations, and in this it has a profound significance that we cannot easily 
dismiss. Analyzing it through self-evident truths and the laws of nature 
doesn’t get to the heart of the matter.134  
Sakaguchi provides little in terms of method for resistance. He clearly wants to see 
the elimination of the emperor system, while at the same time admiring its capacity 
for innovation and adaptation, and acknowledging just how seductive it can be. He 
goes as far as saying that the emperor is necessary for scheming (kenbōjussū) people 
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like the Japanese—especially politicians—in order to carry out their schemes and 
justify (taigi meibun) them. Moreover, the emperor system is simply one institution 
that can easily be replaced by another if it is overturned. As Sakaguchi notes in Zoku-
Darakuron (“Continuation of the Discourse on Decadence”), “even should we 
demolish that contrivance (karakuri) that is the emperor system and institute some 
new structure in its place; that, too, would be nothing more than a more highly 
evolved contrivance.”135 This cycle of one societal system replacing another, he says, 
is the fate (unmei) of humans, but no system can ever be totalizing or last forever: 
humans will “fall through the nets” of these systems through their decadence, and 
when that happens, revenge (fukushū) will be enacted upon those systems. With this 
thought, Sakaguchi displays the conflicting—perhaps even manic or schizophrenic—
feelings embedded in his text: deep pessimism and blithe hopefulness.  
4.5.1  The emperor as arbitrary 
 The cyclical nature of these systems demonstrates their arbitrary nature and 
historical contingency, and as pure construct. Sakaguchi says, “I see the emperor 
system as another creation of politics, and one that is both quintessentially Japanese 
and quite original.”136 While the emperor system might be “quintessentially 
Japanese” (kiwamete nihonteki) and creative or “original” (dokusōteki), Sakaguchi 
does not mean to suggest a particularistic notion of some enduring Japanese 
                                                 
135 Dorsey, pg. 194; SA, pg. 243. 
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characteristic that made the emperor system inevitable. Rather, it was 
circumstantial, and the result of development and innovation throughout the course 
of history. When it was politically useful or expedient, the emperor would be 
dredged out of obscurity to justify the actions of the governmental power holders. 
Politicians, upon observing the proclivities of the Japanese people in any specific 
circumstance, would find political justification for the emperor system based on their 
sense of smell (kyūkaku).  
Sakaguchi’s strongest indictment of the emperor system its contingency and 
circumstantial nature is expressed in the following:  
There’s absolutely no reason that they had to settle on the imperial house; 
they could very well have gone for the descendants of Confucius, Guatama 
Buddha, or even Lenin. It’s just pure coincidence that they didn’t go that 
route.137  
With this, Sakaguchi flips the discourse from the Meiji Period that argued for the 
emperor’s central, essential, and natural position within Japanese cultural and 
political history, a notion inscribed even into the Meiji Constitution with the line “the 
sacredness of the emperor is inviolable.” The emperor system is not essential but 
coincidental, a whim of historical circumstances; politicians at different times 
throughout history could have employed any other symbol (or dynastic line, as it 
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were) to ground their ideological framework.138 Sakaguchi recognizes that arbitrary 
nature of the emperor system is central to Japan’s political structure.   
 What Sakaguchi does not acknowledge here, or if he does so, only implicitly, 
is that the political utility of the emperor and the emperor system was also judged in 
the postwar context based on the “sense of smell” that MacArthur and his advisees 
had for the response of the Japanese people; their sniffing, consequently, was 
effective in ways that may have not even anticipated. What the postwar 
manipulation of the “emperor system” exposes, if nothing else, is its arbitrary and 
contingent nature, as it was at the complete mercy of the power holders at the time, 
which happened to be the SCAP occupation forces. In so far as the postwar emperor 
system, in which an emperor could be defined as human and the symbol for 
democracy, was a pure expression of political utility (a tool, a puppet) of the 
occupying forces, we should reconsider Sakaguchi’s suggestion that the emperor 
                                                 
138 Naoki Sakai has critiqued Watsuji Tetsurō on the grounds that his model, which 
posits a closed national community represented by the emperor, has to assume an 
arbitrariness because its continuity lacks empirical grounds: “The sanctity of the state 
that ‘leads’ but does not ‘dominate’ the national community must be designated by 
the emperor, who supposedly expresses the totality of the nation. Moreover, since 
the emperor expresses the existence of the substantialized cultural community on 
which the national community is grounded, we would be led, as long as we adhere to 
Watsuji’s logic, to the thesis that to accept he emperor as the expression of the 
national totality is to believe dogmatically and arbitrarily in its continued existence 
since antiquity. Thus, the continuity of the national community must be posited 
beyond all possible contestation based on empirical evidence and would be 
perceived as some ‘spirit’ devoid of any institutional stipulations.” Sakai, Naoki. 
“Return to the West/Return to the East: Watsuji Tetsurō’s Anthropology and 
Discussions of Authenticity.”  ranslation and Subjectivity  On ‘Japan’ and Cultural 
Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pg. 112.  
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system is “quintessentially Japanese” because its postwar form is at best based on 
international cooperation and complicity.  
 This gets to a larger problem with Sakaguchi’s representation of the “emperor 
system” within Darakuron. He correctly demonstrates the contingency of the role of 
the emperor and imperial family throughout history, and exposes how the role was 
constructed and functioned as a political tool (“the emperor system represents a long 
history of innovations based on keen observations”); he likewise conceives of 
emperor’s role as mutable and notes how it had to undergo transformations and 
adaptations, as well as having ceased to exist at certain points (“just when the 
emperor system had been forgotten by society at large, it would be dragged out once 
more”); he notes that if the emperor system—a trick or contrivance (karakuri)—were 
overturned, it would be replaced with another contrivance, another system. This 
constitutes a substantial and impressive critique of the ideology of the emperor 
system from Meiji, Taishō, and pre-war and wartime Shōwa Japan, which attempted 
to equate emperor with the essence of Japan.  
However, within this negational model, Sakaguchi posits a new form of 
continuity: the emperor system itself. Rather than locate the “emperor system” 
within the specific context of the modern nation-state, and point out how the 
imperial line was retroactively established and the “emperor” constructed through 
invented rituals, Sakaguchi focuses on the common features of what he calls the 
“emperor system” throughout history from antiquity through to the postwar. For 
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example, he discusses how the Fujiwara clan during the Heian period used the 
emperor as a political tool in order to resolve disputes over succession; how they also 
used the authority of imperial proclamations to exert their own will onto the 
population; or how Hideyoshi during the Sengoku period offered a ceremony to the 
emperor in order to affirm his own worth. In Zoku-Darakuron, he is even more 
explicit about its continuity. He critiques members of the Diet (of 1946) for their 
vapid insistence that the imperial household is the embodiment of Japanese virtue 
and dignity. He says,  
While it is true that the emperor system is one element running through all of 
Japanese history (nihon rekishi wo tsuranuku hitotsu no seido), what are 
called the ‘esteemed virtues’ (songen) of the emperor have always been 
nothing more than a tool in the hands of opportunists.139  
To Sakaguchi, the fact the members of Diet use this type of language to differentiate 
the imperial family from everyone else is nothing but the repetition of history; the 
“emperor system” has always operated this way.  
However, by elaborating the utility of the emperor by rulers throughout the 
entirety of Japan’s history, Sakaguchi fails to show how these transformations 
actually did constitute, to use his language, the demolishing of one contrivance for 
another. The Meiji Restoration (which, after all, was a “restoration” in name only to 
assert a fiction of continuity) was a completely new contrivance, and more 
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importantly, so was the postwar, in which one emperor system was demolished and 
another one put in its place; while the emperor may have been manipulated as a 
political tool in each circumstance, the wider societal values and moral codes that 
Sakaguchi urges people to “fall away” from were completely transformed, if not 
unstably so.  
In other words, because of his anachronistic and ahistorical use of the word 
tennōsei—even despite his recognition of its absolute contingency and 
arbitrariness—he cannot demonstrate that the emperor system of the postwar is a 
completely new contrivance. He would perhaps argue that it is a further example of 
the historical innovation or “discovery” of a new use for the emperor. Yet, there is 
little in the text to suggest that he views the postwar emperor system as 
fundamentally different from the wartime one, as he does so articulately later in 
“Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor.” Instead, in Darakuron, the emperor 
system of the postwar is to him a remainder, a remnant.  
 Sakaguchi comes so close, though, to recognizing the postwar emperor 
system as something fundamentally new, as a new contrivance or mechanism. After 
all, in defeat, the annihilation of a certain value system meant that the kamikaze 
pilots could no longer be seen as heroic and that war widows could no longer be seen 
as faithful. What was this value system if not the emperor system itself? Is it even 
possible that its postwar form was continuous with a previous form? In “Words 
Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor,” Sakaguchi’s conception of temporality is quite 
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different: Japan’s defeat marks a complete ideological break with the past, a point of 
total discontinuity. Thus, he says, “Japan lost, Japan disappeared, and he himself [the 
emperor] disappeared, losing everything he was up to that point.” The emperor 
system—indeed, the kokutai thought to embody the essence of Japan—had ceased 
to exist, and so did the very elements that constituted the emperor’s identity. In that 
text, Sakaguchi documents the effort that went into constructing a postwar emperor 
in a business suit and hat, and with new conditions for demanding respect.  
In Darakuron, he paints a different picture of continuity: “What has changed 
is just the surface of things, the world’s outer skin.” He means that human nature has 
not changed. Humans still have the same desires, urges, and needs. The defeat of 
war and the raw humanity that it exposed provided the context for humans to be 
represented and perceived as acting on those urges, as opposed to upholding an 
impossible image of saintliness portrayed and enforced by the state during the war. 
We can ask, then, if the emperor system is continuous for the Sakaguchi of 
Darakuron, how is this the case? I believe that the answer lies in his treatment of the 
individual emperor. At the end of the essay, he says, “Human’s haven’t changed; 
they've just reverted to their original state. Humans fall into decadence. Noble 
warriors and saintly women fall into decadence.”140 We can infer from this that, in 
the rapid restructuring of the state, the individual emperor was never afforded the 
opportunity to fall into decadence, even if the elements that made up his previous 
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identity were shattered. He was whisked from the emperor system that held the 
individual emperor prisoner during the war to the postwar emperor system that 
equally imposed restrictions and prohibitions on him. Because the emperor can 
neither act as someone who responds to urges or needs, nor be represented as one 
who could, the “emperor system” is essentially remains in place.  
My concern, like the concern of the narrator from Goshaku no Sake in his 
analysis of the Communist Party’s representation of the emperor, is that in 
presenting an “emperor system” that traverses though time—Heian, Sengoku, Meiji, 
postwar, etc.—Sakaguchi inadvertently reproduces the emperor system at the same 
time that he tears it down and exposes its historical contingency and mutability. He is 
absolutely right that the emperor’s Declaration of Humanity did nothing to make the 
emperor into an “ordinary human” (tada no ningen), and that the emperor still 
needed to shed the institutional structures around him for his “true history” to begin, 
both on a personal level and a national level. But, his picture of the emperor system 
is one of remarkable adaptability and endurance throughout history, and we are 
given little clue as to how its postwar form differs from any other iteration.  
The heart of the problem is that, in arguing that the emperor system had a 
continuous and central role as a tool of governing elites, Sakaguchi retrospectively 
assumes the unity and coherence of the Japanese nation-state based on an emperor-
centered historiography (kōkoku shikan). He ends up reaffirming the one-to-one ratio 
of the existence of emperor and Japan as nation-state from antiquity to the present, 
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naturalizing a view of history that is a completely modern construct. This type of 
analysis has to ignore that Japan was not integrated and consolidated politically—not 
to mention culturally or linguistically—until the massive effort to do so during the 
Meiji period, and with great violence and coercion, not simply ideological obedience. 
It also has to overlook that the emperor of antiquity was a much more remote and 
hidden figure confined to the court or cloistered in monasteries (for example, as part 
of cloistered rule, insei, during Heisei); there is little evidence that the ancient 
emperor had much presence in the thoughts of the people who inhabited the 
archipelago of Japan.141 In ancient Japan, there was no shared sense of national 
belonging, or sentiment, that might have made the emperor the useful tool that he 
became from the Meiji Era onward. Sakaguchi’s deconstruction of “sentiment” 
(shinjō) in “Words Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor” is instructive here, as he mocks 
notion that there could be something like an “eternal national sentiment” (eien naru 
kokuminteki shinjō) toward the emperor. What he fails to recognize in Darakuron is 
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that the absence of “eternal national sentiment” is also the absence of eternal 
“nationality” required to give people a sense of community and belonging, which 
simply did not exist in ancient Japan.  
4.5.2 To betray and worship 
These critiques aside, Sakaguchi examples of past abuse of what he calls the 
“emperor system” throughout history illustrates penetrating observations about the 
present. We might even argue that he is speaking specifically about the present, and 
digging in the past for examples that conform to it rather than the other way around. 
In what is a completely novel argument, Sakaguchi exposes how politicians will both 
betray the emperor while worshipping him. In Zoku-Darakuron, he claims that 
because the masses would not accept it if the Fujiwara clan members elevated 
themselves to the status of deities, the Fujiwaras instead chose to prostrate 
themselves before the emperor and demand that the masses do the same. Thus, in 
using the emperor as a political tool to induce mass compliance, the Fujiwara clan 
built its own object of worship.142 Referring the same phenomenon in Hideyoshi’s 
mixture of political manipulation and worship, he says, “political scheming may be 
the work of the devil but that doesn’t mean that these devils themselves don’t 
worship like children at the feed of the gods they themselves have conjured up.”143 
These examples, however, are Sakaguchi’s set up for his critique of the modern use 
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of the emperor: politicians use the emperor as a puppet for manipulating the public 
while they worship that very puppet. In the case of World War II, the military 
conducted attacks without consulting the emperor himself. Sakaguchi says that “this 
so-called military blindly worshipped the emperor as, all the while, they ignored him 
and committed blasphemy (bōtoku) against him. What nonsense!”144  
Nakano Shigeharu, too, pointed out a similar trend during the Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal, in which all the military leaders asserted their own innocence based 
on their complete obedience to the orders of the emperor, at once demonstrating 
that they worshipped him and his words while pinning the blame back on the 
emperor. The behavior of the military leaders indicates something slightly different 
for Sakaguchi, but nevertheless points to both their hypocrisy and something 
essential about their humanity: while the ideology could instantly create deified 
heroes (eirei) of fallen soldiers, the military leaders in their sixties and seventies clung 
onto life desperately during the trials, betraying their inability to follow the dictate to 
fight to the death as they commanded so many soldiers to do. In other words, they 
were willing to die for the emperor until faced with the opportunity, at which point 
they backed down, even willing to incriminate the emperor. The military leaders did 
not commit seppuku,145 and instead were dragged into court with the “bits in their 
mouths.” This life drive, despite all else, is an “unrivaled mystery” (yuitsu no fushigi) 
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to Sakaguchi.146 Of course, it is precisely the “life” of human nature—this “enormity 
of the living organism” (ikimono no kyodaisa)—that constantly deconstructs the 
ideological forces that represent individuals as greater than their own humanity. The 
military leaders themselves did not understand how their desperate concern to save 
themselves conflicted with their own emperor worship. The situation exposes this: 
they were never willing to die for the emperor. They were perfectly willing to send 
millions of soldiers into battle to die for the emperor, but unwilling to do so 
themselves. The war tribunal stripped them of that “false kimono.”  
This also a model for rethinking Kuno Osamu’s clean distinction between how 
the ideologues thought of the emperor internally versus how they projected him 
externally.147 According to Kuno, drafters of the Meiji Constitution such as Itō 
Hirobumi legally inscribed a political function for the emperor that was limited by the 
Diet, what came to be known as the emperor organ theory (tennō kikan setsu), and 
that was thus treated accordingly within the government. This is the “esoteric” 
(mikkyō) view of the emperor because it was kept discrete. However, externally, the 
emperor was sold to the people as a divine figure with absolute sovereignty. This is 
the “exoteric” (kenkyō) view of the emperor, the image spread widely for public 
consumption. This duality, the “exoteric” and “esoteric” aspects for understanding of 
the emperor, was for Kuno characteristic from Meiji until the end of World War II. 
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Although this distinction was made well after the writing of Darakuron, Sakaguchi 
would clearly see such distinction impossible to sustain because the governmental 
power holders that manipulate the emperor and the ideology—thus undermining the 
authority of the emperor and betraying him—are also vulnerable to the very ideology 
of their creation. In fact, the lack of consensus on what constituted the “exoteric” 
and “esoteric” views (to borrow Kuno’s idiosyncratic language) of the emperor, and 
whether the emperor should be considered absolute sovereign under the 
constitution or whether just an organ, was the basis for the 1930s movement to 
clarify the kokutai (kokutai meichō undō). There was no clear delineation; the 
political power holders (in particular the military) could at once, perhaps due to 
ideology’s tendency to allow for cognitive dissonance, manipulate, use, and betray 
the emperor while worshipping him and carrying out their actions in his name. What 
Sakaguchi shows, which Kuno’s model cannot, is that the emperor system could 
never have been merely one way for the power holders and another for the public; 
they are seduced by the very ideology that they spread; they worship the emperor 
while they promote emperor worship as a means for keeping the populace obedient 
and docile.  
4.5.3  Significance of surrender 
 Sakaguchi’s invokes the surrender of August 15, 1945 in his Zoku-Darakuron 
to demonstrate how the military and government were not alone in their “use” of 
the emperor system; it too becames a tool of the people, a “mechanism by which we 
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delude ourselves.” Even though people desperately wanted the war to end, 
Sakaguchi says, they could not admit it, instead behaving out of a sense of what they 
thought was proper or correct (taigi meibun). Rather than lay down their “bamboo 
spears,” they waited for some justification. Unaware of how they deceived 
themselves, the people used the emperor to give the authority to surrender.  
Last year, on August 15 the war was ended in the emperor’s name. People 
claim that it was he who saved us. The historical evidence, in fact, supports 
this claim: history has always turned to the emperor as a creative solution in 
such times of crises. The military intuitively understood his usefulness as a 
trump card, and we citizens instinctively waited for them to play it. So, the 
catastrophic final scene that was August 15 was really a collaborative effort 
between the military and the masses.  
We were called upon to obey His Majesty’s order, told “to bear the 
unendurable, to bear the unbearable.” The standard narration then tells us 
that the masses wept but, because it was at the command of none other than 
his Imperial Majesty himself, they bore the unbearable and conceded defeat. 
It’s all lies! Lies! Lies!148 
The people did not need the emperor to tell them to “bear the unbearable” 
(shinobigataki wo shinonde) as he had done in his surrender speech: they had already 
bore the unbearable. They already been weeping for the suffering that they had been 
                                                 
148 Dorsey, pg. 191; SA, pg. 236.  
154 
 
enduring. Sakaguchi implies that the disconnect between people’s raw feelings and 
emotions and the ideology that dictates how they are to feel—in this case, they 
“feel” when it is at the command of the emperor—should expose the fallacy, 
hypocrisy, and emptiness of the ideology itself. The surrender should have been the 
opportunity to recognize this. In another essay from 1946, “Short Essay on the 
Emperor,” Sakaguchi continues to dwell on the hypocrisy of the surrender and 
questions the necessity for the emperor’s role in it. He says, “Japanese people refuse 
to admit—even in their hearts—that ending the war needed no ‘justification,’ and 
yet ‘justification’ (taigi meibun) is used in the sense that it was the emperor that 
saved us.”149 Japan’s loss was the perfect opportunity to deny and throw skepticism 
onto this “traditional totalizing power.” However, the failure to do so—and instead 
to reassert the need for the emperor—was no more than “pure deception.” People 
wanted the war to end, but instead of responding to this desire by acknowledging 
that very fact (or offering some form of resistance, such as the laying down of 
weapons), the Japanese people, according to Sakaguchi, allowed the emperor to 
decide the terms of the end of war and to let him decide how they were to respond to 
it, when they were to weep. This is what constitutes the “emperor system” for 
Sakaguchi: the willingness to participate in the ideology of the emperor and the 
willingness to be deceived, even when it glaringly runs counter to basic instincts and 
urges, to human nature.  
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 Sakaguchi recognizes that it is so tempting to fall prey to false idols and 
constructs and systems. We build up systems as we tear them down. In “Words 
Humbly Dedicated to the Emperor,” Sakaguchi notes how ridiculous people find 
worshippers of Jiko, a religious group that had claimed descent from the emperor. 
However, these same people who criticize those worshippers are fanatics of the cult 
of the emperor. They are able to recognize fanatical worship in others, but cannot 
recognize that there is absolutely no difference between that form of worship, and 
their worship of the emperor. In Darakuron, Sakaguchi likewise recalls a story of 
Miyamoto Musashi, who caught himself unknowingly praying as he passed shrines 
dedicated to Hachiman, and felt deep regret over this weakness. He says, “Like him, 
we automatically fall to worshipping some pretty ridiculous things and simply aren’t 
aware of it.”150 This weakness of falling prey so easily to objects of veneration and 
the systems that create them reveals that Sakaguchi does not merely want to combat 
or overthrow the “emperor system”; he wants to combat the tendencies within the 
individual that make them vulnerable to it. Darakuron, then, is equally a call for deep 
introspection, looking into one’s heart, and being aware of the illusions of our own 
creation. The emperor system is one of those creations, and in a sense, continues 
only because it is constantly being rebuilt and reconfigured in each individual who 
participates. Thus, the emperor system and the moral values it pedals must be 
deconstructed, and so too must the self that is always ready and waiting to construct 
emperor systems of its own. Deconstruction of the emperor system—historicizing it 
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as contingent and functional as opposed to eternal and transcendental—is also 
deconstruction of the self (especially as a social creature). Likewise, deconstruction of 
the self is also the method for the deconstruction of the emperor system.  
 For Sakaguchi, understanding is deeply connected with affective response to 
the world. To resist the temptation of social and moral systems is to be honest about 
urges and desires and to recognize when they operate in ways that interfere with 
basic human affect. It is to express feelings, act on urges; this, simply, is what it 
means to fall into decadence. It is not hedonism or pure evil. It is stripping away of 
the conventions that dictate what constitutes proper behavior. At the beginning of 
Darakuron, Sakaguchi speaks of how the world has not change, but just its “outer 
skin.” A layer of skin had been removed to reveal something more honest, more 
authentic: a reflection of the real, raw humanity of the individual. By the end of Zoku-
Darakuron, he returns to that symbol of enduring Japanese “culture” that he dissects 
in “A Personal View of Japanese Culture,” the kimono: “The conventions of polite 
society, the taboos on romance, the rules dictating the places of duty and emotion—
we should strip ourselves of these fraudulent kimonos (nise no kimono) and stand 
with our naked hearts fully exposed.”151 As fake kimonos, taboos and morality 
disguise true emotion. Shedding them, and looking deeply at one’s naked self—in 
other words, understanding one’s own emotions and instincts through introspection 
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and interrogation—is the “first condition for restoring the human being (ningen)” and 
the “true birth of humanity (jinsei).”  
For Sakaguchi, here, we can see the connection between affect, morality, 
understanding, and truth. They are inextricably linked in his model. Extricating 
oneself from the “wholesome morals (kenzen naru dōtoku)” of the emperor system is 
to “stand naked on the vast plain of truth.” Moreover, this scrutiny that attempts to 
get at truth is, as I’ve mentioned, is to examine oneself naked, and to equally 
examine the symbols stripped of their illusory qualities. This is precisely what 
Sakaguchi means in his “Short Essay on the Emperor” when he says that the emperor 
must be stripped naked and viewed scientifically (kagaku no mae ni). By this he 
means objectively, clearly, and unadorned by values and morals such as “tradition,” 
“refinement,” and “dignity.” More importantly, he means outside of the realm of 
politics. He says,  
Even if the emperor is stripped naked to be viewed scientifically as an 
ordinary human (tada no ningen) and it is determined that the emperor 
system is still necessary for the lives of the Japanese people, it would be fine 
to create an emperor system that deals with that necessity.152  
Individuals must be “stripped naked” so that their humanity can be interrogated; in 
the same way, the emperor must be “stripped naked” so that his may too be 
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interrogated. If the emperor system were deemed necessary—and through 
Darakuron we can understand that as meaning if it honestly and authentically were 
compatible with the urges and desires of the Japanese people—it could be 
reconfigured to reflect that. We can also read this as a focus on the individual who 
exists alone, independence of the external dictates that construct that individual; it is 
a forceful rejection of the type of communalist identification broadly ascribed to the 
mass participation in “total war” and theorized by thinkers such as Watsuji 
Tetsurō.153 
That both the people of Japan and the emperor must be stripped naked to 
expose their “plain” humanity suggests a parity or parallel treatment of people and 
emperor that refuses to elevate one over the other. We can perhaps call it 
Sakaguchi’s demystified and completely humanized version isshi dōjin, treating 
everyone under his gaze equally and impartially. He carefully refuses to use the 
language of, for example, the Communist Party as represented in Goshaku no Sake, 
when they respond to talk of the emperor as having undergone the “descent to the 
status of subject (shinsekikōka)” by demanding that the emperor go back to the 
“High Plain of Heaven.” As the narrator explains, this language only reproduces the 
differences between the emperor and “subjects,” essentially reifying a postwar 
version of the emperor system, rather than attempting to dismantle the postwar 
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emperor system by recognizing the humanity of the emperor. Instead, the narrator 
calls for the elevation of the emperor to the status of full-fledged citizen. Thus, for 
Goshaku no Sake, if in the postwar people have been elevated to the status of 
democratic citizens, so too must the emperor. In Darakuron, if the people can be 
shown in their humanity to have fallen into decadence, so must the emperor fall. The 
ascent to humanity of Goshaku no Sake is matched with the descent to humanity of 
Darakuron.  
 For both Nakano Shigeharu and Sakaguchi Ango, the emperor system stands 
in the way of the realization of a new form of consciousness or morality, what 
Sakaguchi calls the “proper opening up of the human and humanity.”154 While the 
narrator of Goshaku no Sake, and even the Sakaguchi of “Words Humbly Dedicated 
to the Emperor,” give us an alternative means for representing and treating the 
emperor in order to undermine the emperor system—namely with the respect and 
dignity that every human deserves—the Sakaguchi of Darakuron is more vague, 
ambiguous, even ambivalent. As a commentary on the human condition as much as it 
is a commentary on the emperor system or moral systems in general, Darakuron 
gives expression to Sakaguchi’s experience and feeling in the postwar, the attraction 
and awe of war and the preservation of beauty. For example, he considers the 
suicide of his young niece in aesthetic terms, as the preservation and eternalization 
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of youth and beauty, which is of course directly analogous to the deification of the 
pure spirits of the fallen soldiers enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja.  
His deeply subjective reflections amid the war-torn remains of Tokyo seem 
conflicting and contradictory with his analysis, seeming at times to uphold the very 
virtues that he tears down when they are part of an institutionalized system of moral 
codes and regulations. However, rather than interpret this as self-contradictory, 
though it may be, I prefer to read it as a demonstration of Sakaguchi’s own humanity; 
he too is weak and has a sense of awe toward the very images that then become 
coopted by the emperor system. In Darakuron, he is catching himself in the act of 
unknowingly praying to false gods, just Miyamoto Musashi did. But this is the 
messiness of humanity; Darakuron depicts and performs its contradictions. This is 
what must be embraced and interrogated if the “false kimonos,” the illusions, the 
virtues of tradition are to be shed. For Sakaguchi, to “fall into decadence” is to 
expose oneself to the contradictions that accompany feelings, instincts, and urges. 
Any form of salvation must be found by going first through the gates of hell, or at 
least what pervading morality would deem “hell.”  
 Darakuron is less about conceiving an alternative system to the current ones 
than purely dismantling the ones that exist. It’s a fierce recognition that even with 
defeat, the values of the emperor system—not so much as a political system but as 
something that dictates moral virtues—still held power over the individual, and still 
upheld the illusion of the unity of “Japan” and the illusion of what is meant to be 
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“Japanese.” Sakaguchi’s task for people in the postwar is to disavow themselves of 
what constitutes Japan, Japanese, and the self, not through pedantic moralizing but 
self-reflection and interrogation, understanding one’s urges and needs without the 
interference of “wholesome moral.” Thus, in Zoku-Darakuron, he says, “Citizens of 
Japan, I call upon you to bring about the fall of Japan and its people! Japan and its 
people must fall into decadence!”155 This is no less than a deconstruction of 
nationality itself, and recognition that the emperor system is central to the 
production of Japan as nation.  
As deconstruction, he does not—and cannot—describe what lies on the other 
side of this “fall into decadence.” However, this is the point: Darakuron cannot affirm 
anything, it can only negate. He says, “let all morals dissipate (dōgi taihai), let 
confusion reign (konran seyo).” This is no affirmation of a life of “depravity” or 
“decadence” per se because these are only values relative to the pervading morality, 
not values in and of themselves. Daraku removes the scaffolding of the values that 
construct nation, emperor system, Japan, Japanese, the self such that one is left to 
construct a world of one’s own making, alone. Therefore, I would like to propose 
“deconstruction” a more suitable translation of daraku.  
  On the one hand, Darakuron and Zoku-Darakuron are fundamentally postwar 
texts. The illusory values so critical to the wartime regime and ideology were torn 
asunder, rendered incoherent. In the postwar, people could act on their urges and 
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needs, and most importantly, be represented as doing so, not represented as 
continuing to embody ideal types of virtue, not represented as noble, saintly, heroic, 
or whatever else. On the other hand, Sakaguchi’s ahistorical representation of the 
“emperor system” as something that has always been present in Japan—even while 
acknowledging its historical contingency and mutability—makes it less specific to the 
postwar, and thereby, less capable of dealing with the remarkable new and changing 
ways in which the emperor system itself was being reconstituted. His reference to 
the military leaders’ role in the War Crimes Tribunal and the emperor’s surrender 
speech do illustrate how defeat and the postwar unveiled the strange tendency to 
worship the images of our own creation as we betray them, and for the people of 
Japan to be complicit in the reproduction of the emperor system by allowing it to 
dictate when to feel and how to think. However, he could have easily found examples 
during the war to illustrate the same point.  
 Furthermore, in claiming that humans always act on their urges and needs—
and that they equally always construct false gods—Sakaguchi also universalizes the 
human condition and “humanity.” This is critical for his argument about the absolute 
contingency of socially constructed values and institution, which change from one 
mechanism or device or trick (karakuri) to another: the human condition remains 
unchanged underneath these institutions and values, even though appearances may 
suggest otherwise. To quote again, “What has changed is just the surface of things, 
the world’s outer skin.” In universalizing humanity, though, Darakuron makes it 
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difficult to speak directly to the specific conditions of postwar Japan and the 
opportunities for negating the postwar reconstruction of the emperor system when 
so much was unstable and in flux. If Darakuron can deconstruct the emperor system, 
nation, Japan, and Japanese people, shouldn’t it also be able to deconstruct 
“humanity,” or at least recognize it too as a construct that arose under certain 
historical conditions? At times it seems that an “ordinary human” (tada no ningen) 
for Sakaguchi is not someone that simply responds to urges and needs, but someone 
that stands outside of history, as a basic biological unit. At other times, “ordinary 
human” seems like an implicit assault against the emperor’s “Declaration of 
Humanity” because it merely paid lip service to the notion of being human without 
changing any of the values and virtues of the emperor system, a mere noblesse oblige 
to conform to his newly concocted role as symbolic repository of the citizen.  
 Therefore, we can observe a strange series of tensions within the text: the 
emperor system is contingent and can be deconstructed as such, and yet, it has 
proved remarkably resilient and adaptable throughout Japanese history, suggesting 
that it has overcome this very contingency; the moral self that follows societal 
dictates must be deconstructed so that the “real” self—the self that responds directly 
to urges and needs—can emerge, and yet what also emerges is a picture of a 
universal humanity. Because Sakaguchi oscillates between registers of analytical and 
personal narrative, however intertwined they may be, it is difficult to know just 
where he comes down: as a harsh critic of the present emperor system or of any 
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moral system of codes and regulations that could exist anytime and anywhere. In this 
vein, Nakano’s Goshaku no Sake and Sakaguchi’s 1948 “Words Humbly Dedicated to 
the Emperor” are more explicit in their specific targeting of the problems with the 
postwar emperor system, dismantling it through a type of discourse analysis of the 







FUKAZAWA, LAUGHTER, AND THE BLACKOUT 
 
The emperor as symbol of disunity  
5.1 Remilitarization: peddling back the pacifist narrative 
The question of the emperor system remained unresolved after the postwar 
period, which ended in 1952. While the joint invention of the postwar emperor 
system by the U.S. and Japanese governments had a period of nearly seven years to 
become concretized through ideology, aided by a discursive nexus that reinforced 
the narrative of the symbolic emperor who embodied pacifism and democracy, the 
end of the Occupation left open the possibility of constitutional reform and a further 
reconfigured postwar emperor system. Some conservative elements of Japanese 
society were still eager to return the emperor to his former glory as supreme 
commander as he had been during the age of Japanese Empire, and the U.S., which 
of course had no interest in a restored political emperor, was eager to undo changes 
put in place by the constitution of their own drafting, notably the pacifist promise of 
Article Nine. In other words, the terms of the Occupation’s purported “withdrawal” 
(they in fact never left) rather than merely codifying the legal, political, and 
ideological framework set up during the Occupation, also worked to undermine 
them.   
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The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951 by forty-eight 
countries, promised to return independence to Japan once the Occupation left on 
April 28, 1952. Article Eleven of the Treaty stipulated that Japan must accept the 
terms of the Tokyo Tribunal, thereby further bolstering the legitimacy of the decision 
to exonerate the emperor and members of the imperial family. The U.S. and Japan 
also signed the mutual Security Treaty at San Francisco (on the same day, September 
8, 1951) that would allow the U.S. to retain a military presence in East Asia by 
keeping its bases in Japan. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War and the 
establishment of the National Police Reserve—U.S. troop deployment to Korea left a 
defensive vacuum in Japan—meant that by the time of the Occupation’s withdrawal, 
remilitarization of Japan itself was underway, and would continue through a series of 
developments during the 1950s. The Police Reserves would become officially known 
as the Self-Defense Forces (referred to herein as the Jieitai) in 1954.  
The Left consistently opposed both the continued military presence of the 
U.S. in Japan after the Occupation ended as well as the remilitarization of Japan. Only 
two days after the Occupation had left (or should I say, regrouped), May Day riots 
with over one millions participants took place throughout the country to reject such 
remilitarization and U.S. bases, as well as poor economic conditions and the seizure 
of Okinawa.156 Just as protestors in May of 1946 had descended upon the Imperial 
Palace grounds for the “Food May Day” rally, protesters on May 1, 195  marched 
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from Meiji Shrine to the Imperial Palace in what would become “Bloody May Day.” 
Police used tear gas and opened fire on the crowd, killing several and injuring 
hundreds.  
Two days later, on May 3, 1952, five years after the new constitution officially 
went into effect, a celebration took place at the Imperial Plaza both to honor the 
constitution and independence. However, reminiscent of the description in Goshaku 
no Sake of the anticlimactic and poorly attended attempt at drumming up 
enthusiasm for the constitution upon its ratification, attendance was low and the 
emperor’s message was brief.157 In both circumstances, the outward expression of 
dissatisfaction, as witness by the riots, far dwarfed any outward expression of 
celebration and euphoria for the emperor and Japan’s postwar order.  
 I mention this context to argue that we cannot think of the postwar emperor 
system outside the context of both democratization and remilitarization. Despite the 
concerted effort to portray an emperor who would be on the vanguard of Japan’s 
peaceful and democratic future, the postwar emperor is equally as tied to the 
discourse of remilitarization and a conservative desire to return to the days of 
Japan’s imperial glory. This conceals, of course, that the U.S. role in postwar Japan 
was very similar to what Japanese Empire had been. Nevertheless, the emperor could 
be used to symbolize peace and war, demilitarization and remilitarization, depending 
on which unstable image one chose to accept. Yet, isn’t this very description 
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completely compatible with Watsuji’s notion of an emperor who expresses the unity 
of the nation, who stands above politics precisely because he unites all competing 
political factions under one umbrella of the nation? Could not anti-war factions pick 
the postwar emperor as their symbol while the pro-war factions pick the wartime 
emperor as theirs? Was the emperor a symbol of the integration and unification of 
these conflicting and irreconcilable views? An object of absolute nothingness (mu)?  
Absolutely not. While such an argument would be (and was) convenient to 
explain away discord in postwar Japan, it assumes that the emperor could express all 
views, when he was only being mobilized to express a select few. And among those 
few, he expressed them problematically; for example, while the emperor was clearly 
redesigned to represent the democratic will of the Japanese nation, many of those 
who most strongly embraced democracy—and the constitution that guaranteed it—
rejected the antidemocratic nature of the existence of the imperial family.  
5.2 Symbol of disunity 
There was an outside that the emperor could not express as symbol: the view 
of anyone who was critical of the emperor system itself, or those who were actively 
exclused from being symbolized by the emperor, such as minorities. The emperor, 
who had been mobilized as a symbol of multi-ethnic integration during the age of 
Japanese Empire, turned into the symbol of pure-blooded ethnic homogeneity, 
another invention of the postwar. Moreover, the symbol could not symbolize the 
abolition of the symbol that was necessarily included in the abolition of the symbolic 
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emperor system, shōchō tennōsei haishi. Therefore, I find it more productive to 
understand the postwar emperor not as the symbol of unity, but rather the symbol of 
disunity, the symbol of conflict, strife, racism, sexism, partisanship and polemicism, of 
U.S.-Japan mutual complicity, and the symbol of the inability for postwar Japan to 
reconcile with its past, and thus future.158 In actual practice, the emperor was far 
from the symbol that could unify the nation as defined by official doctrine, or as 
conceived by philosophers as the object of absolutely “nothingness” (mu). Instead, 
the emperor was invoked and upheld as means for tearing down opposition.  
This is how I understand the development of the emperor system throughout 
the 1950s, a time in which democratic consciousness and movements grew not 
merely alongside remilitarization and consolidated power by a single political party 
(not to mention the reestablishment of the zaibatsu in their postwar manifestation), 
but in response to it. The forceful drive by Kishi Nobusuke, but one of many revived 
Class-A War criminals, to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Ampo), gut Article 
Nine, and bolster police power was met with unprecedented public backlash and 
protests. Ultimately, he was successful in forcing through the Ampo Security Treaty 
before resigning due to the toxicity of nearly everything he represented. Kishi’s brand 
of politics—which has not changed since then, especially with his grandson Abe 
Shinzō now in office yet again—demonstrates a deep-set desire to return to the 
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emperor system of the militarized police state of prewar Japan with one major 
addition: U.S. security and cooperation. Importantly, though, when opposition grew 
to push back against Kishi’s new model, Kishi responded with violence legitimated in 
the name of the emperor and “security,” which came to a head in June of 1960.  
Opposition to Ampo and remilitarization, with support from a wide range of 
groups from the Socialist and Communist parties to labor groups, groups advocating 
the rights of women and minorities, student groups and beyond, grew to include 
around sixteen million people nationwide.159 In anticipation of the growing protests 
and due to the insufficient number of police to respond, Kishi sought the help of 
right-wing groups, and with the influential Kodama Yoshio as broker, mobilized them 
as part of his countermeasure strategy for suppressing anti-Ampo demonstrators.160 
A massive protest that encircled the Diet building on June 15 led to clashes with 
police and right-wing youth, who attacked the citizen groups. Protesters eventually 
made their way into the Diet compound where police unleashed tear gas and clubs. A 
student leader from Tokyo University, Kamba Michiko, was trampled and killed, 
becoming a symbol of the effects of state violence.  
In the wake of the ratification of a revised Ampo treaty, which marked a 
significant blow to the opposition movement, candidates running for office in the 
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lower house of the Diet waged an election campaign in anticipation of the November 
ballots. During a nationally televised campaign debate on October 12, 1960, vocal 
critic of Ampo and Chairman of the Socialist Party, Asanuma Inejirō, was assassinated 
by the Right-wing youth, Yamaguchi Otoya. Yamaguchi hanged himself in a juvenile 
penitentiary, scribbling “Service for my country seven lives over. Long live His 
Majesty the Emperor” (shichishō hōkoku, tennō heika banzai) in toothpaste on the 
wall.161 Following his death, he would become a martyr for the cause of anti-Left 
activism in Japan.  
Meanwhile, on October 9, theaters debuted a bold film by Japanese New 
Wave director  shima Nagisa, Nihon no yoru to kiri (Night and Fog in Japan). The film 
depicted the student protest movements surrounding both Ampo treaties of 1952 
and 1960, highlighting the differences between radical factions. The films opens with 
a wedding between Nozawa, a member of the Zengakuren in its earlier form (which 
protested the Ampo of 1952) with its close affiliation with the Communist Party, and 
Reiko, a member of the newer Zengakuren (which protested the Ampo of 1960) that 
attempted to break away from the Communist Party. This wedding serves as an 
allegory for the troubles between Old and New Left movements, a “reconciliation of 
factions on an institutional basis, without any resolution of the issues.”162 In its 
rejection of a unified subject, the film challenged—both politically and artistically as a 
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film—the humanism and Old-Left Communism of the student protest movement and 
its representation.163 On October 13, one day after Asanuma’s assassination, Night 
and Fog in Japan was pulled from theaters by its production company, Shōchiku, in 
what may have been a political maneuver to avoid controversy at a sensitive 
moment. To  shima such censorship was political oppression akin to massacre:  
I really think that what killed Night and Fog in Japan is the same thing that 
killed Kamba Michiko and Asanuma Inejirō, and I protest with unrelenting 
anger. What is it? It is everyone and everything that is displeased when the 
people try to effect reform from their side, to carve out new conditions for 
themselves. The enormous strength shown by the people in the fight against 
the security treaties terrifies and intimidates them, ultimately sending them 
into a frenzy. I swear before the three skeletons of those who were 
massacred by the power of that frenzy that my film is the weapon of the 
people's struggle.164  
 shima draws attention to the fact that political oppression is not the unilateral 
violence of the state, although this violence was present, forceful, and undeniable. 
Right-wing violence against the movement also constituted political oppression, as 
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did the willingness of the film studio, Shōchiku, to censor a political work. While not 
necessarily deriving from the state, the ideological mindset that actively suppressed 
opposition through physical violence or representative violence—determining what 
can and cannot be said through compliance and censorship—worked in concert and 
complicity with the state. That right-wing violence and self-censorship can act in the 
capacity of arm of the state to suppress dissident expression alone demonstrates the 
ever-present possibility for the development of fascistic oppression akin to what the 
Japanese state imposed unilaterally through its Peace Preservation Laws.  
5.3 Consummating the marriage to new media 
  While the content of Night and Fog in Japan is political and aesthetically 
subversive, it is somewhat bizarre that a film that focused more on the sectarian 
conflicts within the student movement itself, and not political oppression by the 
state, would have been deemed worthy of censorship at all. On the other hand, the 
portrayal of marriage, however allegorical, came at a time when the institution of 
marriage itself was being questioned as an instrument of patriarchal oppression165 
and when the imperial family enjoyed reinvigorated interest thanks to a shift to the 
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next generation: the Crown Prince, the young Akihito, needed a bride. For years, the 
Imperial Household Agency had been on a hunt to find a match suitable for Akihito, 
although perhaps the standard of “suitability” was conceived in relation more to the 
imperial household than the young prince. His engagement in 1958 to Shoda 
Michiko, the daughter of an executive of Nisshin Flour Company with a Catholic 
school education, was widely popular because it was perceived as a “love match” 
between Akihito and a commoner (however elite her background), a veritable 
modernization of the values of the imperial family.  
 The “Mitchii boom” in the media, which obsessed over every detail of the 
match—from discussions of “modern love” to the implications of someone from 
outside the court performing the intricate duties of (wifely) palace rituals—
culminated with the royal wedding on April 10, 1959, broadcast to the nation on live 
television. The broadcast was unprecedented, reaching a viewership of fifteen 
million, which put the imperial family at the center of a shared experience that 
produced the ability to imagine oneself as belonging to the nation.166 It marked not 
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only changing perceptions of the imperial family, but the role of new media in the 
dissemination of information.167 As Aaron Gerow notes, the event bolstered 
ownership of televisions and provided an opportunity to improve perception of the 
medium “by wedding itself to the nation.”168 This representation of the imperial 
family, perhaps a welcome diversion for the Imperial House Agency from the 
politically fraught figure of Hirohito, was contemporaneous with growth of the 
protest movement over Ampo; new modes of understanding were inseparable from 
new modes of representation. Television was as important for disseminating the 
apolitical representation of the imperial family as it was for debating Japan’s rapid 
remilitarization, and allowing the nation to witness the violence of, for example, 
Asamuna’s assassination, before its eyes in live time. Meanwhile,  shima Nagima, 
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who was turning film into a radical and revolutionary mode of political expression, 
protested the censorship of Night and Fog in Japan not merely for its suppression of 
political content, but for the active “massacre” of the medium itself.  
 This complex web of events and their representations in 1959 and 1960—
protests, revolution, remilitarization, assassinations, weddings, censorship, new 
media—created a discursive space in desperate need of critical reflection and 
theorization, or at least, problematization. In taking these very elements, juxtaposing 
and inverting them, I believe that Fukazawa Shichirō’s work, Fūryū Mutan, forces a 
reconsideration of both temporality and the symbolic nature of the postwar emperor 
system. In doing so, he transgressed the most potent of taboos: representation of the 
present emperor system and imperial family. He offended and delighted readers, 
often both at the same time, and produced his own violence of representation by 
depicting the very objects (and symbols) that were supposed to be off limits.  
5.4 Fūryū Mutan: No room for symbols 
  Furthermore, I want to look at Fūryū Mutan, published in Chūō Kōron in its 
December 1960 edition, in which he depicts the beheading of the Imperial Family in a 
dream, as an attempt to break out of the realm of the symbolic, as a demonstration 
of what cannot be integrated and sublated into the emperor system though the 
expression of the emperor. In this sense, I interpret it as a challenge to Watsuji’s 
notion that the emperor symbolically expresses the unity of the nation. The response 
Fūryū Mutan engendered reveals the cleavages in Japanese society as well as the 
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fascistic tendencies that wished to punish Fukazawa as if 1960s Japan still operated 
as it did in the 1920s and 1930s under the Peace Preservation Laws. In comparison 
with the texts discussed to this point, I want to argue that Fūryū Mutan performed 
the very daraku that Sakaguchi advocated at every level, violating rules of decorum 
and of proper representation. Far from advocating, encouraging, provoking, or 
glorifying violence against the emperor and the imperial family, Fukazawa delimited 
what constituted representative violence in the discursive space of 1960.  
5.4.1 Brief outline of Fūryū Mutan 
I will start my reading of Fūryū Mutan by treating it textually, and not begin 
with the actual violence that followed its publication.169 It is written as a first-person 
narrative (I will use “Watashi” to indicate the narrator) of a chaotic dream sequence 
bookended by a description of a “broken” watch. The watch only operates when on 
his wrist, stopping when it’s not. The watch is thus “awake” when he’s awake, asleep 
when he’s asleep, making him feel close to it. Watashi takes his watch, on the advice 
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of his nephew, to a watchmaker to have it examined. It turns out that it is in fact a 
very fine watch in working order, something given to a friend by an American who 
had to leave Japan in haste.170 That night, he returns home late and goes to bed.  
Watashi enters into his dream: he is on a packed commuter train near 
Shibuya when he hears news that violence has broken out in center Tokyo. When he 
gets off the train to transfer to a bus, he hears that actually a revolution is taking 
place. Someone in line tells him, “It's not revolution, but the overthrowing of the 
government to make a better Japan.” Watashi is bothered by the word “Japan,” a 
nasty country, he says. “Well, that’s what we’ll call it for now,” the man says in 
response.  
All sides are heavily armed, he’s told, because the international community—
Korea, America, and the Soviet Union—have contributed boats and machine guns to 
“put it to the devil Japan.”171 The soldiers from the Jieitai, too, are on the side of the 
people, but no one had “decided” to take sides. “It just is that way,” he is told. Some 
buses head to Ginza to join the Jieitai fight “reactionary elements” (handō bunshi), 
but Watashi takes the bus to the Imperial Palace, which has been occupied. A packed 
car with a flag that says “Women’s Independence” drives by, and a reporter 
announces that they’re on their way to take pictures of the massacre of “Mitchii.” He 
takes the bus through the Sakurada Gate and all the way to the front of the Imperial 
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Palace. The grounds had been set up like a festival, with stalls selling Oden, ramen, 
candy, and toys.  
The Crown Prince and Michiko are on their backs, awaiting their execution 
with, what Watashi surmises, is his own ax. When the ax comes down on their necks, 
their heads roll like the sound of metal, (sutten korokoro karakara—we might 
translate it as “clangity clang”). Afterward, their headless bodies lay nicely (gyōgi 
yoku), the Crown Prince in tuxedo, Michiko in a splendid kimono.   
Watashi encounters an “old gentleman” (rōshinshi), a long-time employee of 
the Imperial Palace, who informs him that Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako 
have also been killed, and they proceed through to crowd toward them. The 
beheaded emperor was in a suit, the Empress in a blouse and skirt with a tag that 
said “Made in England.” He spots a card with illegible handwriting that resembles 
crawling worms. The old gentleman tells him that it is the emperor’s death poem 
(jisei no on-uta). As he searches and finds the death poem of the Empress as well, the 
crowd parts, making way for the Dowager Empress Shōken (the wife of Meiji who 
died in 1914), which Watashi does not find strange. She has a refined countenance 
and is dressed elegantly, also in an English-made dress, and has a serpentine black 
neck.  
A confrontation ensues between the Watashi and the Dowager Empress. He 
calls her a “shitty old hag” (kuso tare baa), which she matches by calling Watashi a 
“shitty brat” (kuzo kozō) in a regional dialect. Watashi assaults her, twisting her arms, 
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putting her into a full nelson. Meanwhile, the old gentleman continues to recite the 
death poem and interpret them with Watashi, who cannot engage too deeply in 
interpretation for fear of releasing the Dowager Empress. The old gentleman 
emphasizes the intentional ambiguity and indirectness (tōmawashi) of the death 
poem, which prompts Watashi to ask whether the point of waka poetry isn’t merely 
to confuse with riddles (nazo nazo). The Empress Dowager then shouts that Watashi 
(and the rest of the protesters) are only alive thanks to the Imperial Family and the 
Emperor who saved the nation by ending the war, to which Watashi retorts that the 
Imperial Family, conversely, live off the people’s earnings, like blood-sucking 
vampires.172 Watashi experiences a brief moment of sympathy with her when 
noticing her bald spot, a vulnerability that he shares.  
A marching band comes through, and sacred symbols of the Imperial House 
like the medals given for cultural achievement (bunka kunshō, the Order of Cultural 
Merit) and the three Imperial Regalia, which resemble souvenir shop toys (a child’s 
mirror, a jewel that belongs on a toy ring, a wooden sword), are tossed onto the 
ground. The old gentlemen recites the death poems of the Crown Prince and 
Princess, and Watashi provides a rather profane interpretation which the gentleman 
rejects for a reading that suggests that the poems contain more subtlety, depth, and 
refinement (omomuki no aru).   
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Festival entertainment booths for comics and performances go up, and a 
military parade comes through with music featuring tubas, trumpets, and taiko 
drums. It is a celebration that marks the end of the battle in Ginza (in which the 
Jieitai joined the people to defeat reactionaries). Fireworks light the sky in rapid 
succession. Feeling a sense that he had left nothing in this world, Watashi composes 
his own death poem, which the old gentleman points out was ripped off from 
Manyōshū. At that, Watashi shoots himself in the head and visualizes his brain 
matter as maggots crawling around.  
Watashi is woken by his nephew, who heard him screaming some haiku, 
which Watashi concludes must have been his own original death poem.173 He was 
actually still dreaming. Then, he wakes up completely, and his watch, which reads 
2am (only ten minutes after he had set it down), is in sync with the other clocks. He 
hugs the watch, thinking, “It stayed awake while I was dreaming!”  
5.4.2  Exceeding the bounds of proper representation 
The force of this work is its unlikely pairing and inverting of the familiar 
images of the time. Everything is present: the new royal couple, protestors, the 
Jieitai, foreign intervention, the emperor, the death poem, the media, tension, 
conflict, revolution, assassination, and celebration. In the carnivalesque space of the 
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dream, all hierarchies are overturned, royalty interact with the masses, decorum is 
abandoned, the sacred is profaned, and history and teleology are irrelevant. 
Authorship and authenticity are discarded. Time and space are collapsed to reveal 
the hidden tensions that are inexpressible because physical boundaries and societal 
rules otherwise prevent such encounter in “reality.”  
It is mistaken to reject Fūryū Mutan as merely contrarian, disrespectful, or a 
case of anything goes. It does not have a political message or point per se, mocking 
and parodying all sides. However, because Fukazawa was unwilling to honor 
boundaries of “appropriate” representation within the short story form, his text 
offered a new perspective for conceiving of the emperor system.  
If there is not an overt political message in the juxtaposition and inversion of 
images, what does the text disclose? First of all, there is a lurking and constant 
presence of the foreign powers, even if the reason for their presence is unexplained 
and unresolved. Watashi’s watch—which set up a warped temporality outside the 
dream itself, suggesting that the return to reality is not quite so—originated with an 
American woman who had to leave Japan, but was made in Switzerland. The 
distorted time-measuring of his watch was confirmed by the “authentic” time of his 
nephew’s Westminster clock.174 During the protest, Watashi is told that “every 
nation” (kaku kuni) is contributing to destroy Japan by providing weapons, and Korea, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States—unlikely allies during the Cold War era—are 
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mentioned specifically.175 Every member of the Imperial Family except for the newly 
anointed Princess Michiko is dressed in Western clothes made in England, an 
otherwise unexceptional fact had Watashi not made a point of looking at every 
clothing label.  
What are we to make of the very intentional inclusion of the foreign? Why 
would America provide weapons to protesters for the purpose of overthrowing the 
Japanese government when the actual protests struggled against Ampo, the 
mutually-assured protection of both countries? I believe that the inclusion of the 
foreign in Fūryū Mutan specifically highlights the colonial relationship at the center of 
the debates over Ampo, disclosing the absurdity of speaking of Japan’s 
“independence.” The “made in England” labels on the clothing of the Imperial Family 
are also a keen reminder that the postwar emperor system was a collaborative 
invention with foreign powers; that the labels were British as opposed to American is 
immaterial, as objects are freely swapped and mixed in dreams. Also, the narrative of 
the new, “modernized,” and democratic emperorship was contingent on the 
“everyman” nature of the emperor, performed through mere wardrobe change. The 
fact that only Michiko wore a refined kimono points to the Imperial Family’s costume 
change in reserve: as a “commoner” brought into the sacred realm of the Imperial 
Palace, she had to perform “Japaneseness” in a way that, ironically, the Imperial 
Family was now exempt, and overcompensate for her deficiency for not being born 
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into the family. It makes we wonder if, despite the initial reluctance of Hirohito and 
the Imperial Household Agency to accept that Michiko could be a befitting bride to 
Akihito, they didn’t come to see the domestification of an outsider to the Imperial 
Family as a way to sustain its existence by having her submissively perform the 
role.176 
5.4.3 Disruptive temporality 
The time of the text is also foreign, both because of the foreign-made watch 
and the disjointed and interrupted time that the watch (and the dream) produces. It 
is a “colonial time” that breaks with the temporality of “imperial time” in which the 
nation of Japan is measured by the unbroken and continuous reign of emperors, and 
counted by eras (nengō) defined by the one-to-one relationship of emperor to era 
(issei ichigen).177 Imperial time is further interrupted by the execution of emperor as 
well as the first in line to inherit the throne, the Crown Prince Akihito, severing the 
continuous reign of emperors. That a bus is able drive through the Sakurada Gate, up 
past the Nij bashi Bridge, and directly to the square of the Imperial Palace is pure 
violation of imperial space as well. As a sacred space, the access to which is tightly 
controlled and monitored, it is fitting for the carnivalesque inversions that the text 
performs.  
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Yet, the alternative to “imperial time” is not “revolutionary time” because the 
temporality of revolution assumes progress and development through stages until a 
climactic break point is reached; revolutionary temporality assumes a historical 
teleology. The interrupted and collapsed time of Fūryū Mutan eschews such history 
or purpose. There was no development that culminated with the events of the text, 
no past history to explain the state of the present, let alone a historical agent. 
Watashi, perplexed that the military is fighting on the side of the protestors, asks a 
woman, “When was all of this decided?” She responds, “It’s not a question of anyone 
deciding. It just is that way.”178 Her day had started as any normal day, with the 
quotidian humdrum of her commute, but now that a revolution was underway, she 
was participating. The events are just happening, without reason or meaning.  
Revolution, in fact, is constantly parodied and subverted within the text. It’s 
never quite clear if what is occurring is mere violence, war, or revolution. Watashi 
asks, “Is it revolution? Is it the Left (sayoku 左欲)?” However, rather than use the 
kanji for Left-wing (sayoku 左翼), Fukazawa creates a pun, replacing “wing” with 
“desire,” which could yield a reading such as “Is it revolution, the desire of the Left?” 
It is also hardly clear what, if anything, is being overthrown. The Imperial Family is so 
trivialized that their decapitations have no particular significance. All of the fighting 
occurs at a slight distance from the Imperial Palace, in Ginza, but even there, the 
enemy is only described as “reactionary elements” whereas the protestors are 
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backed by Japan’s Jieitai and with the help of foreign arms. The events bear no 
resemblance to the democratic movement to oppose the Ampo and Kishi’s police 
state; there is no sharp delineation of friend and enemy; there are no demands made 
by the protestors. In fact, Watashi is so busy discussing the death poems of the 
Imperial Family and fighting with the Dowager Empress that the “revolution” is 
inconsequential, a part of the scenery.  
The author Takeda Taijun rejects the many critics who saw the texts as “not 
taking a position on the revolution.” He notes the pervasive anxiety of Watashi, who 
operates in a strange temporality established by his watch and dream state, and the 
very instability of events and images within it. Since the logic of the text operates 
according to a distorted sense of space and time, to critique it as if operated 
according to the logic of historical progress (empty, homogeneous time) is mistaken. 
He says,  
There is a detachment from the type of formal logic required for the analysis 
of the revolution—or comparative revolutions of different countries—in 
which history is fated to move toward a certain direction. Space is 
interrupted. In a Dali painting,179 pocket watches are drawn in an exhaustedly 
warped state, like paper drenched with water. Time in this work, too, like the 
exhaustedly warped pocket watches, is not a continuation of the “punctual 
time” of the continuous everyday. The freedom within a dream after all is 
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liberation from the space and time of the everyday, and from within that, 
there could be no discourse capable of analyzing revolutionary history. 
Rather, revolutionary history is unanalyzable, and the real value of the dream 
is its ability to leap over that type of method. Dreamers dream at a depth 
unknown to scholarly activities or the particularities of history, and therefore 
to critique it from those angles misses the mark.180 
The text is unanalyzable as critique precisely because it is not critique, and therefore 
cannot be forced to conform to its standard or “take a position” on the politics of the 
day. Many critics were not quite sure what to make of it, and at a loss, attempted to 
understand it not as text but as event. As I’ll show later, Nakano Shigeharu’s own 
uneasiness over the text is related to its subversion of proper method of resistance to 
the state, which in turn, he believes can play into the hands of state violence.   
5.4.4 Dirty mouths: the language of the text 
The only “critique” of the emperor system is expressed in the vulgar and 
brutish argument and brawl between Watashi and the Dowager Empress, brought 
back from the dead to articulate the distain of the Imperial Family for the people. 
That too, however, is a caricature of a critique, and more an expression of raw 
sentiment instead.  
                                                 
180 Takeda Taijun. “Yume to genjitsu [Dreams and reality].” Bessatsu Shinhyō  
Fukuzawa Shichirō no sekai.7.2, 1974, pg. 216-219. Originally published in Gunzō, 
Shōwa 36 (1961), Feb. 
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Dowager Empress: “Who do you Shits think is responsible for ensuring your 
very lives? It’s thanks to us that you’re alive!”  
Watashi: “What the hell, you shitty old hag! You have no proof of that. You 
vampires have sucked us dry of our money, and you dare say we owe you 
thanks? More like thanks for nothing.”  
Dowager Empress: “What the hell to you, shitty brat! Have you forgotten 
August 15th? It’s thanks to our very own dear Hirohito that the unconditional 
surrender was made, saving your lives.”  
Watashi:  “The reason your fucking son ended the war, and saved anyone’s 
life, was that he was told by others to surrender and then to claim that he 
was tricked by those around him. You going to tell me who the hell it was?”181 
The point of the confrontation between Watashi and the Empress Dowager is not so 
much that they repeat the common postwar theme that the Hirohito magnanimously 
saved the nation through surrender, and the equally-as-common trope that the 
Imperial Family owe their extravagant and cloistered existence to the people whose 
taxes support them, but rather the depiction of the type of interaction that could 
never take place. No one would ever dare disrespect the members of Imperial Family 
to their faces with such vulgarity, and no one from the Imperial Family—whose 
designated postwar role is to personify humility, elegance, and refined language—
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could ever utter such debauched language. Such indiscretion could only happen—
and certainly did all the time—in the private sphere. In public, however, it’s an 
impossible encounter. In depicting the impossible itself, Fukazawa gives cathartic 
expression to a desire typically not allowed to enter the field of representation: the 
desire to publically transgress. It is a desire constantly kept in check by the very moral 
or ideological constructs that Sakaguchi Ango recognizes as taking the humanity out 
of the human being.  
 Throughout Fūryū Mutan, this vulgar language is juxtaposed with the elevated 
and oblique language of the imperial death poems, the ancient language of waka. 
The poems serve to buttress the Imperial Family’s status as the arbiter of aristocratic 
elegance and linguistic grace. The performance of the waka is a ritual, like others 
done by the emperor, intended to fuse the image of the Imperial Household with the 
language of antiquity, such that both the Japanese language and emperor could 
serve the metonymic function of representing a timeless and unchanging Japan, 
where “Japan,” “Japanese language,” and “tennō (or kokutai)” could be used 
interchangeably. Yet, Fukazawa constantly undermines the privileged position of 
representation through the waka death poems. The old gentleman, the officially 
sanctioned interpreter of the poems by virtue of his long tenure with the Imperial 
Household Agency, gives readings that are equally as obtuse as the original poem, 
while Watashi undermines the supposed profundity of each poem through vulgar 
interpretation that, in a sense, domesticates it by making it relatable and 
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understandable, devoid of its mystique and privileged status.182 He questions 
whether the point of waka itself is to be intentionally confusing and enigmatic, a 
puzzle (nazo nazo) that one has to work to crack. Of course, the old gentleman 
rejects any such notion, but fails to show how it could not be the case.183  
In another instance, the old gentleman reads Akihito’s and Michiko’s death 
poems together, interpreting them as if one poem in complete harmony, just like the 
young couple. To him, the seasonal imagery and colors—clichéd tropes each with 
specific connotations—are perfectly offset to complement the other, and suggest a 
poignant reconciliation with their premature deaths. Watashi interrupts him mid-
sentence, struck by his own sudden understanding of the poem:  
I got it! He says something and she responds one way. Then she says 
something and he responds another way. It means that couples will 
stubbornly fight with one another, but when they are on their deathbeds, 
they can look back and understand those fights to be romantic expressions.184  
                                                 
182 John Treat’s essay covers in detail the readings of these poems, which make 
repetition of them here unnecessary. He discusses how ceremonies such as the New 
Year’s poetry parties, the utakai-hajime, invite the masses to submit entries of their 
own waka compositions in an attempt to collapse the difference between emperor 
and people. “Waka, through its conservative unity of aesthetics that define Japanese 
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among individual Japanese is purportedly dissolved.” Treat, pg. 106. However, to me, 
such a ceremony only functions to secure the authoritative role of the Imperial 
Household in designating what constitutes Japaneseness.  
183 Fukazawa, pg. 335.  
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Watashi’s interpretation relies solely on the structure of reading two poems in 
counterpoint, deducing that it is like a quarrel, but a quarrel that can be reconciled at 
the time of death as an expression of romance. This interpretation strips the poems 
of their symbolic content, completely ignoring the signifiers at the center of the old 
gentleman’s interpretation—a butterfly, yellow flowers, autumn maple foliage, etc—
in favor of an analysis based on the structural act of reading two poems together. 
Therefore, Watashi not only challenges the officially-sanctioned interpretation by 
bringing the death poems into the domestic space of a fight (kenka) between 
couples; removing the symbolic content of the poems also deprives the Imperial 
Household of its power to represent.185 To reject the symbolic import of the poems is 
to extract them from the tradition and legacy of poetic meaning—a legacy that takes 
into account symbolic usage since the Manyōshū—that authorizes what constitutes 
proper interpretation. In this sense, Watashi’s reading enacts an interpretative 
violence upon the poems that undermines the value of the symbol as well as the 
power to symbolize.186 
 The text thus parodies the notion that the event of the deaths of the Imperial 
Family could have any “meaning.” Meaning would have to be constructed through 
language, but the very unity of this language is subverted through such interpretative 
                                                 
185 Treat notes that the manipulation of the death poems by Watashi functions to 
“trespass into one of the unresolved paradoxes of the emperor in postwar Japan: his 
official status as both reified symbol and reigning symbolist.” Treat, pg. 106.  
186 In the flattened space of the dream, Watashi gives equal weight to interpreting his 
own use of the phrase “shitty old hag” (kusottare baa, literally “shit-dripping hag”) as 
he gives interpretation of the death poems. 
192 
 
violence; the elevated language of waka inhabits the same space as the indelicate 
language of the Empress Dowager. The decapitations are given no greater meaning 
or significance within the text. They are a spectacle for the crowds to witness, and for 
a journalist to photograph for the consumption of her magazine’s Michiko-obsessed 
readership; the deaths merely happen and have no cause or explanation. There is no 
trial and conviction, no suggestion that the executions are punishment for war crimes 
or the responsibility of the emperor for the war itself—if the beheadings were about 
retribution or bearing responsibility for the past, surely the focus would have been 
on Hirohito himself, not the imperial family in general, and especially not the 
outsider, the new Crown Princess Michiko. The sound of the heads rolling (sutten 
korokoro karakara) suggests that they are made of metal, but that only points to 
what we already know: the function of the emperor is little more than that of a robot 
or machine; every movement is predetermined, every utterance scripted.  
Only the old gentleman, who appears absolutely unconcerned with the actual 
deaths that took place, is focused on salvaging the remnants of symbolic imperial 
authority through his interpretations of the poems. Likewise, he runs around picking 
up Order of Cultural Merit medals (bunka kunshō)—he had been awarded one for 
being a go-between (nakōdo) for the royal couple—because they were being thrown 
out. He say its “such a waste” (mottainai) to see them strewn about. However, even 
this act of reclaiming the discarded artifacts of the emperor system is hardly a 
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desperate attempt to reestablish symbolic order—the time for that has clearly 
passed.  
 The Imperial Regalia (the sword, mirror, and jewel)—those enduring physical 
objects that have accompanied the supposed unbroken line of emperors down to the 
present since their divine origin—have no symbolic power either. Their use-value 
does not even warrant resale at a pawnshop.187 Instead, they have been reduced to 
toys that could be found at a souvenir shop or penny-candy store, perhaps something 
that could be purchased at one of the festival stands that had set up shop on the 
palace grounds; the sword looked like it was made from a chunk of wood, the mirror 
looked like it belonged to a child, and the jewel was more fitting for a toy ring. They 
are mere tchotchkes. The Imperial Regalia, in coordination with the Japanese 
language of antiquity and the continuous imperial line, are all deprived of their 
symbolic function.  
5.4.5 The space for laughter 
Of course, nothing in Watashi’s dream space is privileged. It is a space of 
unfettered connections, where nothing is sacred and therefore nothing can be 
transgressed. It is a taboo-free zone. With such a setup—and perhaps only with such 
a setup—Fukazawa allows the reader to imagine a world in which Japan’s reigning 
symbols have no currency. In fact, this is precisely what makes Fūryū Mutan so 
subversive: it gives expression to what many people may have been thinking but 
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could not articulate in public, or perhaps even to themselves. Even though people 
may know that the emperor system is pure construct, they re-inscribe and reproduce 
it by carefully abiding by its boundaries, giving respect to its symbols and 
symbolizers. The symbolic capacity of the emperor system—its ideological power—is 
only maintained to the degree that the public agrees to adhere to what it deems 
sacred, giving the impression that it is sacred. For Fukazawa to represent the Imperial 
Family, the Palace grounds, the Imperial Regalia, the imperial death poems, and even 
the protest movement itself, as anything other than sacred thus is in pure violation of 
the prohibition. In other words, Fukazawa establishes Watashi’s taboo-free zone in 
order to break through the taboo-dense space of present Japan; to represent the 
unrepresentable, to give expression to the impossible. This representation gives way 
to catharsis in that it allows the reader to confront any secret desire to perform such 
transgression and violate the taboo imposed on society not by any legal code 
(fukeizai had lost its legal foundation) but through self-regulation and restraint. This 
desire, needless to say, is not the desire to kill the king, but to openly acknowledge 
that the emperor is not sacred.  
In this sense, Fūryū Mutan fights the very tendency to suppress one’s feelings 
or desires because of how one ought to feel. Takeda Taijun, who describes shaking 
with laughter while reading of the Dowager Empress and Watashi hurling abuse at 
one another, writes:  
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I could not stop laughing. It’s quite a delightful piece. It felt mean-spirited 
towards the victims within the work. It never occurred to me to injure such 
characters in literature, and never imagined it would be delightful. Yet, it was 
funny, so what could I do (shikata ga nai)? Even if I’m told that I’m not 
supposed to find it funny, it’s not as if I can deceive my own true feelings.188  
This seemed to be a very common reaction. Many of the writers who engaged in the 
debate over the text (‘Fūryū Mutan’ ronsō) described their insuppressible and 
uproarious laughter (gera gera waratta), even when critical of it (Hirano Ken is a 
prime example) or despite feeling a little unnerved as well. Yoshimoto Takaaki, who 
was in stiches laughing at it, considered the text to be a case of “high-class rakugo,” 
and that Fukazawa is less a writer than a storyteller (kōshakushi), a manzai artist, or 
rakugo performer.189 Yet, it’s interesting that Takeda should describe the tendency to 
laugh despite the fact that it’s not supposed to be funny. It speaks to the subjective 
and internal forces that stand in the way of overcoming the social dictates of what 
constitutes proper representation. Takeda laughed in spite of his better judgment, 
but in doing so, was able to objectify and thus expose the ideological forces that are 
in operation within him. His laughter itself in this sense is transgressive.  
 Yet, this very type of laughter that was troubling to others. The poet 
Hasegawa Ry sei, for example, was astonished that so many writers could express 
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the extent of their laughter upon reading Fūryū Mutan. He says, “Of course readers 
are free to laugh when reading a text, and they are free to find laughable elements 
within the text. But, there is something lamentable hidden behind the laughter of 
these authors, something irresponsible.”190 Hasegawa detects a type of “homicidal 
thought” (satsujin kannen) behind the laughter and that is archetypal of Fukazawa’s 
aesthetics, characterized by the vengeance of the isolated masses with no alternative 
and the brutality of those with no faith in solidarity. The laughter of the writers 
indicates a type of nonchalant attitude in the writers who, rather than being 
concerned of the deeply rooted homicidal tendencies within Japan (and that 
Hasegawa says are especially present within the lower classes), just shrug it off with 
their “tranquilizing laughter.” He says, 
We can only surmise that there is a quiet but cowardly homicidal thought—a 
half-baked and easygoing homicidal thought—that exists within the laugher 
of each writers who claims, “Oh, it’s so funny!” and “It’s ingenious,” whether 
they agree or disagree.191 
Hasegawa believes that Fūryū Mutan serves as a valuable “litmus test” for public 
intellectuals and writers (bunkajin) in general, not only as an indication of whether 
they harbor “homicidal thoughts” but also as a test of loyalty to see how they would 
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connect their personal “hate thought” (zōo kannen) to class-based hate.192 I find this 
argument wholly unconvincing and bizarre; it is much more telling that Hasegawa 
could convert his discomfort with the reaction to the story into a blanket 
psychoanalysis of the homicidal tendencies of the writers who partook in the debate 
following the publication of Fūryū Mutan. How could laughter, or the expression of 
one’s laughter, ever be “irresponsible” as he says? His assessment is troubling for 
numerous reasons. First of all, Hasegawa exhibits the typical tendency to reduce the 
text to the killing of the imperial family without taking into consideration the entirety 
of the piece and its parodic dismantling of the symbolic authority of the emperor 
system. Second, if there were a suppressed desire within Japanese society to kill the 
king (or simply to commit murder—Hasegawa does not distinguish the two), 
especially among lower-class society, he fails to show why it would problematic to 
give literary expression to such dark thoughts. Third, despite the fact that the real 
names the Imperial Family were used, the characters in the text were clearly no more 
than puppets from a puppet theater, as Yoshimoto Takaaki pointed out, barely 
resembling actual humans.193 Forth, Hasegawa’s desire to suppress the laughter of 
intellectual and writers is the identical compulsion that Takeda Taijun recognized 
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within himself, a compulsion that was completely overridden and decimated by 
laughter. In that moment, Takeda’s laughter was an expression of the unknowing of 
any compulsion to restrain himself.194  
  I believe that Hasegawa’s criticism is less about any “homicidal thought” 
within the literary community than about the fact that the literary community gave 
vindication for a text that violated the basic decorum of how the Imperial Family may 
be represented and what is appropriate to publish. However, Fukazawa’s breach of 
etiquette went well beyond representation of the Imperial Family because it even 
parodied the protest movement and revolution itself. In its absolute refusal to 
elevate any person, concept, or literary mode to a sacred level, Fukazawa performed 
a representative daraku with his Fūryū Mutan. It’s critical to first read it as a text that 
responded to the present moment, and that enacted a representative violence on the 
reigning symbols, rather than interpret the text retrospectively based on what 
transpired after the text’s publication. Other than parody and satire itself, the text 
had no point; it was not a political critique, which is why many who were steeped in 
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the opposition movement treated it hostilely. For Sakaguchi Ango, to fall into daraku 
means to strip away the veneer—the “false kimonos”—that stand in the way of 
acting on one’s urges and needs. It is to listen to oneself, to be introspective, and to 
act in accordance with inner dictates, not what society or ideology deems correct. In 
this sense, it is fundamentally apolitical. To perform daraku, hence, it to undo 
ideological constructs without the consequences in mind, to “let all morals dissipate 
(dōgi taihai), let confusion reign (konran seyo).” This is precisely what Fukazawa does 
in his Fūryū Mutan so boldly and, dare I say, elegantly. Takeda’s laughter is the pure 
expression of this very daraku because no abstract notion of value or sacredness 
could suppress it; his laughter is the sound of morals dissipating. On the other hand, 
Hasegawa’s claim that the laughter of the critics (bunkajin) was irresponsible is the 
re-inscription of that very morality, the conservative tendency to uphold ideological 
constructs when at threat.  
5.5 Nakano’s reaction  
  It is in this tendency to judge Fūryū Mutan not by its content but instead by its 
aftermath, not by its subversive ability but its political expression, that we can begin 
to see greater cleavages between the Nakano’s and Sakaguchi’s critique of the 
emperor system. Unfortunately, by the time of the text’s publication, Sakaguchi had 
been dead over a decade and thus could not take part in the debate over it. Nakano’s 
critique, though, is one of the most important to respond to Fūryū Mutan. In many 
ways, it is an incredibly lucid and insightful critique of state violence, and the ability 
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of the state to transform violence in any form into a mode for suppressing political 
movements that challenge state power. On the other hand, it fails as a piece of 
literary, which implicitly holds Fukazawa responsible for any political fallout.  
 Understandably, Nakano could not separate his understanding of the violence 
within Fūryū Mutan from the violent suppression of the anti-Ampo movement and 
the assassination of Asamuna. His essay, “Is terrorism against the Right permissible?” 
(teroru ha uyoku ni taishite ha yurusareru ka) starts from the standpoint of politics. 
The general elections had taken place in November of 1960, only one month after 
Asanuma had been assassinated and one month before the Fūryū Mutan was 
published. The problem at hand was terrorism.  
 In the wake of Asanuma’s assassination, electoral politics forced the 
discussion of political terrorism and its eradication. However, Nakano observes, the 
primacy of “terrorism” itself got lost in the debates, which spoke only of “violence” 
generally. The problem, as he sees it, was Right-wing terrorism, but the debates 
further muddled that specificity by equally rejecting both Left-wing and Right-wing 
violence. He says, “In the form of negating violence in general, they let terrorism slip 
through the cracks. It played right into the hands of the reactionary camp that 
dispatched the terrorist.”195 Even though legislation was brought to the floor of the 
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Diet to address violence, the problem of Right-wing terrorism was left completely 
unresolved.  
 At a meeting of intellectuals after the election, Nakano had an argument with 
a college student who advocated violence against the Right. Nakano quotes the 
student as saying, “It is only proper to enact terrorism against the conservative 
reactionaries that intimidate with force. An eye for an eye, tooth for tooth. If Kishi is 
on his way to sign a bill and is killed, you can prevent the signing of the bill. Or at 
least you can delay its enactment.”196 Yet, to Nakano, this desire to enact revenge on 
the Right through terror was a naïve ignorance of history, practical politics, and 
actual power relations; the college student knew nothing of Ampo, the specifics of 
the treaties (1951, 1960), the history of the opposition movement, or the way that 
power can use violence. “He paid no attention to the extent to which violence is 
directly mobilized in the name ‘security,’ or even worse, the degree to which physical 
and mental violence is deployed.”  
 The basic problem, as Nakano sees it, is that Right-wing terrorism is the same 
as state violence. It is equivalent to joining forces with the state. The state does not 
fear political violence because it provides an opportunity to retaliate against labor 
and the mass action of the people. In fact, the state has effectively set up a trap, and 
all it has to do is wait for the people to take the bait. It waits for violence from the 
Left so that it can suppress the entire movement, which does have actual power. To 
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give the state exactly what it wants—to fall into its trap by enacting terror against the 
right—is to threaten the power that the opposition movement has and to bring 
shame to the growth of that power and to history itself.197 Therefore, “Terrorism 
must be shut down, but not because it comes from the Right. It must be shut down 
because it’s the inevitable political method of the anti-revolutionary course. Terror 
itself must be shut down.”  
 With this, Nakano stages his entrance into his discussion of Fūryū Mutan. 
While acknowledging that the text is not about terrorism, he finds three issues that 
need to be fleshed out:  
First, there is a problem of the relationship between the freedom to dream 
and the freedom to make that dream public. Second, there is the kind of 
problem following from the first, of a novel that uses actual names (being a 
roman à clef), the problem of defamation and the violation of human rights. 
Third, there is a problem with the literary image of “revolution.” 
It should be clear immediately from Nakano’s three issues that he has little intention 
of providing a literary analysis of the text, but rather wants to interpret it via the lens 
of what followed. This is not inherently problematic, but it leads to a 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the text itself.  
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 Nakano first tackles the second issue, the question of defamation. Within the 
media, there had been much discussion of whether Fukazawa could be tried on lèse 
majesté (fukeizai) charges despite that it had been invalidated during the Occupation 
era. Of course, nothing would come of that. Nakano had even read a newspaper 
article suggesting that the Prime Minister would sue on behalf of the emperor on the 
charge of defamation (meiyo kison). However, he notes, defamation is only borne of 
the injured party suing, and the emperor refuses to do that, which could suggest two 
things: either the emperor is too weak and powerless, or that he’s so powerful that 
he’s above defamation, “an infinite existence that appears as a zero.”198 This, he 
mentions in passing, could become a constitutional issue of the nature of the 
“symbol,” but unfortunately does not pursue the thought further. I say it is 
unfortunate because it is specifically the nature of the symbol and the power to 
represent that Fūryū Mutan problematizes through its parody, but Nakano fails to 
engage it at that level.   
 Returning to problem number one, Nakano states that everyone has the 
freedom to dream, a freedom that cannot be taken away by incarceration or 
anything else. “However,” he says, “if I make a dream public, other issues can arise.” 
The “issue” that Nakano proceeds to discuss is the representation of revolution 
within Watashi’s dream as something not fixed, moving from “riot” to “revolution” to 
“not a revolution.” In other words, the dream is problematic for the image of 
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revolution. However, in using the phrase “make a dream public” (yume wo kōhyō 
suru), Nakano discloses that he is not referring to Watashi but to Fukazawa himself. 
Yet, it was never Fukazawa’s dream. And it is not Watashi that makes the dream 
public; Fukazawa merely depicts the dream of a fictional character. This is an 
unfortunate conflation of author and protagonist that, ironically, Nakano would 
criticize the newspapers (Asahi and Yomiuri) for doing towards the end of his essay. 
To me, the whole question of the “freedom to make a dream public” is no different 
than the question of “freedom of speech.” In other words, to problemize the first is 
necessarily to question the value of that latter. For Nakano and others to disguise it 
as a literary problem (i.e. the problem of the representation of revolution) is to 
conceal the question that they really want to ask: should it have been censored? 
  For Nakano, the fundamental problem of the text is the third, the literary 
image of revolution, and I believe this is at the root of his distaste for Fūryū Mutan. 
To Nakano, Fukazawa’s depiction of the revolution is “symptomatic” (kuse) of the 
way the revolution is fantasized to be riotous, chaotic, violent, and destructive. 
Fukazawa is not alone in this fantasy (kūsō): “the habit of assuming that the 
revolution is approaching because there is chaos means that there remains a problem 
of the weakness of our image of revolution as a problem in general.”199 We should 
recall here that Nakano sees the power of the opposition movement (the 
revolutionary movement) as growing, but also vulnerable, and always at risk of being 
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annihilated by state violence if the state is given the chance. For Nakano, the 
revolution must be based on practical issues of justice and responsibility. A true 
revolution would hold the emperor responsible in court.  
In that sense, Nakano is critical not only of Fukazawa, but of those critics and 
respondents who portrayed the decapitation of the imperial family within Fūryū 
Mutan as an execution (shokei). It cannot be an execution because that would entail 
conviction in a trial, which is absent in the text. There can be no revolution without a 
trial, a “serious” trial in which the defendant has a lawyer and rights. However, to 
present an image of a revolution that skips over the trial, opting instead for 
immediate use of the “halberd” (masakiri), is to bring disgrace and shame to that 
image. Nakano feels that Fukazawa wants to avoid taking responsibility for spreading 
that image. He says,  
I’m not trying to attack Fukazawa based on that point. It’s just that, to take a 
serious trial that would accompany a revolution—for example, even now the 
question of the emperor’s war responsibility remains—and turn it into a fake 
mob lynching because someone saw it in a dream, does not constitute 
criticism. I just want to say that this author’s great defect is that he tied 
literature to actual history and actual human beings. It’s conceivable that the 
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emperor will be punished. But, that is not something that can happen in a 
dream.200 
I believe we can detect in this statement Nakano’s fundamental misreading of Fūryū 
Mutan: he wants to understand it as political criticism. Yet, as I argued earlier, the 
text’s value is not in its political agenda, but its subversion of the authority to 
designate symbols. The dream space was established to tear down the hegemony of 
signs and symbols, to create a zone in which taboos do not exist, and to treat neither 
the emperor nor the revolution as sacred. The temporality of the dream is the active 
negation of both imperial time and revolutionary time; there is no room for history, 
justice, or teleology. He takes actual history and distorts it into something 
unrecognizable and, ultimately, impossible. Fukazawa is actively juxtaposing and 
shuffling around history, images, events, literary styles that are symbolically charged 
in order to expose their constructed nature.  
 Nakano criticizes the college student (who advocated terrorism against the 
Right) for being clueless about the history of the movement and about the 
specificities of the Ampo treaties, and for not understanding what was politically at 
stake.201 However, in holding Fukazawa’s representation of the revolution to the 
same standards—demanding that it depict a revolution based on justice by convicting 
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students about the true nature of the emperor system despite their desire to merely 
critique it and advocate its abolition.  
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the emperor in court—Nakano overlooks Fūryū Mutan’s ability to undermine the 
symbolic authority of the state. Instead, despite his repeated insistence that he does 
not want to specifically attack Fukazawa given that there is a problem with the image 
of revolution in general in Japan, Nakano clearly believes that Fukazawa has planted a 
seed for state retaliation against the revolutionary movement, that he bears 
responsibility for what might ensue. For me, the most revealing passage in Nakano’s 
essay is this: “Fūryū Mutan is not about terrorism. And yet, I worry if there isn’t a 
belief in there, casting its shadow in the background, that can forgive terrorism 
against the Right.”202  
 Just like in the immediate postwar, Nakano is concerned primarily with the 
humanistic representation of the emperor, and the importance of representing his 
humanity as a mode for holding him accountable in a democratic society that 
operates according to the rule of law, not one in which anyone is exempted—
including the emperor—from accountability. His demand during the anti-Ampo 
struggle, too, seems to be that the most accurate representation of the actual 
conditions of things—the unaccountability of the emperor, the violence of the 
state—is the most powerful way to “establish a sense of national conscience,” to 
quote the narrator of Goshaku no Sake. Clearly, Fukazawa does not have such lofty 
expectations. He is the embodiment of literary daraku, writing against prohibition 
without obsessing over the consequences.  
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 I do not mean to diminish Nakano’s critique of state violence. He is absolutely 
correct in his observation that Right-wing terrorism acts as an arm of the state, and 
that the state can easily absorb violence that originates from the Left (or popular 
movements or labor movements in general) by using it as pretext to suppress it.203 In 
this sense, his essay is highly reminiscent of another essay he wrote at in 1936, 
following the rebellion of February 26 (ni-niroku jiken), entitled “Impressions From 
But One Citizen” (ichi shimin toshite no kansō),204 in which he shows that both the 
event and the reaction to it (the demand for more security) would result in the full-
scale strengthening of Japan’s police state. He asks at the end, “whether this was a 
rebellion against the government and the regular army, or whether it was a rebellion 
against the people.” Therefore, at all times, Nakano is primarily concerned with 
political method and what constitutes effective resistance, always on guard to avoid 
the traps set by the state. Political method is deeply tied to representation for him.  
                                                 
203 I feel compelled to mention here that John Treat misrepresents Nakano’s reaction 
to Fūryū Mutan. He writes, “old-line leftists such as Nakano Shigeharu lambasted it 
for a parodic flippancy no doubt antithetical to the premises of the intellectual 
arguments commonly advanced in attacking the emperor system.” Treat, pg. 103-4. 
Consequently, he also mischaracterizes Nakano’s Goshaku no Sake when citing it as 
an example of a work of fiction critical of the emperor prior to Fūryū Mutan that did 
not “unleash the fury” that the latter did. He says, “Nakano’s narrator is conveniently 
inebriated when he scorns the emperor; and all the works are concerned with the 
unreconstructed emperor of wartime—not postwar—Japan, a distinction that 
perhaps exempted these authors from the discipline dispensed to Fukazawa.” (my 
italics) First of all, Goshaku no Sake was censored, having passages excised. Second of 
all, and much more importantly, Goshaku no Sake is fundamentally about the 
postwar emperor system and how it must not be mistaken for the wartime one at 
the risk of eviscerating any potential for resistance. I hope to have demonstrated that 
within this dissertation.  
204 Nakano Shigeharu. Nakano Shigeharu Zensh , Volume 10, pg. 430-2 
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 But, Fukazawa’s assault on the dominant taboos and modes of polite 
representation are incompatible with this model—it is unconcerned with method, 
and for Nakano to judge it as if it were is a blatant misreading, intentional or not. 
Perhaps we can understand Fukazawa’s attitude as a type of aloofness to politics. On 
the other hand, it does not make the text less valuable. In its ability to provoke 
debate alone, I believe Fūryū Mutan delimited what could and could not be 
expressed at the time, performing a representative violence by transgressing that 
very boundary. In the response it engendered from the critics and the media, which 
ranged from revulsion to ambivalence to delight, it exposed the very toxicity of the 
emperor serving as symbol; it was a reminder that the practical ramifications of 
restructuring the emperor system in postwar Japan was that the emperor ended up 
serving as symbol of disunity.  
Given that the U.S. was instrumental in the construction of the postwar 
emperor system, and now was instrumental in eroding the very constitution that 
codified it through the renewed and revised Security Treaty—effectively demanding 
a remilitarized and further occupied Japan with a pacifist emperor that symbolized 
this contradiction—we must concede that the U.S. had a major role to play in 
fostering this disunity. Fūryū Mutan actually depicts this all too clearly: the U.S. (and 
other foreign powers) has joined forces with the people to overthrow the emperor 
by supplying weapons. The U.S., too, takes part in the beheading of the Imperial 
Family.   
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Among the responses to the text that I have read, only  oka Shōhei’s 
connects the foreign presence within the text with the creation of the “symbolic” 
emperor during the Occupation: “The fact that the ambiguous title of the emperor as 
a symbol within the Constitution remains is a form of state authority connected to 
the Occupation. It wasn’t a temporary phenomenon of Japan’s defeat; it continues 
today.”205 To  oka, the ambiguous status of the emperor established during the 
Occupation was still unresolved. He does not pursue this further, but what’s clear 
from his reading is that Fukazawa has not only challenged the status of the symbolic 
emperor system, but also the U.S. role then and then U.S. role now in its production, 
or for that matter, its destruction.  
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the U.S. had any interest in 
dismantling the symbolic emperor system itself. It could still be an incredibly 
productive tool for projecting a democratic and pacifist façade for Japan while Japan 
was being converted into a strengthened police state and a series of military bases 
for U.S. strategic interest. However, through its insistence on Japan’s remilitarized 
state and bolder Security Treaty, the U.S. contributed to the crisis of representation 
for the symbolic emperor system. I believe the reason that Fūryū Mutan is so 
disruptive, and why few writers analyzed and interpreted the actual text itself, is that 
it specifically problematizes this crisis of representation.  
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The ideological strength of the symbolic emperor system was contingent 
upon holding onto the authority to represent the nation, to suturing any cleavages or 
differences within the nation by appearing transcendent and above politics. 
However, Japan was at clearly at war with itself when it came to how the emperor 
and Japan should be represented. Fūryu Mutan depicts this in its full chaotic glory. 
The notion that U.S. should have a role in the disintegration of the representative 
power of the emperor was troublesome because it highlighted the colonial 
relationship between Japan and the U.S., and because the U.S. too had a stake in 
ensuring that the postwar emperor system was not challenged. It was central to the 
notion that both Japan and the U.S. could exist separately as distinct entities, what 
Naoki Sakai calls the “schema of co-figuration.” This is why the text was challenging 
for one prominent Area Studies specialist, Edward Seidensticker, who betrays in the 
following quote the desire to withhold the text from American readership because of 
the anxiety of what an emperor-less Japan would mean:  
How dare the refined Ch ō Kōron publish such a vulgar (akushumi) novel! I 
don’t think of it as distinct from a political novel, but for it to kill off a living 
person is deeply disturbing. When I speak to other foreigners in Japan, they 
are mostly in agreement with me that the problem is its repercussions within 
Japan, namely, where public opinion on the Imperial Household will go from 
here. The question of where the Imperial Household should be headed is an 
interesting one. I bet that if Fūryū Mutan were translated [into English], there 
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would be quite the reaction in America, which thinks that the destruction of 
the Imperial Household would mean that Japan has gone Communist (akka 
sareta).206 
Yet, Seidensticker makes no mention that the U.S. is represented within the text as 
an actor in the overthrow of the emperor. Instead, he reveals what the emperor 
really signified for the U.S.: security against the threat of Communism. Was it not the 
deep-seated anxiety over Communism in China (and then Korean and beyond) that 
compelled the U.S. to maintain bases throughout Japan in the first place? The critic 
Usui Yoshimi writes that it was “fear (kyōfushin) about the revolution”—a line cited 
over and over by other critics—that made Fukazawa write the story.207 I completely 
disagree. Quite the contrary, the story exposed the anxiety (and thus fragility) of all 
sides: Japan and the U.S. feared the rise of the Communism and labor, while the 
protest movement feared the government’s capacity to violently suppress it (as 
Nakano articulated). In exposing—not causing—this widespread anxiety, Fūryū 
Mutan helps shed light on the nature of the crises overwhelming Japan at the time, 
both the crisis of actual violence and the crisis of representation.  
5.6 Aftermath 
 I have withheld until now the events with which the story is always connected 
because I want to be absolutely explicit that neither Fukazawa Shichirō nor Fūryū 
                                                 
206 Saka, pg. 207.  
207 Usui Yoshimi. “Fukazawa Shichiō no ‘F ry  Mutan.’” Bessatsu Shinhyō  Fukuzawa 
Shichirō no sekai.7.2 1974, pg. 209.   
213 
 
Mutan are to blame for the failure to represent the emperor in literature from that 
point on. The most important event for the legacy for Fūryū Mutan is referred to as 
the Shimanaka Incident, which involved an assassination attempt on Shimanaka Hōji, 
the president of publishing company Ch ō Kōron. The company had published the 
text in its journal of the same name, Chūō Kōron. On February 1, 1961, the assailant, 
Komori Kazutaka, had gone to Shimanaka’s house with the intent to kill Shimanaka, 
who was not there. Forcing himself into the house, however, he drew his sword and 
injured Shimanaka’s wife and killed their maid. Komori, who was seventeen, had 
been dispatched by a well-known Right-wing organization, Aikokutō, although he had 
resigned the day before his assault. Ch ō Kōron, which had proclaimed its right to 
publish the text and defend the freedom of speech prior to the incident, issued the 
following apology by Shimanaka Hōji himself:  
It has been judged that Fukuzawa Shichirō’s Fūryū Mutan is an inappropriate 
piece for publication and that I am culpable for its publication as director. I 
would like to deeply express my sincerest apologies to the Imperial Family 
and readers in general for the devastating nuisance we have caused. I 
consider this the origin of what incited a case of bloodshed, and for that, I 
would like to further express my sincerest apologies for its disruption to 
society.208  
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[After the “F ry  Mutan” Incident—the Personal History of an Editor] Tokyo: 
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Whatever the pressures the Right put on the editing company, including the direct 
threat of continued violence, this apology set a precedent of publically declaring the 
text and its publication to be the cause of the Shimanaka Incident, or at least 
accepting responsibility for its occurrence. Watanabe Naomi has pointed out that, 
had a case of defamation been waged, such an apology would have even been used 
in court for proof of the author’s guilt.209 Not only that, but it completely validated 
the tactics of the Right in its retaliation against improper representation of the 
emperor.210 John Treat, too, implicates Fukazawa when suggesting that his rhetoric 
had “unforeseen dramatic consequences not just for the Shimanaka Household but 
also for the freedom of Japanese writers,”211 and, “Just as Plato feared, the poet does 
make fun of the gods, and Japanese writers have paid the penalty.”212 Likewise, as 
discussed above, in gleaning the sense that Fūryū Mutan contained a sentiment that 
could forgive violence against the Right (and thus spark action that would mobilize 
                                                                                                                                            
Tabatake Shoten, 1976, pg. 34. This text extensively documents what happened 
behind the scenes in the wake of the publication of the text, such as secret meetings 
between editors of Chūō Kōron and the influential Right-wing thug of Dai-Nippon 
Aikokutō, Akao Bin, and other various pressures on the editors, like the demand that 
Fukazawa be exiled to a foreign land. Nakamura speaks of her frustration and 
loneliness in resisting even the other editors as they buckled to external demands 
(see pg. 44).  
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the problem of the intensification of Right-wing terrorism at the time of Ampo, but 
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state force against the opposition movement), even Nakano Shigeharu implies a type 
of guilt for the author, despite the repeated claims that does not mean to do so.  
 However, I want to argue that it was exactly the opposite; it was not the text 
itself, but the response to it, both by critics and by Chūō Kōron, and the persistent 
self-restraint and self-censorship of writers themselves that is responsible for 
postwar inability to represent the emperor critically. In the overwhelming focus on 
the fact that the text used actual names, serious analysis of the text was largely 
absent, replaced instead by discourse on the problems of defamation, terrorism, and 
freedom of speech.  
5.7  The literary shift to terrorism 
 This also needs to be considered in the context of the publication of  e 
Kenzaburō’s Sebunchin, a story in two parts that depicted the radicalization of a 
Right-wing youth who is pushed to violent acts and culminates in his suicide in prison 
while sexually fantasizing over the emperor. The text was modeled directly after the 
youth who assassinated Asanuma in October of 1960, Yamaguchi Otoya, and 
released in the literary magazine Bungakukai (published by Bungei Shunj ) in January 
and February of 1961, the months following the publication of Fūryū Mutan. Akao 
Bin, president of the Right-wing organization Aikokutō, accused Bungei Shunj  of 
defamation (Yamaguchi Otoya, too, had originally been a member of Aikokutō), and 
the publishing company issued their own apology on January 30. It expressed their 
deepest apologies, saying that even though the piece was fictional, they “candidly 
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recognize the nuisance it had caused to Mr. Yamaguchi, Bōkyō Teishintai [“Attack 
Corp for Communist Prevention], Zen-Ajia Hankyō Seinen Renmei [“All-Asia Anti-
Communist Youth Alliance”], and all related groups.”213 This apology specified is 
purported “injured parties” among Right-wing groups unlike the one by Ch ō Kōron, 
which, on top of apologizing to the imperial family, ambiguously expressed its regret 
for disrupting society, making it hard to tell just who was the perpetrator of the 
incident of bloodshed.214  
 Therefore, both publishing companies demonstrated their absolute surrender 
to Right-wing pressure through these apologies within the span of two weeks, a 
discursive move that essentially concretized the force of the Chrysanthemum Taboo. 
These apologies and the ensuing debates served to foreclose any further substantial 
discussion about the texts themselves. In other words, the circumstances were 
debated, but at the costs of dealing with the question of what it meant to give 
literary representation of the emperor. Watanabe Naomi summarizes the context of 
this “peripheral reaction” to both Fūryū Mutan and Sebunchin in three points: First, 
literary analysis of the texts themselves was transferred to the opposition of 
“terrorism and the freedom of expression,” which effectively nullified the question of 
“emperor and novel”; second, even progressive authors with no direct connection to 
either text were involved in the “blackout” (anten) of literary representation of the 
emperor in the name of personal protection, for fear of provoking violence; third, 
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terrorism became infinitely “creepier” by targeting not the authors themselves but 
rather third parties, a point made by Takeuchi Yoshimi.215  
 It seems only too ironic that Nakano Shigeharu contributed to this 
transference of textual analysis to the question of terrorism and freedom of speech. 
It was his narrator in Goshaku no Sake that critiqued the Communist Party for only 
coming to the defense of Matsushima of the 1946 Placard Incident on the grounds of 
“freedom of speech” while they ignored the contents of the placard itself: “In their 
critique of the Placard Incident, why did the Communist Party ignore the very words 
of the sign when it was those words that best critiqued the emperor system?” 
However, even though Nakano was critical of Fūryū Mutan, he still grappled with the 
emperor system in his literary work, having recently depicted the complicated 
mixture of late Meiji images—the death of the Meiji Emperor, the execution of 
Kōtoku Shusui, the “absent presence” of the Taishō Emperor—from the perspective 
of a child in his 1957-8 novel Nashi no Hana (“Pear Flowers”).216 The “blackout” of 
representation of the emperor that followed cannot be pinned on Nakano; it was the 
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216 In an extended scene from Nashi no Hana, set at the end of the Meiji Era, the 
Crown Prince (who would become the Taishō Emperor) visits the hometown of 
Ryōhei, the child protagonist, on rickshaw. Ryōhei and his classmates were to be 
given warning of the approaching procession by three pistol shots, but after hearing 
the shots, could not make it to the scene quickly enough. It was a missed opportunity 
for encounter, what Miriam Silverberg calls a “absent presence” that points to the 
“central irony of Taishō political history, the truth that while the ideology and 
structures constructed to buttresss the position of the Emperor were firmly in place 
by the time of the demise of the first Emperor, his successor could not in any way 
actively support the system.” Silverberg, Miriam. Changing Song: The Marxist 
Manifestos of Nakano Shigeharu. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pg. 22. 
218 
 
result a wide convergence of events including the apologies by Ch ō Kōron and 
Bungei Shunj , the debate as a whole, the response by the media and public, and 
immediate fear of violence.  
  The fear of violence—the terror unleashed by Right-wing groups—was 
certainly real. Fuzakawa himself fled to Hokkaidō for safety due to a great number of 
death threats.  e, too, for his writing of Sebunchin, was the target of Right-wing 
threats, rocks thrown at his study, loudspeakers blasting outside his house, and late-
night phone calls.217 Even Mishima Yukio was put on guard for an unsubstantiated 
but widely spread rumor that he had recommended the publication of Fūryū Mutan 
to Ch ō Kōron. John Nathan, in his biography of Mishima, reports that Mishima 
patrolled his own garden with a sword, and was eventually assigned a police officer 
for personal protection during February and March of 1961.218  
 How can we understand the impact of the threat of violence, the fear of 
retaliation for the representation of the emperor? Is there a qualitative difference 
between the feeling of terror when it originates from the Right or when it originates 
from the state? The state had made an example of Kōtoku Sh sui through execution 
1911, and it made an example of Kobayashi Takiji when policed tortured him to 
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death in 1933,219 but did the Shimanaka Incident and the related threats carry the 
same weight? It might be understandable that Fuzakawa and  e might exercise 
restraint in the face of immediate threat, but what does it mean that, as Watanabe 
Naomi points out, authors who had no connection to Fūryū Mutan or Sebunchin 
would be cowered into silence? Was the “blackout” that followed not mere silence, 
but as an active sacralization of the emperor?     
In thinking about these questions, we ought not minimize the randomness 
and uneven application of terror. Certainly, no one could have expected the backlash 
that the authors or publishers would face for publishing the texts.220 It was rather 
curious that texts without an overtly political agenda221 would be targeted over 
writings that did, of which many, especially from the Communist Party, advocated 
abolition of the emperor system. However, the aspect of randomness, the possibility 
that terror could be inflicted from anywhere at anytime, combined with the 
government failure to substantially curb Right-wing terror—and in fact its 
mobilization and cultivation of that terrorism—must have been at play. It is telling 
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that only one year after the Shimanaka Incident, Ch ō Kōron decided independently 
to halt the publication of a special edition of Shisō no Kagaku (“The Science of 
Thought”) on the emperor system, planned for January 196  release, because the 
trial over the Shimanaka Incident was still ongoing, and therefore, tensions were 
high.222 Writers were left to guess what might provoke retaliation; their restraint was 
largely improvisatory.  
 Yet, just as Watanabe recognizes a discursive shift away from “emperor and 
novel” and towards “terrorism and the freedom of expression,” I believe we can 
witness a literary shift as well that provides a clue to how the emperor system was 
actually subsumed within the discourse of terrorism; representation of the emperor 
became representation of terrorism performed in the name of the emperor. This was 
already true of Sebunchin, but clearly such a pathological depiction of a sexually 
perverse Right-wing youth would not be tolerated by the Right, as  e learned 
through direct threats to his safety. It was also true Mishima Yukio’s Yūkoku 
(“Patriotism”), published in January 1961, within the same three-month window in 
which Sebunchin and Fūryū Mutan were also published, which makes an implicit 
connection to Yamaguchi Otoya’s assassination of Asanuma and subsequent suicide 
in prison. The text depicts the double suicide of a husband and wife following the 
events of the failed coup of February 26, 1936. While this may not seem at face value 
to be a representation of terrorism at all, I believe it is a glorification of just that, 
                                                 
222 Nakamura Tomoko, pg. 122.   
221 
 
terrorism performed in the name of the emperor. Mishima, in this and other works, 
establishes a categorical equivalence between Right-wing terrorism in contemporary 
Japan—so long as it ends in suicide—and the coups d’état of the 1930s. In the next 
chapter, I will attempt to make this connection much clearer, and show how Mishima 
co-opted the literary representation of the emperor during the 1960s. Paradoxically, 
his mobilization of these events for his writing actually provided a damning critique 
of the individual of Emperor Hirohito at the same that it exalted the concept of 




MISHIMA’S EMPEROR OF TERROR 
 
6.1 Yūkoku: bringing the coup to the present 
In many ways, Fukazawa’s Fūryū Mutan,  e’s Sebunchin, and Mishima’s 
Yūkoku seems like variations on a single theme,223 an attempt to make sense the 
present moment. The first two reconfigure contemporary characters, events, and 
imagery more directly, and the third only obliquely. Yet, like Fūryū Mutan, Yūkoku 
stages the death of a young couple married less than a year; like Sebunchin, the 
characters unquestioningly take their own lives for a higher cause, mixing death with 
eroticism; and like both, Yūkoku depicts a country divided, where Japanese people 
are pitted against each other. I certainly do not mean to overstate their similarities, 
but do believe that the virtually concurrent publication of the stories and their novel 
approaches to getting at the nature of the emperor system is nothing less than 
remarkable and fundamentally a product of the time of their writing.  
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The entirety of Yūkoku224 takes place on February 28, 1936 in the apartment 
of a Lieutenant of the Imperial Army in Yotsuya, near the site of the coup d’état that 
began two days earlier, February 26 (from herein, the 2.26 Incident), the 11th year of 
Shōwa. The coup had been the culmination of a movement within the Imperial Army 
to wrest power out of the hands of bureaucrats and nobility (kizoku) who they 
believed subverted the emperor’s authority by acting unilaterally, thus betraying the 
emperor’s prerogative.  Around fourteen hundred young officers among the Kōdōha, 
the “Imperial Way Faction,” banded together to overthrow those officials who 
impeded direct connection of the people to their emperor, which they called the 
Shōwa Ishin or Shōwa Restoration, echoing the language of the Meiji Restoration. 
The coup successfully assassinated a number of high-ranking government operatives 
(although an attempt to kill Prime Minister Okada Keisuke failed), and an infuriated 
young Emperor Hirohito ordered a swift suppression of the uprising and labeled the 
coup as a rebellion (hanran).225 Consequently, seventeen participants in the coup 
were sentenced to death. The iconoclastic ultranationalist Kita Ikki, though having no 
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direct connection to the coup, was executed as well for the crime of being ringleader 
of an insurrection, through perhaps his only real crime was writing the influential 
Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan (Nihon Kaizō Hōan  aikō, 1923). This 
Reorganization Plan opens with the call for the emperor and Japanese people to 
carry out a coup d’état in which they suspend the constitution, dissolve both houses 
of the Diet and bring the country under martial law. This book constituted a major 
source of inspiration for the young activist officers. Hirohito’s rejection of the coup 
was a shock to the soldiers who had taken part; he had exhibited the capacity to 
betray his most ardent and loyal followers in the name of state security, and to 
protect the bureaucratic dominance of the government through imperial prerogative. 
In Yūkoku, the dramatic suppression of the rebellion—Imperial Army soldiers 
fighting against the Imperial Army soldiers—takes place outside while Lieutenant 
Takeyama and his wife Reiko take their own lives inside the apartment. Takeyama’s 
closest comrades had taken part in the coup, but had not informed Takeyama of their 
plot. He speculates that they did not want to implicate him out of consideration for 
his new marriage to Reiko. Reiko, listening closely to news from the radio upon the 
outbreak of violence, hears the very names of Takeyama’s colleagues listed as among 
the rebels, a guarantee that they would be put to death. What was seen as an 
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uprising (kekki) in order to restore the country (ishin) was now being defiled as a 
rebellion (hanran).226  
As a lieutenant, Takeyama would be obligated to follow the emperor’s orders, 
which meant he would face an irreconcilable dilemma: attack his own comrades or 
disobey the emperor. He says, “There may be an Imperial ordinance sent down 
tomorrow. They’ll be posted as rebels, I imagine. I shall be in command of a unit with 
orders to attack them… I can’t do it. It’s impossible to do a thing like that.”227 He 
resolves, with Reiko’s complete acceptance, to disembowel himself through seppuku 
and for his wife to join him; they will soon be able to join Takeyama’s comrades in 
the other world.   
Takeyama and Reiko’s seppuku is thus premised on the refusal to take part in 
the suppression of the rebellion, an active rejection of the emperor’s command. The 
text, therefore, cannot be read as an unguarded glorification of the emperor228; in 
betraying the rebels, who sought to unite directly with their emperor, the emperor 
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implicitly brought shame to the throne. Mishima’s depiction of Takeyama and Reiko 
was an attempt to portray a noble and righteous alternative to suppression of the 
uprising. Hence, the death note left by Takeyama does not mention the emperor, but 
rather the army: “Love Live the Imperial Forces (tengun banzai)!” It may be a 
resolution to die for the concept of emperor that it a metonym for Japan or Japanese 
culture, but it is certainly not a resolution to die for this emperor, Hirohito.  
Mishima attempts to depict the purist and most loyal sentiment of patriotism, 
and thus cannot be bothered with overt critique of the emperor; their deaths spare 
them of that need. They are pillars of loyalty and honor, resolved to die according to 
the dictates of the Imperial Rescript on Education, harmoniously as husband and 
wife.229 Despite the implicit critique of the individual emperor for his suppression of 
the soldiers, Yūkoku is a complete affirmation of the emperor system itself, and the 
validation of aligning oneself with its moral teachings. The exaggerated 
representation of the purity of the couple is in fact a complete construct of the heroic 
soldiers and their loyal wives that Sakaguchi had already deconstructed in his 
Darakuron; people were actually never were that way, just represented as such, and 
defeat exposed that very fact. Mishima, however, wants to reconstruct the very 
possibility of a moment in which such purity was possible. This moment of pure 
loyalty to the state is combined in the text with heightened erotic titillation; the 
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anticipatory resolution towards death becomes the ground for the most sensuous of 
bodily pleasures.  
The lieutenant was confident there had been no impurity in that joy they had 
experienced when resolving upon death. They had both sensed at that 
moment—though not, of course, in any clear and conscious way—that those 
permissible pleasures which they shared in private were once more beneath 
the protection of Righteousness (taigi) and Divine Power (shini), and of a 
complete and unassailable morality. On looking into each other’s eyes and 
discovering there an honorable death, they had felt themselves safe once 
more behind the steel walls which none could destroy, encased in an 
impenetrable armor of Beauty (bi) and Truth (seigi). Thus, so far from seeing 
any inconsistency or conflict between the urges of his flesh and the sincerity 
of his patriotism, the lieutenant was even able to regard the two as parts of 
the same thing.230 
The “unassailable morality” is thus confirmed and elevated by the transcendent 
sensation of exquisite pleasure and the excruciating pain of what would come next, 
the seppuku; sexual pleasure and patriotism have become one and the same thing. 
Of course, that all of this happens within the apartment and not on the battlefield is 
irrelevant because only the resolution to die and the self-confirmation of the sincerity 
matter; in other words, it only matters how that resolution is represented to the 
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individual. Takeyama later has a brief fantasy of dying alone on the battlefield as his 
wife watched on. The couple “discovered” (miidashita) that their deaths were indeed 
honorable by looking into each other’s eyes. Mishima is thus unconcerned with the 
politicality of the act, but the aesthetics of it, as if politics were separable from art.  
6.2 Relativizing terrorism 
 Mishima would later express his own anger that Hirohito did not allow the 
young officers from the 2.26 Incident the dignity of taking their own lives through 
seppuku. In my interpretation of Yūkoku, this representation of an “honorable death” 
by Takeyama—who would not be deprived of the opportunity to take his own life by 
the emperor because he was never embroiled in the actual event—is Mishima’s first 
attempt to reclaim the dignity that was stolen from those Kōdōha soldiers who had 
failed in their coup. It is his first attempt to represent their purity of heart and the 
sincerity of their actions. By extension, but in the exact same sense, it is an attempt 
to grapple with, and ultimately validate, the assassination by Yamaguchi Otoya of 
Asanuma Inejirō, a terrorist act that occurred off the battlefield, as it were. To me, it 
is no coincidence, and of no little significance, that both  e and Mishima chose to 
depict the merging of patriotism and sexuality, emperor worship and eroticism, at 
the exact same time. Consequently, it is what makes both of their representations of 
the emperor system so problematic.  
 As I mentioned at the end of the last chapter, Mishima establishes a 
categorical and moral equivalence between the Right-wing terrorism of 
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contemporary Japan and the coups d’état of the 1930s. Yūkoku is but his first step. 
Not until the character of Isao in his 1969 book Runaway Horses would Mishima 
depict a young aspiring terrorist in the likeness of Yamaguchi Otoya, or for that 
matter the protagonist of Sebunchin.231 The book in effect displaces an idealized 
version of Yamaguchi onto the 1930s, where Isao plots a coup in the spirit of 
Mishima’s revisionist conception of the  . 6 Incident. In doing so, he renders invisible 
the historical figures, Yamaguchi and the young soldiers of the 2.26 Incident. Mishima 
makes the most explicit connection between them in an extended “teach-in” with 
college students that took place at Hitotsubashi University in 1968.  
 There, he and the students engaged in a lengthy discussion about the nature 
of “assassination” (ansatsu) that ranges in discussion from Robert Kennedy to 
Russian terrorists to the pacifism of Quakers. To Mishima, a political act is the one-
on-one confrontation between two individuals in which each individual is involved 
with complete body and mind. When such a collision occurs, there can be no 
distinction based on rank or class, which is why such politics constitutes the basic 
principle behind democracy itself. Democracy is premised on the possibility for the 
collision of individuals and their political opinions, represented by each individual 
having one vote. That such collision can be settled through assassination is, to 
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Mishima, unfortunate and even accidental, but it is embedded in the concept of 
democracy; assassination is an essential element (tsukimono) of democracy.232 He 
opposes this form of politics with Communism or totalitarianism, which simply 
purges anyone that gets in the way, and disallows the possibility for the one-on-one 
collision.  
 Moreover, in Mishima’s definition of “pure” assassination, one must also have 
the resolution to die—to wage one’s entire human being (ningen no zenshin wo 
kakeru)—and must follow the act by committing suicide. Predictably, he works 
bushido, the way of the warrior, into his logic, saying, “The Japanese tradition that 
the assassin must kill himself after the act is the way of the samurai.” If the assassin 
does not kill himself, it is not is interesting (omoshirokunai), not manly (otoko-
rashikunai).233 Assassination, therefore, is the one-on-one confrontation of 
individuals in which the assassin is resolved to die; it is an essential element of 
democracy and yet rooted in Japan’s warrior code.234 To Mishima, when it takes this 
form it is both manly and beautiful (biteki). One student (Student I) pushes him on his 
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aestheticization of such killing and suicide, saying what matters is not the beauty of 
it, but the ramification that someone actually dies, that a life is lost. Yet, for Mishima, 
this student and others attack him from the basic standpoint of naïve pacifism, not 
taking into account violence that occurs in the world. To him, it is not about 
accepting or rejecting assassination because it necessarily occurs; instead, the task is 
to discern among the assassinations that take place which ones possess a purity of 
human political thought and a purity of human action.235 Eventually, one of the 
students asks Mishima about the Asanuma Incident and Yamaguchi Otoya, to which 
he responds:  
That was magnificent (rippa). The wrong kind of assassination is what Komori 
of the Shimanaka Incident did—it’s absolutely unforgivable to include women 
and children. What makes the  . 6 Incident so wonderful is that it didn’t 
included women and children—truly beautiful (migoto). The worst thing you 
could do is include women and children. Yamaguchi Otoya, Asanuma’s killer, 
is exceedingly magnificent. It’s because he took his own life afterward, you 
see! He’s perfectly in line with Japanese tradition.236 
Yamaguchi’s assassination of Asanuma was magnificent because it accorded with 
Japanese tradition; he took his own life and did not involve women and children. This 
is Mishima’s standard for discerning the “beauty” and “purity” of assassination. It is 
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immaterial here that he uses the word “assassination” and not “terrorism” because 
he never draws the distinction. In fact, he recognizes the same spirit of bushido 
among Russian terrorists, who too took their own lives as part of their act, the only 
instance of such spirit in the West.237 As I will discuss, Mishima even refers to the 
young soldiers of the 2.26 Incident as terrorists elsewhere, and argues that, in order 
to protect Japanese culture, the emperor can side with terrorists to reform the state.  
 Amidst the serious discussions of the impact of Right-wing violence and 
terrorism on the freedom of speech following the Shimanaka Incident, Mishima 
poses this alternative, which he would take most of the 1960s to articulate in 
different forms. He takes the type of violence that contributed to the “blackout” of 
representation of the emperor and reconfigures it as something to be judged only in 
aesthetic terms, not for its repercussions but some vague notion of an ahistorical 
essence. In this sense, we cannot merely understand Mishima’s revisionist 
representation of 2.26 as glorification of what he interprets as the “pure” spirits of 
the soldiers who carried out the coup; it is also a glorification of Yamaguchi Otoya 
and a deceptive yet active disruption of the discourse of freedom of speech that 
marked the beginning of the 1960s. He took the focus on terrorism’s threat to free 
speech and shifted it to the literary representation of terrorism within his own 
writings. In doing so, he refused to confront the specific consequences of Right-wing 
terrorism on freedom of speech and the power to represent, and even integrated it 
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into his conception of “Japanese culture.” To add to the violent Right’s state support 
and sanction, they now had a spokesperson (whether Mishima would accept such a 
role or not). Nakano was wrong; it wasn’t Fukazawa that legitimated violence against 
the Right, it was Mishima that legitimated Right-wing violence by framing it as the 
“defense of culture.”  
6.3 Pretending to like democracy 
Curiously, however, the concept of freedom of speech itself is integral to 
Mishima’s formulation of the emperor system.  As Mishima would elucidate in Bunka 
Bōeiron, he believes that freedom of speech itself is important only as a practical 
political matter, the best choice for democracy. Yet, it must be in the service of 
protecting the “cultural totality” (bunka zentaisei). In fact, for him, freedom of 
speech is the “unimpeachable guarantor” of the temporal and spatial continuity that 
are fundamental requirements for this cultural totality. In that sense, freedom of 
speech is subordinate to, yet necessary for, culture. Whereas culture is an absolute 
value, freedom of speech is not absolute; it is a technical (gijutsuteki) political 
concept founded on relativism that has only the flimsiest of ethical roots. It is 
essentially non-ethical. Moreover, Mishima sees freedom of speech itself as 
permitting the corruption of culture in contemporary Japan and thereby threatening 
its cultural totality: “freedom of speech forces us to lose the creative and traditional 
character and hierarchy of culture, where only the surface (hyōmen) of culture's 
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totality is maintained and the solidity of the totality is lost.”238 The solution for 
Mishima is to move away from the relative values of politics and towards a cultural 
community that endures through space and time, a concept that contains both the 
absolute ethical value and the undiscriminating comprehensiveness of culture. 
“This,” he says, “is where the emperor as cultural concept enters the stage.”239  
 Mishima is playing a strange game, acting as defender of the freedom of 
speech and liberal democracy while at the same time attempting to point out its 
shortcoming, namely that it cannot sufficiently ensure Japan’s cultural community, 
and in fact, can undermine it. Therefore, within this democratic model, something 
else is necessary and the emperor system is central to it, but not in its current form. 
Towards the end of his teach-in at Hitotsubashi University, he begins to summarize 
the point he wants to convey by saying,  
The state form of democracy that we have today has to protect 
parliamentarism because it protects the freedom of speech. But protecting 
free speech is insufficient; it also must protect our tradition and our historical 
continuity. To that end, the emperor system as it is now is troubling and so, 
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rather than consider it as a political concept, we must restore the emperor as 
the cultural concept of historical antiquity.240 
On the one hand, Mishima is arguing against the concept of the emperor as a political 
figure that was established during the Meiji Era. On the other hand, he rejects the 
surface and superficial role played by the imperial family in the postwar, even though 
making the emperor into a symbol of national unity can be seen, to a large degree, as 
precisely an effort to turn the emperor into a cultural concept. However, despite all 
his talk of the “comprehensiveness” and “totality” of culture, what he really means 
when he says culture is something very specific, and not even very historically old: by 
“culture,” he means bushido, and more specifically, bushido within the Japanese 
military, which the emperor consecrates by bestowing military honors.   
 Mishima’s theory of the emperor as a cultural concept (bunka gainen toshite 
no tennō) hybridizes two thinkers, Kita Ikki and Watsuji Tetsurō, the former for his 
theory of revolution and the latter, for his notion that the emperor is the expression 
of the unity of Japan’s cultural community. This theory is fully articulated in his 1968 
essay, Bunka Bōeiron, and while Watsuji is heavily quoted within the text, Kita’s 
presence is largely spectral. Perhaps we can understand Kita’s spectral presence as 
perfectly parallel to his role in the 2.26 Incident; he was a prime intellectual influence 
on the young soldiers, but was completely uninvolved in the coup itself. 
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Nevertheless, Kita and the 2.26 Incident become central to Mishima’s emperor 
system theory during the 1960s. As I will argue, Mishima selectively adopts Kita for 
his purposes and implicates him in his own version of 2.26; despite the effort to 
extricate Kita from the event, Kita’s thought returns to haunt it. Thus, I’m interested 
in how Kita’s thought can be used to undermine Mishima’s.  
  Like the state did to Kita’s body, Mishima executes Kita’s thought; to Mishima, 
he was guilty of conceiving of the emperor system in purely political terms. In short, 
Mishima adopts Kita’s notion that the emperor can be a force for revolution, but 
extracts such a notion from Kita’s political grounds for doing so, a strict adherence to 
the emperor’s political capacity to suspend the constitution as an organ of state. To 
make this argument, I will elaborate on Kita Ikki’s thought and return to Mishima’s 
postwar appropriation of him and the event he inspired. 
6.4  Kita Ikki’s anti-kokutairon 
While Kita’s text, Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan (1919), was 
considered the bible of the 2.26 Incident, it was firmly rooted in his theory of the 
emperor system written much earlier. Published in 1906 when Kita Ikki was 23 years 
old, “Theory of Kokutai and Pure Socialism” (Kokutairon oyobi Junsei Shakaishugi) 
sought to completely redefine the kokutai as completely heterogeneous to the 
official versions premised on the logic of restoration, loyalty and mythology.241 The 
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prime targets of critique were the influential scholars Hozumi Yatsuka and Ariga 
Nagao, whose works interpreted the constitution to give absolute authority to the 
emperor, the locus of sovereignty (shuken no shozai), and relied on the ahistorical 
notion of bansei ikkei, the unbroken imperial line which supposedly reached back to 
the Sun Goddess Amaterasu of the Kiki myths, and the enduring loyalty (chu) towards 
the imperial institution.  
For Kita, the Meiji Restoration was a democratic revolution that legally 
guaranteed equality among the people. The Meiji Restoration-Revolution (Meiji Ishin-
kakumei), as he called it, was the most important change since the Taika reforms 
because it overthrew the patriarchal state (kachōkoku) and replaced it with a 
people’s state (kōmin-kokka). It was neither a return to the past (ōsei fukkō) nor an 
installation of monarchy because, for the first time, the emperor was put on equal 
ground with the citizens, an achievement only possible with enlightenment ideals 
promoted by the People’s Rights Movement and awareness of the exploitation they 
had suffered. Despite the achievement of legal equality initiating the process of 
transforming serfs to equal citizenry, further revolution was required to actualize his 
true socialist ideal. However, according to a view of history evolving through stages, 
the Meiji Ishin-Kakumei had forever changed the kokutai for Kita. Until that point, the 
kokutai had been patriarchal in form; the state was considered thing-like (bukkaku), 
to be owned by—and serve the profits of—nobility. But now, the state had a human 
character (jinkaku) that served the people as a whole democratically, a kōmin kokka 
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(“citizen-state” or “people’s state”). Now, with the kokutai of the people’s state, a 
new governmental structure, or seitai, was possible. The seitai transformed from 
being aristocratic in form to democratic, which he calls the democratic governmental 
structure (minshūteki seitai). However, since these new kokutai and seitai had only 
been realized legally, Kita demands that the economic conditions, still class-based, be 
brought in line with the other Meiji ideals through an economic restoration-
revolution (ishin-kakumei) that would nationalize all land and capital, including the 
holdings of the imperial family.  
For Kita, in the new people’s state (kōmin-kokka), sovereignty lay neither with 
the ruler nor the people, but with the state, which he equates with society itself. The 
state, as sovereign, is an organic body (kokka yūkitai) made up of individual elements 
that exist in space. As such, the emperor is merely one organ (kikan) that acts in 
concert with the people, represented by the Diet. This solidly puts Kita Ikki in the 
camp of emperor-organ theorists (tennō kikan setsu-sha), who would later feel the 
brunt of persistent attacks for violating the kokutai. However, Kita also maintains 
critique of the leading emperor-organ theorist, Minobe Tatsukichi. Minobe’s flaw, in 
Kita’s eyes, is not his characterization the emperor as an organ, which he is, but 
rather labeling the emperor to be the highest organ. Kita offers no such privileged 
status for the emperor.242  
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Kita argues that official kokutai ideologues were incapable of accounting for 
historical change because their notion of sovereignty relied merely on the continuous 
rule of the emperor. Rather than grasp history dynamically or evolutionarily, they 
repeated the static notion of the unbroken line of emperors (bansei ikkei), constantly 
falling into their own tautological trap: 
It is continually thought that the Japanese people have an unbroken line of 
emperors, and so in the West the kokutai and seitai evolve along with his 
historical evolution, but only in Japan do the Japanese people sit in the lotus 
position outside of the law of evolution, not evolving. Therefore, when 
debating the nature of our kokutai and trying to determine where the 
location of sovereignty lies, the Constitutional scholars make this 
interpretation: the consistency of our kokutai consists of the unbroken line of 
emperors, and therefore, sovereignty resides within the emperor. But this is 
not interpretation. It is the same as saying, sovereignty resides in the 
unbroken chains of emperors and therefore sovereignty resides in the 
emperor.243 
Hozumi and Ariga seemed to argue that kokutai was determined historically, yet this 
only applied to other countries, and they act as if Japan underwent no change over 
time; their entire concept of temporality is “backward” or “retrogressive” 
(gyakushinteki). Moreover, their doctrine relies on the notion that loyalty exists as a 
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constant through history, ignoring the long history of rebellion and revolt. The point 
of the Meiji Ishin-Kakumei to Kita was to cast off the fetters that dictated to serfs to 
landowners the meaning of “loyalty.”  
By employing the unbroken line of emperors (bansei-ikkei) as an inviolable 
law, the kokutai ideologues were doing no more than stifling debate, and would 
characterize any discourse that did not conform to theirs as a violation of the kokutai. 
Kita compares their use of kokutai to the portable shrines, mikoshi, carried by warrior 
monks, which they would designate as sacred and inviolable. The emperor and 
ideology of kokutai were untouchable. Kita is unambiguous: 
Enshrining the emperor in the portable shrine of kokutai-ron, monks scream 
foul if anyone dares to touch, claiming disrespect (fukei). But, this is not true 
emperor; it is rather a clay figure fabricated by the indulgent superstitions of 
the monks… Simply, (the emperor of kokutai-ron) is not His Majesty the 
Emperor of Great Japan of the Constitution, but rather a clay figure fabricated 
by provincial simpletons through ignorance of the state’s essence and legal 
principle, made from Shinto superstition, slave morality, and a delusory 
interpretation of history.244  
                                                 
244 Ibid, pg. 363 
241 
 
Thus, as a polemical weapon, kokutai theorists would greet dissent or even rational 
argumentation with accusations of disrespecting the emperor, fukei.245 Yet, as Kita 
indicates in the quote above, designating the kokutai and emperor as sacred and off-
limits to critique is akin to fanatical idol worship. The emperor of such an ideology 
was no more than a construct, completely detached from the reality that the 
emperor had a purely political function in a fundamentally modern state institution.  
Kita’s attack on kokutai theory was powerful, and posed serious challenges to 
ideologues like Hozumi Yatsuka, who pushed for a radical version of absolute 
monarchism. Despite his iconoclasm, he was an articulate defendant of Japan’s 
constitutional monarchy. And despite his rhetoric of revolution, he was a staunch 
statist whose enthusiastic support for growing the organic body of the state through 
expansionist imperial policies put him at great odds with other young anarchists and 
socialists of the time. His project in many ways can be read as justification for Japan’s 
expansionism; it extolled the virtues of multiethnic empire, not unlike many other 
political theorists of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, Kita’s populist appeal and 
pushback against the peddlers of Shinto myths perhaps made his call to action years 
later all the more attractive; his nationalism had a strong basis in enlightenment 
modernism like that of, for example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, not blind faith.  
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Disillusioned with Japan’s foreign policy, especially in regards to the Twenty-
One Demands made on China, and the backlash it created there, Kita’s Outline Plan 
for the Reorganization of Japan (Nihon Kaizō Hōan  aikō), published first in 1919, 
stipulated terms for the redistribution of wealth, and rights of workers, women 
(though not suffrage, yet) and Koreans in the colony, among other things. Largely 
building on his conception of kokutai established in his first book, the Reorganization 
Plan calls on the emperor, as representation of the democratic will of the people, to 
take command of the state by putting it under martial law. He compares the emperor 
to an imaginative leader such as Napoleon or Lenin. The text begins:  
The emperor in concert with all people of Japan will exercise imperial 
authority, and in order to determine the basis for national reorganization, will 
suspend the constitution for three years, dissolve both houses, and 
implement martial law (kaigenrei) throughout the nation.246  
He calls for a coup d’état carried out by both emperor and his people in which the 
government expels nobility and aristocracy (kizoku) that remained from feudal times 
and that interfered with direct imperial rule, and hence, the expression of the will of 
the people. The emperor, in other words, was a force for revolution that could bring 
about equality in Japan by expelling its true feudal remnants, the nobility.  
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Kita attempts to clarify the true significance of the “Peoples’ Emperor” 
(kokumin no tennō) who serves as the political center of the democratic state (kōmin 
kokka).247 The present configuration of the imperial court had lost touch with its 
original intention (at the outset of the Meiji Ishin-Kakumei) by employing medieval 
customs and adding remnants of European courts. Thus, it must be purified back to 
the original modernizing spirit of Meiji. Kita says, “This purification is necessary once 
again because when the state undergoes fundamental reorganization, the 
construction of the imperial court alone cannot be left in its ramshackle state 
(literally, “leaning pillars, crumbling walls,” 傾柱壊壁).”248 In other words, the 
emperor system as Kita saw it in 1919 had already abandoned the modernizing 
principles of the Meiji Revolution, degenerating into an institution premised on 
existing outside a modern temporality, completely anachronistic.   
Kita’s aims to dismantle the “backwards/retrogressive” (gyakushinteki) 
concept of the emperor system, and replace it with a fully modern structure that has 
only a coincidental connection to the past. Kita’s theory of history as evolutionary 
(shinkateki) meant that history only moved in one direction, forward. But, the 
ideological strength of the emperor system as defined by kokutai-ron scholars—Kita’s 
enemies—rested in its ability to claim primacy through inheritance of a static past, 
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whether ritualistically or through imperial regalia; it worked precisely by concealing 
its modern/modernizing exploits in the aura of sanctity/tradition and inviolability.249 
To kokutai-ron scholars, the modern imperial project was indistinguishable from 
other empires unless its modern elements were disguised. Therefore, the 
particularity of imperial continuity had to be maintained absolutely. What puts Kita 
Ikki at odds with state ideologues is keen understanding of the absolutely modern 
nature of the emperor system, his piercing critique of kokutai ideology, and his faith 
in the revolutionary potential of the emperor when directly united with the people of 
Japan.  
Kita’s Reorganization Plan was highly influential among youth activists at the 
time of its writing in 1919, and continued to have influence until the 2.26 Incident of 
1936 even as Kita himself became increasingly distant from political activism. 
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Employing the language of socialism and communism, Kita’s revolutionary principle is 
that the emperor could be harnessed as a force for revolution to overthrow the 
nobility within the government, who consisted of wealthy land-owners and landlords. 
Such language was particularly powerful for soldiers within the Imperial Army who 
were mobilized from the impoverished countryside. It offered hope to restore the 
revolutionary possibilities of Meiji through their own renewal and restoration, the 
Showa Ishin. The young officers of 2.26 were said to carry copies of the text during 
the coup.   
The coup that began on February 26, 1936 and lasted for several days did not 
bring about the lost connection between the young officers and emperor that they 
had desired. Rather, as I mentioned above, Hirohito denounced the coup as a 
rebellion, and while his official response sounded rather sympathetic, the officers 
were charged with rebellion and seventeen put to death, including Kita, who bore no 
direct relation to the events.  
6.5 Mishima’s (ab)use of Kita   
 When Mishima uses the coup d’état of February  6, 1936 for his own theory 
of the emperor system, however, he has to evacuate it of its premises, and pick and 
choose what of Kita’s system is attractive while discarding the rest. First and most 
importantly, Mishima adopts the principle that the emperor can be a force for 
revolution. As I will show, Mishima sees the 2.26 coup—the Showa Ishin—as an 
opportunity for the emperor to side with the revolution that Hirohito utterly refused 
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to do, opting instead for protection of the elite power holders. However, Mishima 
discards Kita’s concept of history as evolutionary, and subsumes revolution within his 
concept of uninterrupted, continuous time. Mishima’s entire concept of emperor as a 
cultural concept is contingent upon temporal continuity and “tradition,” and as such, 
is at odds with revolutionary time, history as interruption. Second, but relatedly, 
Mishima has to deny the modern function of the emperor system; to him, it is 
timeless. Of course, his disavowal of the modern aspect of the emperor system is 
identical to that of the kokutai-ron ideologues that Kita critiques. Simply put, 
Mishima’s conception, in Kita’s language, is “retrogressive” (gyakushinteki) and 
anachronistic. Third, as Noguchi Takehiko has convincingly argued, Mishima was not 
only hostile to Kita’s emperor-organ theory, but worked hard to scrub out any of 
Kita’s influence when depicting the participants of the coup.250 Forth, in a most 
curious move, Mishima shared Kita’s rejection of the state’s protection of private 
financial capital.251 This is strange considering Mishima’s incredible elitism252 and his, 
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as Noguchi puts it, “indifference to the poverty of the farming villages” that can be 
directly linked to the coups d’état of the early 1930s.253  
 Mishima never claimed to adhere to Kita’s worldview or principles, and in fact 
denied that Kita influenced his thought. However, Mishima’s conception of the 
emperor as cultural concept and his literary representation of emperor system 
ideology is completely indebted to the emperor’s revolutionary potential, a notion 
conceived and articulated by Kita. In this sense, Kita is a constant specter that looms 
over a large body of Mishima’s writing in the 1960s, haunting it despite Mishima’s 
attempt to distance himself from Kita’s influence. Thus, measuring how Mishima’s 
thought holds up to Kita’s is useful for demonstrating what an absurd fantasy 
Mishima had concocted.  
During the 1960s, a subset of Mishima Yukio’s writings paid great, even 
obsessive, consideration to the coup of Feb. 26, 1936 (from hereon, 2.26 Incident), 
including what he dubbed the “2.26 trilogy,” comprised of Eirei no Koe (Voices of the 
Heroic Dead),  ōka no Kiku (Tenth Day Chrysanthemum), and Yūkoku (Patriotism), as 
well as numerous essays that deal with the subject, including one called “The  . 6 
Incident and Me,” and both direct and oblique references scattered throughout his 
tetralogy, Hōjō no Umi (The Sea of Fertility). Mishima along with his own military 
society, Tatenokai, staged a performative coup on November 25th, 1970, capped by 
                                                                                                                                            
and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991, pg. 160.  
253 Ibid, pg. 439.  
248 
 
Mishima’s own suicide at the Ichigaya base station in Tokyo. Mishima’s texts and 
performances are further demonstration of what Gavin Walker calls Mishima’s 
“autofiction” in relation to Mishima’s purported autobiography, Sun and Steel, the 
creation of a completely closed loop of self-referentiality between Mishima’s texts 
and the author himself that puts the critic in a bind, only able to interpret Mishima’s 
writing as a reflection of Mishima the person (as biography), and vice versa.254 In this 
sense, we may be better off conceiving of Mishima, as Masao Miyoshi instructs, not 
as writer or thinker but as a “presence” or an “event.”255 I am personally not 
concerned about reconstructing or even psychoanalyzing Mishima, nor am I 
interested in determining if he or is writing is fascistic or whatever. Rather, I want to 
shed light on his theory of the emperor system, and ask whether it is useful for 
understanding the discursive space in which he was writing. I take as a premise that 
his theory is fraudulent due to its sheer disregard of logic, history, and politics, but I 
do not care whether that was his ironic intention or sheer playfulness. Either way, I 
believe it is still important to demonstrate what of his text is problematic and why.  
In his “The  . 6 Incident and Me,” Mishima assumes that the young activist 
soldiers felt unease with Kita’s version of kokutai: 
Kita Ikki thoroughly captured the hearts of youth through a cyclone of 
passionate negations, negation piled on negation—this is easy to imagine. 
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However, the officers who carried out the 2.26 Incident felt something 
incompatible with Kita's view of kokutai alone… The tragedy of the  . 6 
Incident lies in its compromise, continually adopting Kita Ikki in method while 
using kokutai as a concept. This is the true cause of their failure, but at the 
same time, the true beauty of their failure. Within their inconsistency and 
self-contradictions, they ultimately could not defile the supreme beauty 
within themselves. Had they defiled that—well, they probably achieved this 
to a degree—they would have killed themselves for the sanctity of their 
purity. This purity (seiketsu) is the kokutai that they believed in.256 
Mishima astutely recognized the attraction of Kita’s negational politics of 
nationalism, and saw both the failure and yet beauty of the attempted coup to be the 
synthesis of incompatible versions of kokutai. This criticism is tempered by Mishima’s 
own aesthetics of destruction and synthesis of irony, distance, and sincerity in the 
packaging of his own kokutai-ron. If Kita’s interpretation of kokutai was not sufficient 
to Mishima for the success of the young soldiers, Mishima gives little clue as to what 
alternative might have not brought the repudiation of the emperor. However, he 
provides a tentative solution by purging kokutai of its political affiliation and defining 
it in relation to subjective experience—which is to say, he conceals the very 
politicality of kokutai by making it an issue of aesthetics and individual 
subjectification. He says,  
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What is kokutai? I've encountered several of the debates on kokutai over time 
and have found the vagueness hard to penetrate. While understanding that 
Kita Ikki has his own reasons for his refutation of the kokutai discourse, I on 
the other hand was interested by the paradoxical phenomenon that "kokutai" 
itself exists in everyone's heart shining so clearly and brightly. In each of the 
hearts of one-hundred million citizens there is a kokutai, and there are one-
hundred million types of kokutai. Soldiers have their own military kokutai, 
which we call the spirit of the soldier, and the "kokutai" of the officers who 
incited the 2.26 Incident was the pure cultivation of this spirit of the soldier. 
And, the unbroken line of emperors is not at the same time the combination 
of all the gods, but rather The Emperor His Majesty's single figure appearing 
as one-hundred million distinct figures: the multitude in one, one in the 
multiple... However, it was clear and distinct to every beholder.  
Yet, if you felt that someone was responsible for obscuring such a clear and 
bright thing, it would be completely natural to instantly grab a sword and 
attack him in an effort to defend such clarity and purity. To the officers of the 
2.26 Incident, the problem of the prerogative of the supreme commander 
was the core of kokutai as seen from the spirit of the soldier (gunjin seishin), 
and they believed that killing those who (they thought) infringed on that 
command was the means for realizing the Imperial Heart (Oomikokoro). Not 
only did they fail to realize the Imperial Heart, but gave a fine exculpation to 
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those infringers, and had to suffer the disgrace of being labeled a "rebel 
army."  
Separate from a literary interest, deep within me there flows an undercurrent 
that wants to comfort these ghosts of the true heroes who had control over 
me, to vindicate their honor, and attempt to rehabilitate them. Yet, while 
trying to draw the line back to them, I would only get snagged by the 
emperor's "Declaration of Humanity" (Ningen Sengen).257  
Certainly Mishima’s understanding of kokutai as the brilliant light glowing from each 
individual’s heart is, like Kita’s understanding, heterogeneous to the kokutai-ron 
ideologues whose emperor-centered vision squarely placed the locus of sovereignty 
within the emperor. However, it is exactly the affective nature of nationality that he 
keenly understands, and it’s this type of penetration, what Takeuchi Yoshimi calls 
“the emperor-system that extends to every tree and every blade of grass” (ichimoku 
issō nu yadoru tennōsei), that Mishima hopes to revive through his 2.26 texts. 
Mishima connects the decay of this kokutai with the failure of Hirohito to answer to 
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6.6 Coopting the voices of the dead 
Mishima’s Eirei no Koe258 (“Voices of the Heroic Dead,” 1966) is an attempt to 
redeem those accused of rebellion at 2.26, referring to them instead with the title 
normally reserved for fallen soldiers consecrated at Yasukuni Shrine, eirei (“deified 
spirits of the fallen”). The novella portrays the voices of the young soldiers executed 
for their coup as well as kamikaze pilots, who, through a blind youth named Kawasaki 
acting as medium, air their grievances through séance. They explain their reason for 
attempting the “restoration” of the direct connection of the emperor not in terms of 
their plight—suffering from poverty and starvation—but rather the need to rescue 
the emperor. He was imprisoned by “ugly beasts,” a captive who was pure and 
lonely. Their task was to topple those beasts and save the emperor. Only by rescuing 
the emperor could they save the people from their abject misery and give soldiers 
the confidence to proudly defend their country with no anxiety about the future.259 
However, in demanding the suppression of the coup and designating them as rebels, 
the emperor had condemned them to die like slaves. Their voices, like a “chorus of 
dogs,” bemoan the betrayal of the emperor, saying, 
The kokutai, which tried to make us manifest as its true figure, has already 
been trampled upon, and Japan, without its kokutai, is out there floating like 
buoy or jetsam of the heart….  Thirty years ago we incited a righteous army 
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and were murdered after suffering the disrepute of being called a rebel army. 
You must not forget us.260 
Each angry declaration is followed by a poem that ends with the question, “Why did 
the emperor become a human?” (sumerogi ha hito to naritamaishi) The emperor 
appears to accost them for wounding the kokutai through their treacherous and 
treasonous act, and will not even honor their dignity by ordering them to kill 
themselves. Through Kawasaki the medium, a soldier expresses his anger and hatred 
towards the emperor for this, saying, “When asked if he’d order us to take our own 
lives, the emperor replies, ‘If you’re going to kill yourselves, go ahead and do it on 
your own. I’ll give you no such order.’”261 By labeling the soldiers as traitors, the 
emperor deprives them the possibility that their deaths are vindicated though 
sacrifice for the state, and by further refusing to order them to kill themselves, he 
forestalled their chances to die honorably at their own hands.262 As I mentioned 
above, in Yūkoku, Takeyama’s seppuku is a chance to restore the dignity and honor of 
suicide that had been stripped from the young soldiers of the coup. In Eirei no Koe, 
the emperor refused to answer to the call for direct imperial rule by the soldiers, and 
in Mishima’s words, “shamefully defiled us as traitors” and “destroyed our great 
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obligation to the imperial land,” thereby allowing the soldiers to die but not to be 
sacrificed.  
Invoking the Christ-like image of betrayed individuals who attempted to 
actualize the kokutai of their hearts, with reference to the crucifix,263 Mishima 
envisions a redemption in which the soldiers’ deaths become sacrifice for the state, 
at which point their restless purgatory-like suspension can end. Yet, for Mishima’s 
soldiers, Hirohito’s postwar “Declaration of Humanity” constitutes further betrayal of 
the cause for which sacrifice is possible. The spirits of kamikaze pilots, destined to 
wander restlessly throughout the islands of Japan, lament that only “one year after 
we had turned our bodies into bullets and were forced to target enemy battle ships 
for the sake of this divine emperor,” the emperor had to declare, “I am a human (chin 
ha ningen de aru).”264 Through their deaths, they, and all soldiers who had died for 
the Empire, had been deified and immortalized as eirei. But, they could only be divine 
if the emperor too is divine, and his renunciation of divinity invalidated their divinity 
as well; it made their deaths worthless. Therefore, they cry through the medium, “His 
Majesty must be a god. From the highest stone of the gods, His Majesty must shine 
down on us. This is the source of our immortality, the source of the glory of our 
deaths, the single thread that connects us to our history.”265 The novella ends with 
the seething anger of the heroic spirits overwhelming the medium, Kawasaki. They 
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finally moan the line, “Why did the emperor become a human?” three times, and 
Kawasaki collapses and dies.  
According to the text of Eirei no Koe, there were two times when the emperor 
ought most to have expressed his divinity, at the time of the 2.26 Incident and at 
Japan’s defeat. In both those times, though, the emperor missed his chance and 
instead became merely human.266 This corresponds exactly to the two moments that 
Hirohito is said to have exercised imperial prerogative, the two times he is said to 
have been essentially political, and hence, bear political responsibility. Thus, in this 
instance, the emperor’s humanity is also tied to his political responsibility and 
accountability; implicitly, the emperor can only be irresponsible if he is divine. 
Insisting on his humanity is not only to bear political responsibility, but also to admit 
that he was wrong.  
Mishima, in representing the desire for the emperor to validate the action 
and spirit of the rebels of the 2.26 Incident, firmly establishes his ideal for the 
emperor system: it must be transcendent and embrace the beauty and purity of the 
spirit of kokutai within the soldiers. The failure to do so—Hirohito’s failure—is to 
cause the decay of the emperor system itself, and to invalidate and bring shame to 
the war and those who died in the emperor’s name. Interestingly, Mishima’s own 
articulation of the decay of the emperor system also offers a fairly substantial 
critique. In fact, the 2.26 Incident and Hirohito’s “Declaration of Humanity” did 
                                                 
266 Ibid, pg. 66.  
256 
 
expose that when tested, the emperor was much more willing to save himself as 
individual than to save the emperor system or its principles. Yasumaru Yoshi, thus, 
refers to Eirei no Koe as, “in a sense, an internal critique (naizaiteki hihan) of the 
emperor system.”267 For all of the failings of Mishima’s concept of the emperor 
system, I believe it is also important to ask what it can contribute to the critique of 
the emperor system in general. In other words, it is important to read Mishima 
against Mishima as well.  
Mishima’s antipathy directed at Hirohito (whether sincere or contrived) is 
unguarded. He disrespects the emperor as individual, but only en route to expressing 
his supreme loyalty for the divine nation of Japan as embodied by the emperor as 
concept. Elsewhere, Mishima has also said that he is revolted by the Showa emperor 
as an individual and that he would like to kill the emperor in the imperial garden 
before committing seppuku himself.268 For Mishima, the concern is not with the 
emperor as individual, but the eternal line of emperors that alone secures continuity 
for Japan, the emperor system, tennōsei; as he said when defining the kokutai above, 
it is the multitude in one, the one in the multitude. When the emperor became 
human, he severed the divine line that ensured continuity from emperor to emperor.  
Moreover, it is not mere continuity of the imperial institution and its loyalists that 
Mishima wants to rescue, but his own sense of continuity. He confesses in his essay, 
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“The  . 6 Incident and Me,” his own sense of loss in the rupture of pre- and post- 
defeat, and why he sought to suture the past by understanding its continuity:  
The history of Showa, due to defeat, is perfectly divided into before and after 
this defeat, and for me who has continued to live through this period, there 
was a strong urge to search out a grounds for personal continuity and 
grounds for logical consistency. It had nothing to do with being a writer. It 
was a raw, natural urge. At that point, what really would snag me up was less 
the new constitution that established the emperor as a "symbol," and more 
the emperor's own "Declaration of Humanity." My suspicion chased me back 
to the 2.26 Incident like a single shadow that I followed until the point where I 
had to write Eirei no Koe. As a result of digging deep into my own aesthetics, I 
needed to know where, at the base, the bedrock of the emperor system 
lurked. It is not something that can be forever avoided.269 
His words suggest a nostalgic sense of loss for the Japanese Empire, a the strong 
desire to rehabilitate the spirit kokutai he had projected onto the soldiers who 
incited the 2.26 coup; he wanted to redeem the emperor system from the defilement 
it suffered under the Hirohito. Because the  . 6 Incident is the “bedrock” of his 
theory of the emperor system, it is important to notice how Mishima systematically 
excises Kita Ikki, the coup’s inspiration, from his representation of it.  
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6.7 Bunka Bōeiron: a “retrogressive” theory of time 
In his essay Bunka Bōeiron (On the Defense of Culture, 1968)270, Mishima 
addresses the notion of the emperor system not as the manifestation of an individual 
emperor, but rather the unbroken chain of emperors that serves to symbolize culture 
and Japan itself as tradition. He, like the narrator of Goshaku no Sake, very clearly 
could distinguish between the emperor as individual and the emperor as institution, 
between the “emperor’s two bodies” as it were. To Mishima, culture is not a thing, 
an object to be passed down and preserved. Japan has distinguished itself among 
nations for this fact. Unlike elsewhere, Japan does not distinguish between original 
and copy, and transmission of technique instead guarantees authenticity. He gives 
the example of Ise Jingu, torn down and rebuilt every twenty years as embodying this 
type of authenticity. Mishima refers to this type of temporal transmission—through 
preservation and destruction—to be Japan’s cultural concept. And, it is none other 
than the emperor that is the ultimate embodiment of it.  
The distinctive character of this type of concept of culture is that the emperor 
of antiquity is the exact same emperor of each generation; the relationship of 
each emperor to Amaterasu is not that of copy to original because they are 
one and the same. This is the distinctive character of the emperor system.271 
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Accordingly, Japan has an “emperor as cultural concept” (bunka gainen toshite no 
tennō), and Mishima contrasts this with the “emperor as a political concept” (seiji 
gainen toshite no tennō). If the emperor as cultural concept represents the unity, 
totality and continuity of Japan and its people, then the emperor as political concept 
would have already failed on those grounds; the war defeat completely redefined the 
political status of the emperor. History for Mishima must be read culturally, and the 
unity of people and emperor can only be conceived in cultural terms because politics 
necessarily implies change. He says,  
The essence of the continuity of cultural life—and its total affirmation—is 
incompatible with the concept of dialectical development or progress. This is 
because Japanese culture, this creative subject (kōzō shutai), transcends the 
limitations of historical conditions—sometimes hiding, sometimes bursting 
out (incidentally, I am not referring to a cultural history that enumerates its 
artifacts)—and forms the unified cultural history of a constant national spirit 
(kokumin seishin).272 
This is the heart of Mishima’s conception of temporality. History and politics operate 
according to a temporal scheme—either dialectical in the case of historical 
materialism or progressive in the case of modernization theory, presumably his two 
targets—that is not compatible with culture. Culture is pure continuity, impervious to 
change. As such, it is not quantifiable; he is not a cultural preservationist that collects 
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and “enumerates” artifacts in cultural storehouses and museums. To do so would be 
to make culture finite and susceptible to time. Due to historical circumstances, it may 
become invisible, may hide, and at other times may “burst out” into full visibility; its 
appearance, though, has no effect of on its existence. To Mishima, culture—Japanese 
culture—simply constantly and continuously exists. It cannot be articulated in terms 
of objects or that which is objectifiable, either; culture must be absolute continuity of 
spirit.  
 Mishima runs into logical trouble, though, by conceiving this totality of 
continuous culture as subject or agent (shutai). Shutai, as practical agent, itself 
implies the ability to create and change history, which Mishima even suggests 
through the term “creativity” (kōzō), or poiesis. However, if culture is continuous, 
and outside temporality of progress and dialectical movement (including violent 
interruption), such change initiated by the practical and creative agent—even as a 
cultural totality—is not possible. His articulation of culture totality as a living agent is 
largely an adoption and adaptation of Watsuji’s philosophy, and runs into many of 
the same problems that Watsuji does, most importantly the false assumption that 
the consciousness of Japan as a national community existed since antiquity, outside 
of its fundamentally modern production. Like Watsuji, Mishima wants to deny the 
political nature of the emperor, and has to portray the emperor’s modern political 
function since the Meiji Era as an aberration and perversion of emperor’s cultural 
signification. Watsuji’s separation of state and nation, which correspond respectively 
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to politics and culture, is crucial for Mishima, and he quotes from Watsuji’s postwar 
debate with Sasaki Kōichi (see the end of Chapter Two).273 In following Watsuji, 
Mishima is eager to distance himself from restorationists of the postwar who were 
eager to return sovereignty directly to the emperor as head of state, as supreme 
commander (sōransha).  
 At the point where Mishima employs Watsuji to extract politics from his own 
theory of emperor system, though, he smuggles politics back by insisting on the 
emperor’s revolutionary potential. This is where his theory of temporarily completely 
falls apart. First, I will explain Mishima’s position: If corrupt elements defile the 
relationship between emperor and people, the emperor can work in concert with the 
people (much like in Kita’s vision) to restore their direct connection through military 
action. Mishima assiduously avoids reference to political or historical circumstances 
that may lie behind any desire to seek the emperor’s assistance, shifting focus to the 
aesthetic value of elegance (miyabi), the embodiment of courtly grace. He says,  
‘Miyabi’ is the culture glory of the court, and the longing towards it, but in a 
time of emergency, the form of terrorism was even considered ‘miyabi.’ In 
other words, the emperor as cultural concept was not simply on the side of 
state power and order; he also extended his hand to the side of disorder. If 
state power forced the separation of country and people, the emperor that is 
cultural concept would be utilized as the revolutionary principle that attempts 
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to restore (kaifuku) the ‘inseparability of the country and people.’ Responding 
to the imperial wishes of Emperor Komei, the righteous warriors of the 
Sakuradamon Incident carried out a ‘ray of elegance’ (hitosuji no miyabi), and 
to the extent that the cultural form was not violated, the coup on behalf of 
the emperor should have received approval, but the Showa emperor system 
that adhered to the form of western constitutional monarchy had lost the 
power to understand the ‘miyabi’ of the 2.26 incident.274 
To Mishima, the emperor perverted his status by acting in a political, not cultural, 
capacity; the Showa Emperor had failed to see the beauty of the coup, and failed to 
actualize the revolutionary potential of the emperor as cultural concept. His 
reference to the Sakuradamon Incident of 1860, in which loyalists from Mito 
assassinated a powerful advisor to the shogunate, Ii Naosuke, is meant to illuminate 
a time when the emperor still had a firm grasp of miyabi, which would become lost 
by the beginning of the Meiji Era, less than a decade later; to Mishima, the essence of 
the emperor as cultural concept had never made itself manifest in modern Japanese 
history.275 
Whereas Kita Ikki’s completely modern theory that saw the emperor and 
people working together as organs to install a reorganized political structure 
(remember the very legalistic language of his Reorganization Plan), Mishima viewed 
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the incident inspired by Kita’s book as failure of the emperor to carry out the proper 
transmission of timeless courtly elegance. For Kita, precisely those antiquated and 
anachronistic practices of the court ritual made up the “decrepit state” that his 
Reorganization sought to rectify, but for Mishima, the severing of those very 
antiquated practices led to the tragic failure; to him, 2.26 was a merely a stage play in 
which the lights were turned off on the actors. However, by stripping the attempted 
coup of its politic core and aestheticizing politics—a trend of fascism that Walter 
Benjamin articulated in his “The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical 
Reproducibility”—Mishima in effect conceals the very political nature of individual 
subjectification through aesthetic attachment to the nation-state. Whereas Kita’s 
wants to expose the modern nature of the emperor system, Mishima tries to hide it, 
to sweep it back under the rug.  
 However, Mishima fails to demonstrate how a revolutionary emperor does 
not also become implicated in the revolutionary or dialectical temporality that he 
firmly denounced above. As we learn from Walter Benjamin, the understanding of 
history from the standpoint of revolution (that of “materialist historiography”) blasts 
open the continuum of history based on progressive time, or “empty, homogeneous” 
time. Revolutionary temporality thus resists history based on the chronological 
development through time in which violence is flattened and concealed by the 
constant and steady accumulation of facts and details, where time is measured 
evenly and progressively. In distinction to this, the materialist can thus reach back 
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into the past to find configurations (what he calls “monads”) that can be sublated—
simultaneously destroyed and preserved—for the revolutionary potential of the time 
of now.276 Mishima’s conception of cultural temporality does not even reach the level 
of empty, homogeneous time; there is only renewal of the same, and no accounting 
for difference; the original and the copy are the same. Thus, when Mishima discusses 
the destruction and rebuilding of the Ise Shrine277—his favorite analogue for the 
emperor as cultural concept—this has nothing to do with sublation; it is not 
destroyed and preserved at the same time, only preserved as a replica of the same. 
Since cultural continuity for him is absolute, his understanding of the temporality of 
revolution must be radically heterogeneous to either Benjamin’s or Kita’s. Revolution 
for Mishima can only mean the preservation of culture, the most corrupt and 
impoverished definition of revolution possible. Far from the Kita’s progressive or 
evolutionary history (shinkateki), Mishima’s is retrogressive (gyakushinteki 逆進), or, 
to pun on the term, traitorous (gyakushinteki 逆臣的). 
6.8 Culture as the militant defense of culture  
 Despite the utter incongruity of including revolution—a temporality of 
rupture and interruption—within his conception of the emperor as cultural concept, 
it points to what Mishima really has in mind: the militant defense of “culture” is 
culture itself. This militancy can be terroristic, revolutionary, or otherwise. It is no 
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coincidence that Mishima uses the most militant terminology for “defense,” bōei, a 
term used mostly in connection to armed forces. Mishima concludes his text with his 
solution for restoring the emperor as cultural concept and returning the emperor to 
the center of the national cultural community (kokumin no bunka kyōdōtai): the 
emperor must be able to bestow military honors. He calls this the revival of the 
“imperial privilege of giving honors” (eiyo taiken). He summarizes his position during 
his teach-in:  
The imperial privilege of giving honors is not merely about the Order of 
Cultural Merit or honors to civilians in general, but about the Jieitai being 
recognized by the nation through military honors (gunteki eiyo); this must be 
a system in which the emperor is directly the supreme commander (sōran) of 
the Jieitai. If that doesn’t happen, democracy in Japan cannot become a truly 
indigenous democracy. This is the form I’m insisting on.278 
Mishima would rather see the emperor as arbiter of what constitutes military honor 
or glory much more than he would like to see the emperor as arbiter of poetic 
refinement as evidenced by his judging of utakai hajime, etc. Furthermore, he is 
careful to insist that this would not revive the emperor as a political concept. The 
emperor would not be a political sovereign of head of state (genshu). Yet, he would 
become the supreme commander (sōran) of the Jietai. It is incredibly hard to see 
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how Mishima could designate the emperor an apolitical “supreme commander” 
(sōran) with any logical consistency. Watsuji’s own articulation of the emperor as 
expression of the unity of Japan’s cultural community, the centerpiece of Mishima’s 
argument, had to adamantly reject the notion that the emperor throughout history 
was even a “supreme commander.” It was merely an aberration that began with 
Meiji and ended at Japan’s defeat in 1945. However, for Mishima, it is crucial; it is 
what makes Japan’s democracy distinct from other democracies. This is what is at 
stake: whether Japan’s democracy is “indigenous” or not. Mishima, through such 
analysis, expresses the true nature of nationality and Japan’s emperor system: it is 
identical everywhere. His entire treatise on the emperor as cultural concept is a mere 
reflection of the deep anxiety that just maybe Japan’s postwar emperor system has 
nothing to distinguish it from other forms of nationality.  
 Mishima finds one tiny example of something distinctive within Japanese 
culture that he believes can rescue the emperor system from this undifferentiation: 
the purported ability for the emperor to discern the elegance (miyabi) of a violent 
confrontation, and in particular, one that ends in seppuku. Throughout Bunka 
Bōeiron, he refuses to define culture because it means only bushido. Supposedly, in 
Mishima’s fantasy, the emperor would designate and bestow military honors in 
complete alignment and affirmation of traditional Japanese culture; this would be 




 With one final reconfiguration of the postwar debate on the emperor system, 
Mishima alters the phrasing of both Kanamori Tokujirō and Watsuji. For Watsuji, the 
emperor was the expression of the totality of cultural community precisely because 
he was always respected throughout history. He devotes an entire book to the 
attempt demonstrate that the “Japanese nation” has always possessed “reverence 
for the emperor” (sonnō). Likewise, Kanamori repeatedly articulates that the 
emperor is the “center of affection” (akogare no chūshin) of the Japanese nation. Yet, 
for Mishima, the emperor is the “center of honor” (tennō ha eiyo no chūshin).  
6.9 Mishima’s Orientalism 
Bunka Bōeiron is rather spectacular in its ability to amalgamate and assimilate 
various theories of the emperor system into Mishima’s own theory. As I have argued, 
he adopted Kita Ikki’s notion of the revolutionary potential of the emperor while 
ignoring the implications of such an incompatible temporality, and excised any 
political influence from the event of 2.26, including and especially the emperor-organ 
theory; he used Watsuji’s thought while sneaking politics back into it by having the 
emperor be a “supreme commander,” even though such a role included no 
sovereignty or responsibility; and he took Kanamori’s notion of “affection” and 
turned it into “honor.”  
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In his reading of Robert Bellah’s 1965 essay, “Japan’s Cultural Identity: Some 
Reflections on the Work of Watsuji Tetsuro,”279 Naoki Sakai shows how incredibly 
useful Watsuji’s thought could be within American and European scholarship for 
confirming and fulfilling Orientalistic fantasies about Japan, opposing Japan’s 
“tradition” and “particularism” to the United State’s supposed “modernity” and 
“universalism.” Bellah’s essay, a highly favorable reading of the mostly the same text 
quoted by Mishima in Bunka Bōeiron (Watsuji’s response to Sasaki), according to 
Sakai, “accomplished its mission” of ideological warfare during the Cold War era by 
“accommodating the work of Watsuji Tetsurō within the general framework of 
national character study, as well as promoting Watsuji as a representative thinker of 
modern Japan who ‘western’ readers could appreciate within the typical Orientalist 
framework.”280 I believe that Mishima’s use Watsuji in Bunka Bōeiron, only three 
years after Bellah’s essay was published, served the exact same function. It is careful 
to craft a nativist, culturalist Japan and its “indigenous democracy” in the image of 
foreign desire; it is not inconceivable that Mishima himself had read Bellah’s essay.  
However, in terms of fulfilling the other’s Orientalist fantasy of Japan within 
Bunka Bōeiron, use of Watsuji pales in comparison two other texts that backdrop 
Mishima’s work: Nitobe Inazō’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan, 1900, and Ruth 
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Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946.281 These two texts, both 
written in English, were aimed at presenting an idealized and essential conception of 
a timeless Japanese culture to a non-Japanese, “Western” audience, and asserting an 
image of Japanese masculinity that is alternative to that of the “Western” male. 
Nitobe begins his Bushido with the following:  
Chivalry is a flower no less indigenous to the soil of Japan than its emblem, 
the cherry blossom; nor is it a dried-up specimen of an antique virtue 
preserved in the herbarium of our history. It is still a living object of power 
and beauty among us; and if it assumes no tangible shape or form, it not the 
less scents the moral atmosphere, and makes us aware that we are still under 
its potent spell.282  
This quote includes nearly every element contained within Mishima’s “emperor as a 
cultural concept”; is it indigenous, living, and not tangible; it is not a dried-up and 
preserved specimen, exactly how Mishima critiqued the decay of Japanese culture 
turning into dead objects on museum shelves, preservationist; most importantly, the 
indigenous warrior is paired with the indigenous flower. Nitobe’s image of Japanese 
culture, bushido, as sold to a foreign audience, furthermore, corresponds perfectly to 
Ruth Benedict’s 1946 study, which only confirms Nitobe’s formulation. The two texts, 
one by a Japanese author and the other by an American but both directed at the 
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“west,” function within Bunka Bōeiron to mutually reinforce Japan’s unique cultural 
essence. In this sense, Mishima’s text is itself fundamentally Orientalist in its premise 
and execution.  
 The Chrysanthemum and the Sword283 was an anthropological study of 
national behavioral types commissioned in 1944 and largely based on interviews with 
second and third generation Japanese-Americans.284 It sought to “answer a multitude 
of questions about our enemy, Japan,” and explain “the Japanese” as perfect 
embodiments of contradiction itself; any explanation of the “cultivation of 
chrysanthemums” must be complemented by explanation of the “cult of the sword.” 
She says,  
The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive, 
both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, 
submissive and resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, 
brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways.285 
Mishima accepts Benedicts thesis completely without question. Japanese culture was 
for him the perfect synthesis of such opposites. This duality of the “chrysanthemum 
and sword” (kiku to katana) is the form that pierces through all things Japanese 
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(nihonteki na mono), from Tale of Genji to contemporary novels, the Manyosh  to 
waka, the Buddha at Chusonji to modern sculpture, flower arranging, tea, kendo, 
judo, from kabuki to yakuza and chambara movies, from Zen to military strategy.286 
However, to Mishima, it was the Occupation that severed the chrysanthemum from 
the sword; it kept everything it deemed “safe”—flower arrangement, tea 
ceremonies—while stripping Japan of any hint of violence, even banning chambara 
sword-fight films and “vengeance” in Kabuki plays.287 This severing of this “eternal 
linkage,” Mishima says, has turned Japanese culture into something feminine and 
emotionally slovenly. Thus, the task is to reunite the “chrysanthemum and the 
sword” in order to restore the integrity of Japan’s cultural community.  
Mishima wants no less than to restore the Japan of Ruth Benedict’s fantasy. It 
is a perfect example of Sakai’s notion of the “schema of co-figuring,” a never-ending 
circuit that constructs difference between nations, and that is deeply tied to 
knowledge production within the Area Studies model; in 1975, Ivan Morris would 
attempt to confirm Mishima’s central thesis—that Japanese culture is the resolution 
of death in battle—in his The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan, 
projecting the same image of desire back to Japan by connecting the death of 
legendary Yamato Takeru with the kamikaze pilots of World World II, giving the 
impression that bushido, the code of the warrior, is an eternal characteristic of 
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Japanese culture.288 Of course, this can only be done retrospectively. Neither 
Mishima nor Morris account for the fact that even Yamamato Tsunetomo’s 
Hagakure, a product of the Edo Period, did not describe a systematic code already in 
place, but rather, prescribed an ideal based on the philosophy of one retainer that 
applied only to the samurai class, a book that would only gain currency in the modern 
era for the purpose of this retrospective construction of a Japan that had never 
existed. Bushido was merely a modern invention, primarily by Nitobe, to project an 
image of nationality that he perceived Japan to lack in comparison to European 
nations, an image that applied not only to warriors but culture as totality. Precisely 
because Bushido: The Soul of Japan was able to depict a national culture within Japan 
that made it different from—and thus measurable against—an idealized perception 
of “Western” nationality, it became wildly popular within Japan after it was 
translated from the English into Japanese.  
In 1912, Basil Hall Chamberlain, professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo, 
treats both “Mikado-worship” and bushido as parts of a systematic attempt to invent 
a new religion in Japan.289 To him, bushido was so modern that it had never shown up 
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in the writings of any major Japanologist because “Bushido was unknown until a 
decade or two ago!” The term itself had not even appeared in either native or foreign 
dictionaries prior to 1900. In what can only be a direct attack on Nitobe, he says, 
“Chivalrous individuals of course existed in Japan, as in all countries at every period; 
but Bushido, as an institution or a code of rules, has never existed. The accounts 
given of it have been fabricated out of whole cloth, chiefly for foreign consumption.” 
[my italics] Mishima’s conception of Japanese culture—and Mishima desperately 
sought global recognition through the Nobel Prize for literature—was primarily 
intended for a foreign audience, which could, in turn, confirm and validate as truth 
his fantasy. In this sense, Ivan Morris played a necessary role in sustaining the bi-
lateral continuum. We can imagine an endless game of volleyball in which the 
objective is merely to keep the ball (“Japanese culture”) in air as long as possible; 
Nitobe serves to Benedict, who returns to Watsuji, who dives and punts the ball over 
the net to Bellah, who spikes it to Mishima, who taps it back to Morris. It is critical, 
therefore, to find a referee who can call the game for what it is: foul play. As a 
practical issue, it is most important to teach against Mishima and Morris in colleges 
and universities in the U.S., Japan, and anywhere that serves as site of complicity in 
                                                                                                                                            




the reproduction of the emperor system as something “unique” and “particular” to 
Japan.290   
Mishima’s Orientalism is neatly summarized in a conversation between  e 
Kenzaburō and Kazuo Ishigoro. Ishigoro says, “My suspicion is that the image of 
Mishima in the West confirms certain stereotypical images of Japanese people for 
the West,” to which  e replies,  
Mishima’s entire life, certainly including his death by seppuku, was a kind of 
performance designed to present the image of an archetypal Japanese… It 
was the superficial image of a Japanese as seen from a European view, a 
fantasy. Mishima acted out that image just as it was.291  
He continues by saying that Said conceived of “orientalism” to refer to Europeans’ 
false views of Asia, but that Mishima thought that those same views held by 
European were truth: “He said that your image of me is me.” Therefore, if we are to 
make a distinction between foreign essentialist views of Japan and Japanese 
essentialist view of Japan (a fraught distinction, nonetheless), we can refer to 
Mishima in the same way that Sakai refers to Watsuji, as an “Orientalist native.”  
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7.1 Relevance to today 
The greatest testament to the effectiveness of the invention of the postwar 
emperor system is that, despite its transformations and further reinventions since 
1945, it remains intact in a form much like how it was conceived. In fact, the greater 
the temporal distance from its origin, the greater its capacity to conceal its invented 
nature, and to seem natural. The postwar Constitution is still unrevised, having 
already lasted over ten years longer than its predecessor, the Constitution of the 
Empire of Japan. The most contentious part of the Constitution, Article Nine (which 
renounces the sovereign right to wage war), has been at constant threat of revision 
by the Liberal Democratic Party, which believes that Japan should be a “normal 
country” with a “normal” military. However, popular support for Article Nine has not 
yet relented to their efforts.292 
 Strange paradoxes are at play within the different positions. For example, 
arguments by the LDP (and the Right in general) are often premised on the rejection 
of the “imposed” nature of the Constitution on Japan by the Occupation; and yet, 
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their arguments are perfectly in line with the perpetual continuity of the mutual 
Security Treaty, which continues to be renewed every ten years, thus sustaining the 
U.S. military presence in Japan. In other words, their desire for revision is actually a 
rejection of the U.S. in rhetoric alone; it could not be more complicitous with U.S. 
empire, and complete compliance with U.S. wishes since the 1950s that Japan 
change course from pacifist to militant.293 Those that support Article Nine are caught 
in another paradox altogether: their demand that Japan forever renounce war 
conceals the power that operates behind the façade of “pacifism”; it, too, is 
compatible with the U.S. occupation of Japan. Unfortunately, those that do call for 
pacifism and unilateral reject the “emperor system” and U.S. empire, such as 
Okinawan activists, are largely marginalized by mainstream modes of representation.  
 The fact is that emperor system is stuck in the exact place it was in 1960. It 
embodies the tensions of democratization and remilitarization and everything in 
between: in practice (not theory), the emperor is the symbol of disunity. The 
invention of the postwar emperor system aimed to resolve all such tensions, but 
there has been no such reconciliation. The tensions continue as tension, as 
irreconcilable differences. I believe that the postwar emperor system has been the 
greatest obstruction to reconciliation because it has not allowed Japan or the U.S. to 
honestly face the mutually lived past.   
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 This is why it is so important to turn back to writers like Nakano Shigeharu 
and Sakaguchi Ango, who recognized in the immediate postwar how the 1946 
invention of the emperor system already hindered the ability to honestly confront 
the recent past. They recognized how easily the “human” emperor was being 
sacralized into a new object of worship that fit a democratic model. In demonstrating 
the true nature of the postwar emperor system—that it was a complete invention 
that disavowed its wartime past in order to conceal it—they exposed it as contingent 
and arbitrary. To them, a true human emperor would be treated just like everyone 
else: no special treatment, no symbolic status, no being held captive, and at the same 
time, no free pass from bearing responsibility for the war. Even more, they 
recognized how representation of the emperor within the media and academic and 
political spheres reproduced the emperor system in ways that the government could 
never have done alone. In that sense, their writings were ahead of their times, 
predictive of what was to come.  
 Every aspect of the emperor system that they problematized continues to this 
day. Nakano’s narrator in Goshaku no Sake points to how the emperor system kept 
the entire imperial family imprisoned; as a pure expression of politics, their lines are 
scripted, their moves choreographed, their images controlled. The current state of 
affairs is even more insidious; the bodies of the wives of heirs to the crown are 
enslaved to the pressures to reproduce male heirs. The mental health of Masako, the 
wife of Crown Prince Naruhito, should be evidence enough. Her mental fragility for 
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the pressures of royal wifely responsibilities, and inability to produce a male heir 
(she’s given birth to one female child, Aiko), is compounded by mass media tracking 
the saga in real-time, reporting on Masako’s mental state and even Aiko’s acting out 
in school. There seems to be a media obsession over the details of the lives of the 
imperial family, and yet, little scrutiny of the institution itself. Even the birth of a 
male heir in 2006 by the wife of Prince Akishino, Princess Kiko, served to foreclose 
growing debate over the outdated nature of primogeniture. The imperial family 
“symbolizes” modern democracy while literally “embodying” the male takeover of 
female reproductive organs in order to sustain it.  
This type of over-exposure but lack of critical reflection is intimately tied to 
what Nakano’s narrator recognizes as the inability to separate the emperor from the 
emperor system, the inability to separate the individual from the institution. My 
suspicion is that the further we are from World War II, the weaker the sense in Japan 
that an “emperor system” continues to exist. However, many fail to realize that 
insofar as people continue to treat the emperor, imperial family, the imperial palace, 
the imperial regalia, and all related objects as sacred and untouchable, they 
reproduce a sense of nationality by imagining a collective relation to them. In other 
words, as we focus on the all-too-human lives of the individuals of the imperial family 
without questioning the entire structure of representation that sustains their 
captivity, they cease to be individuals themselves. As we learn from Sakaguchi, they 
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can only start to be individuals—can only start to be human—if we deconstruct the 
multitude of ways they are discursively reproduced.  
7.2 New expressions of collectivity 
 Nakano also points us to the fiction of collective guilt or “mass repentance” 
(ichioku zange), and how it was deployed as a means for the government to deflect 
personal responsibility away from the military leaders (and, of course, the emperor 
himself) and onto the nation as a whole. This notion of collective guilt must be 
considered as the flipside of another narrative that coexists with it: collective 
victimhood.294 In actuality, for the production of nationality, it is immaterial whether 
people are depicted as victim or victimizer, guilty or innocent, as long as the 
“collectivity” is not questioned. As Takahashi Tetsuya has pointed out, there is little 
room for the voices of those who are systematically excluded from victimhood, such 
as the non-citizen/non-national who died during the war.295 I believe such narratives 
of collectivity have found more recent articulation in the form of self-restraint 
(jishuku). Used to describe the collective effort by businesses and agencies to 
                                                 
294 Incidentally, America contributed greatly to this discourse through what can only 
be the greatest unrecognized war crime of all time, the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not to mention the devastatingly comprehensive aerial 
firebomb attacks on most major cities. For more on victimhood, and the 
identification of even victims of those bombings, hibakusha, with Hirohito himself, 
see: Takahashi, Tetsuya. “The Emperor Showa Standing at Ground Zero: on the (Re-
)Configuration of National Memory of the Japanese People.” Japan Forum, 15.  003, 
pg. 3-14.  
295 On this note, the efforts at the Hiroshima Peace Museums to remember those 
minorities who died in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must be applauded.  
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demonstrate their deference to Emperor Hirohito as he lie on his deathbed in 1989, 
jishuku refers to a supposed internalized and “collective” sense of mourning 
expressed by the voluntary suspension of pleasure, celebration, and even profit. 
However, there was nothing sincere or natural about it, as the media, businesses, 
and other institutions scrambled to determine what constituted the proper code of 
decorum. It was a prime example of the type of censorship that cannot be 
represented by law. Companies dictated the rules to their employees under the guise 
of “loyalty to the emperor,” but as Watanabe Osamu has pointed out, it was merely 
an opportunity to enforce discipline and allegiance to the company itself: “It had 
nothing to do with loyalty to the tennō and everything to do with loyalty to the 
firm.”296  
Jishuku was revived as a term again only recently after the triple disaster of 
tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear meltdown that began on March 11,  011. “Self-
restraint” meant solidarity for the victims, and a refusal to celebrate during the 
tragedy; it also meant conservation of energy. Yet, we must also interrogate who 
proscribed such behavior, and what fault it concealed. We can connect it to the 
internalization of collective guilt for the lifestyle and consumerist behavior that 
required heavy electrical usage to warrant nuclear energy, thus concealing the 
                                                 
296 Watanabe Osamu (1989): The sociology of Jishuku and Kichō: the death of the 
Shōwa Tennō as a reflection of the structure of contemporary Japanese society, 




corrupt relationship and lack of transparency between government and big energy. It 
also provided another opportunity for Akihito and Michiko to be “among the 
people”; they “shared the pain” with displaced victims of Fukushima by visiting 
shelters. We need new attempts to connect these representations of the emperor—
the very reproduction of the emperor system—with the historical significance of 
“self-restraint” as a call for collective self-censorship on anything deemed 
“disrespectful” toward the dying emperor. To me, jishuku is none other than a 
renewed prohibition on “disrespectful” representation of the emperor, fukei.  
7.3 Chysanthemum Taboo in the Red, White, and Blue 
We must also remember that the U.S. complicity in the production of the 
emperor system goes far beyond the unilateral decision by Douglas MacArthur to 
protect Hirohito from any war accountability. Japan studies experts in America, too, 
have chronically engaged in their own jishuku, their own self-restraint, when it comes 
to critical—and perhaps more importantly, theoretical—analyses of the emperor 
system. In fact, the sole focus in U.S. scholarship on the emperor as individual has 
blinded the recognition that something ideological might be at play. I will give one 
concrete example of the complicity of Japan experts to censor critical 
representations of the emperor system:  
In February of 1989, one month after the death of Hirohito, PBS (Public 
Broadcasting Service) aired a BBC documentary called “Hirohito: Behind the Myth.” 
The documentary was a strong indictment of Hirohito for the personal involvement 
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in planning the attack on Pearl Harbor among other things. A handful of Japan 
scholars had called for the film to be cancelled.297 Edwin Reischauer called it 
“nonsense,” claiming, “No emperor of Japan had any real power for many hundreds 
of years. It’s bad taste and so incorrect that it shouldn’t be shown”; John Toland 
referred to the film as “Japanese-bashing”; Carol Gluck called it “biased, 
irresponsible, and wrongheaded,” but, according to the article, she “stopped short of 
calling for its cancellation.”298 
Several weeks later, Norma Field published an editorial in the New York Times 
on the “dismaying… spectacle of Japan experts lobbying against the broadcast” of the 
documentary.299 To Field, it was not a question about the emperor’s war 
responsibility or even the accuracy of the film; “The issue is whether crucial questions 
on Japan's role in World War II are to be permitted free and open debate. It is 
astonishing to have to make the point that no group of experts is entitled to veto 
power over public access to the materials for historical inquiry.” It was a time for 
debate, and Japan experts in America were functioning to suppress it.  
                                                 
297 Honan, William H. “A Program on Hirohito’s War Guilt Denounced.” New York 
Times, February 6, 1989. [http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/06/arts/a-program-on-
hirohito-s-war-guilt-is-denounced.html] 
298 Ibid. For full disclosure, I was unable to get a copy of the film through interlibrary 
loan or PBS websites or otherwise, which attests to the fact that the complaint were 
effective. However, I cannot judge the film on its merits. It is still troubling to me that 
Gluck was among the scholars denouncing the film.  
299 Field, Norma. “On Eve of Funeral, Hirohito War Role Needs Airing.” New York 
Times, February 23, 1989.  
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Sadly, this speaks to a larger trend; censorship in the U.S. has come more in 
the form of self-restraint than it has in active suppression. Therefore, we must probe 
into the similarities between the “blackout” of representation of the emperor that 
has been ongoing (in evolving ways) since the early 1960s within Japan, and the 
parallel movements within the United States. We need to return to Fukazawa 
Shichirō’s Fūryū Mutan, and ask why mention of it—and the heated debates (ronsō) 
surrounding it as text and event—are all but absent today. We might also ask: how 
has Right-wing terrorism in Japan been enabled by the silence of U.S. Japan scholars 
on the emperor? What it at stake for the Japan expert in the U.S. in protecting the 
emperor? Is there still fear now that an emperor-less Japan would mean, as 
Seidensticker worried, a communist Japan? Is there a latent belief that, in some way, 
the emperor system itself sustains the existence and relevance of the field?  
 The problem is that, within English-language scholarship, there has been 
almost no attention to the debate of the emperor system (tennōsei-ron). There are 
few notable exceptions, but the overwhelming focus on biography has shifted 
attention away from question of the formation of nationality and ideology, and the 
debates that have gone on since the postwar period. While this dissertation has not 
focused on those debates per se, I do take as my object the “postwar emperor 
system” and its representation in literature as one way to enter into them. Unlike 
many of scholars of “emperor system ideology,” I’m not interested in diagnosing 
Japan’s fascism by limiting discussion to what occurred as a gradual build-up from the 
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mid-Meiji period, culminating with the “fascist period” of 1937-1945, even though I 
have no intention of denying that Japan was fascist by some vague notion that there 
is a distinction between “ultranationalism” and “fascism” either.  
7.4 Tennōsei theory 
 The debate over the emperor system in Japan, while certainly needing to see 
the light of day in U.S. scholarship, is not without its problems. Some scholars have 
attempted to anthropologically trace the origins of the Japanese emperor to its 
nativist (and ancient) origins among marginalized groups within Japan, thus hiding 
the fundamentally modern formation of the Meiji Emperor, reinforcing the myth of 
its “authentic” particularly, and projecting an ahistorical notion of “Japan” into 
antiquity. Yamaguchi Masao, for example, writes of a parallel structure between the 
emperor class and the excluded (untouchable) class; both classes are nomadic and 
exist largely outside of society. By no coincidence, both classes descend from the 
marebito, deity-strangers. Yamaguchi also hopes to demonstrate that throughout 
Japanese history, the “dual structure of Japanese emperorship”—the emperor as 
head of state, on one hand, and chief performer of rituals—been constant, that the 
“system remained virtually intact even after the Meiji Restoration.”300  
I’m most troubled, however, by Yamaguchi’s tendency—which is persistent 
within “emperor system” discourse—to frame the emperor system as duality. I have 
                                                 
300 Yamaguchi Masao. “The Dual Structure of Japanese Emperorship.” Current 
Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 4, Supplement: An Anthropological Profile of Japan (Aug. - 
Oct., 1987), pg. S5-S11.  
285 
 
mentioned Kuno Osamu’s division of “exoteric” (kenkyō) and “esoteric” (mikkyō), in 
which the former refers to the way that the government bureaucrats conceived of 
the emperor internally as limited in power, and the latter refers to how they 
promoted his image publically, as absolute and inviolable. In her book, The Dual-
Image of the Japanese Emperor, Takeda Kiyoko sees a duality developing over time: it 
started (importing Kuno’s theory) as Itō Hirobumi’s constitutional theory that the 
emperor was a limited monarch to the politicians but a transcendent sovereign to the 
people. Then, she says, Watsuji grasped the duality as a central figure of a political 
system versus as symbol of cultural identity.301 Finally, Mishima also interpreted the 
emperor as a cultural force with “two contradictory, yet coexisting elements: 
‘gentility’ and ‘terrorism,’ or in other terms, ‘sacred’ and ‘profane,’ or ‘peaceful spirit’ 
(nigimitama) and ‘violent spirit’ (aramitama).”302 Likewise, historian Stephen Large 
notes the concurrent “impulses” for portraying the emperor into the 1960s “as a 
popular and democratic constitutional monarch close to the people” and “as a 
venerable neonationalist icon of state authority and control.”303 The emperor was, 
“like Janus, depicted with two faces, one looking forward and one looking backward.”  
Even Takeuchi Yoshimi, who tried to locate the possibility for “resistance” 
(teikō) to the emperor system through art, ends up theorizing its dualistic nature of 
                                                 
301 Takeda Kiyoko. The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor. New York: NYU Press, 
1988.  
302 Ibid, pg. 3.  
303 Large, Stephen. Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography. New 
York: Routledge, 1992, pg. 162.  
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embodying “violence” and “benevolence.” In his famous essay, “Power and Art” 
(kenryoku to geijutsu), he too makes reference to Kuno’s division of “exoteric” and 
“esoteric” as the equivalence of “façade” (tatemae) and “true feelings” (honne). To 
him, the Communist Party to him was destined to fail because it only grasped half of 
the equation of the emperor system, only the violent half. In doing so, the Party 
treated it like a thing. He says,   
Within the emperor system, violence and its flipside, “benevolence” (jinji), are 
present at the same time. It won’t merely beat you on the head—it will pet 
your head gently with the other hand. It’s impossible to grasp the essence of 
the emperor system without probing into the fiction of this benevolence.304 
Even though I am very sympathetic to Takeuchi’s analysis in the essay, its proximity 
to Mishima’s conception of the dualistic emperor, and even more, its resemblance to 
Ruth Benedict’s Chrysanthemum and the Sword, is deeply troubling. I worry that to 
speak of the emperor system’s dualistic “essence” is to project into it eternity, and to 
make it a constant presence in a timeless Japan. Duality alone is not sufficient for 
explaining the very arbitrariness of the emperor system in its present form.  
As I argued in Chapter Two, there was an ideological dimension to the 
depiction of the postwar emperor in dualistic terms: the emperor was depicted as 
having “two bodies” in the postwar too, but only to give the illusion of continuity. 
                                                 
304 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Kenryoku to Geijutsu.” Kōza gendai geijutsu. Tokyo: Keisō 
Shobō, 1958, pg. 3 .  
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The bodies were new, but the dual-bodied nature of the postwar emperor system 
was not. My worry is that the tendency within the discourse of the “emperor system 
debates” reproduces the image of the “emperor’s two bodies” even as it attempts to 
expose it as fiction.  
Theorization of “emperor system” need not develop according to a trajectory 
that always maintains these dualities, these “two bodies.” In that sense, I agree with 
Fujitani when he says, “It is impossible to respond to the question ‘what is tennōsei?’ 
because there is no such unchanging thing.”305 As important as it is to historicize the 
emperor system itself, we also need to historicize the debate over the emperor 
system and engage with it in new ways. Unfortunately, in the U.S. there is almost no 
engagement whatsoever. Therefore, one way is to bring it to the U.S.  
How can we break out of the model that wants to conceive of the emperor 
system as duality? How can we rethink theories of the emperor system without 
reproducing it? My fear is that to speak of dualities is to fall into Watsuji’s 
philosophical trap; you must concede that the emperor (system) is that which unifies 
all opposing views, and reconciles all conflict. One alternative is to stress that the 
emperor system only works in the opposite direction: the emperor is the symbol of 
disunity.  
                                                 
305 Fujitani, Takashi. "Electronic Pageantry and Japan's 'Symbolic Emperor.' The 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 51. Nov. 1992, pg. 828.  
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This is most certainly the case in Japan, where the emperor is one among 
many reference points for tearing down the opposition. However, one need only look 
beyond the “love match” between the U.S. and Japan, the “bi-lateral narcissism” that 
excludes other Asians from the conversation,306 to realize the emperor’s contentious 
existence today in the world. Responding to Japan’s nationalistic chest-thumping 
over the disputed islands of Takeshima/Dokto last year, South Korean President Lee 
Myung-Bak brought up the emperor: "Although (the emperor) wants to visit South 
Korea, I have told Japan he can only do so if he visits (the graves of) those who died 
in independence movements (against Japan) and apologizes to them from his 
heart.”307  
7.5 Let’s own it 
I have one final proposal: since, as Mishima shows us so beautifully by 
example, the emperor system is a co-production of the U.S. and Japan, and the 
writers and scholars and media from both countries who support it through ceaseless 
reproduction. Therefore, rather than continue the cycle of co-figuring nationality by 
insisting that Japan’s emperor system is indigeneous and particular, I think that the 
U.S. needs to take ownership. It’s not Japan’s emperor system; it’s ours. We share it.  
                                                 
306 Harootunian, Harry and Naoki Sakai. "Dialogue: Japan Studies and Cultural 
Studies.” positions, Fall 1999 7(2), pg. 605.  
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It’s almost shocking that the U.S. has not repeated its emperor system 
production throughout the world every time it undertakes regime change in different 
countries given its proven effectiveness in Japan. Instead, in Iraq for but one 
example, the U.S. carried out a form of “emperor system abolition” by beheading 
Saddam Hussein. I propose that we refer to U.S. attempts to support corrupt regimes 
throughout the world as “maintaining the kokutai” or “emperor system” and its 
attempts to overthrow them as “emperor system abolition.” Such efforts are truly 
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